

James Odo Lay
 Andrew Yves LeMoal
 Edward Jones Leonard
 William Gilmore Lephien
 George William Lester, Jr.
 James Frederick Link
 Nicholas Arthur Liontas
 William Arthur Lusby, Jr.
 Richard Curtis Lyons
 Victor Kingsland Macomber
 Jean Maurice Marchand
 Joseph Aloysius Markum, Jr.
 Joseph Louis Masi
 Lewis Henry Mason
 Robert Gilbert Mathers
 William Patrick Maughan
 Mack Mauldin, Jr.
 William Burdette Maxson
 David Chapin May, Jr.
 John Henry Mayer
 William Ellsworth McConnell
 Robert Darwin McEvers
 Thomas Carothers McEwen, Jr.
 James Richard McFeeters
 Jack Stanley McKinley
 Francis Harold Miller
 Harry Martin Mitchell
 Richard Vito Monopoli
 Robert Moravec
 Richard Bruce Morrin
 Richard Thomas Mulcahy
 Clarence Nash Munson
 Paul Edward Noell
 John Francis O'Grady
 Marvin Ortiz
 Robert Andrew Owens
 John Irvine Paulk
 Dwight Ernest Payne
 Joseph Pidkowitz
 Joseph Nathaniel Portney
 George Edward Price, Jr.
 Roi Francis Prueher, Jr.
 James Lee Quinn, Jr.
 Charles Harold Wickliffe Read, Jr.
 Charles Ferdinand Reichmuth.
 Rae Edward Richerson
 Edward Bailey Richter
 James Rodeen
 William Drayton Rottler
 Manuel Patricio Sanchez
 Richard Karl Saxer
 Walter Frederic Schifferli, Jr.
 Ernest Gordon Schultz
 John William Schwartz
 Richard Hilling Scott
 John Richard Sell
 George Edward Severs
 Ronald Glenn Shaw
 Gerald Don Sjaastad
 Lawrence Albert Skantze
 Ferris MacArthur Smith
 James Henry Smith
 Jimmy Lee Smith
 Roy Benjamin Smith
 William Andrew Smith
 Michael Louis Sorrentino
 Thomas Patten Stafford
 William Oliver Steele
 John Peter Stephens
 Wendell Berg Stockdale
 Thomas Joseph Stolle
 James Kenneth Streett
 Robert Neal Strickland
 William Anthony Studabaker
 Stanley Runyan Swanson
 Raymond Leroy Tacke
 Oliver Howard Tallman II
 Thomas Melvin Thawley
 Paul Bristol Thompson, Jr.
 George William Todd III
 Charles Robert Troppman
 Erwin Edwin Troske, Jr.
 James Scott Troutman
 Richard Henry Van Bergen
 Charles James Walsh
 Robert Walter Washington
 Carl Robert Webb
 Leland Merritt Welsh
 Jack Williams, Jr.
 David Dale Young

The following-named midshipman, United States Naval Academy, for appointment in the Regular Air Force, in the grade indicated, effective June 3, 1952, upon his graduation, under the provisions of section 506, Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress (Officer Personnel Act of 1947), subject to physical qualification, with date of rank to be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force:

To be second Lieutenant

Paul Stonebraker MacLafferty

Subject to physical qualification and subject to designation as a distinguished military graduate, the following-named distinguished military student of the Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps, for appointment in the Regular Air Force in the grade indicated, with date of rank to be determined by the Secretary of the Air Force, under the provisions of section 506, Public Law 381, Eightieth Congress (Officer Personnel Act of 1947):

To be second Lieutenant

Ennis F. P. Miller

IN THE NAVY

Rear Adm. Walter S. DeLany, United States Navy, to have the grade, rank, pay, and allowances of a vice admiral while serving as commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, and commander, Atlantic Reserve Fleet.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FRIDAY, MAY 16, 1952

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.
 The Chaplain, Rev. Bernard Braskamp, D. D., offered the following prayer:

O Thou who art humanity's gracious benefactor, we are again beseeching Thee for the blessings of wisdom and strength, of faith and fortitude, of humility and patience, as we endeavor to be the heralds of a new day and the builders of a better world.

Grant that our minds and hearts each day may become increasingly strong and steadfast in the possession and power of moral and spiritual principles and in the assurance that Thou hast placed at our disposal the inexhaustible resources of Thy grace.

Help us to understand that the achievement of a nobler civilization can only be possible in terms of the ideals and teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.

Give us the vision to see that if our Nation, in the providence of God, is to play the divinely ordained and appointed part in the world reconciliation and peace, and in mankind's salvation and security, then, as leaders in Government, we must apply the beautiful, the profound, and the ancient wisdom of the Prince of Peace.

Hear us in His name. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Landers, its enrolling clerk, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a joint resolution of the House of the following title:

H. J. Res. 445. Joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States to

proclaim the 7-day period beginning May 18, 1952, as Olympic Week.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 5715) entitled "An act to amend sections 201 (a), 301 (e), 302 (b), 302 (g), 508, and 528 of Public Law 351, Eighty-first Congress, as amended."

IMMIGRATION

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks at this point in the Record.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Speaker, on the 22d of this month hearings will be started on a bill designed to permit the admission of 300,000 aliens into the United States. Considerable propaganda is being prepared for the purpose of attempting to influence the subcommittee in its decision.

So that the Members of the House may recognize this propaganda when it reaches them, I include the following instructions that are going forth from those interested in authorizing the admission of the classes of aliens enumerated in the bill H. R. 7376:

SPECIAL MIGRATION ACT, H. R. 7376

JERSEY CITY, N. J.

This bill authorizes over a 3-year period issuance of 300,000 special nonquota visas to 117,000 Italians, 117,000 Germans, 22,500 Greeks, 22,500 Dutch, and 21,000 refugees from Communist countries. Their admission into the country will be like the displaced persons, namely, must be sponsored by an American citizen, providing a home and a job so that they will not become a public charge, and at the same time will not put anyone here out of a home or job.

This bill is now before the Immigration Subcommittee for consideration, and if approved by the full committee, will go to the floor of the House for consideration. This bill must be passed now before Congress recesses in June.

We want you to write at once to your friends and relatives in the West, South, and Middle West to write to their Senators and Congressmen asking for support of this bill. You should also write to the following members of the subcommittee to vote the bill out favorably and work for its final passage:

CLIFFORD P. CASE, Sixth District, New Jersey; WILLIAM B. WIDNALL, Seventh District, New Jersey; GORDON CANFIELD, Eighth District, New Jersey; FRANK C. OSMER, Ninth District, House Office Building, Washington, D. C.

You should especially write individual letters to support the bill to H. ALEXANDER SMITH, Senator from New Jersey; ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON, Senator from New Jersey; EDWARD HART, Congressman of Fourteenth District, New Jersey; ALFRED SIEMINSKI, of Thirtieth New Jersey District, at Washington 25, D. C.

You should get your society, club, or organization to write similar letters to both Senators and Congressmen.

On the other side, you will find samples of letters to be sent. Anyone may write your letter, but you must sign it yourself with

full name and address. Do not use identical wording of sample letter. Get as many of your relatives, neighbors, and friends to do the same thing. Contact your ward leader and committeeman as well as your club or society to do the same thing in the name of the organization.

Let us know what you have done and what results you got from your letter.

When you come this Thursday, May 8, from 10 a. m. to 9 p. m. for the free chest X-ray at Giles Avenue and Broadway, the school will be open with pen and postcards for you to bring others to write a message similar to the ones on the other side.

SAMPLE LETTERS TO SENATORS

DEAR SENATOR (insert name): I would like you to support special emergency immigration legislation such as proposed in the House in H. R. 7376. This will greatly help my relatives and friends as well as my neighbors.

We want to know if you will vote yes to support this. Please send us favorable answer soon. We won't forget you in the November election.

Grateful for your courtesy and prompt reply, I remain with personal regards.
Sincerely yours.

DEAR SENATOR (insert name): On behalf of the membership of ----- numbering ----- whose names and addresses are signed to this letter, I write to know if you will support a Senate bill to enact special emergency immigration legislation that will benefit our relatives and friends as proposed by the House bill 7376.

Are you in favor and will you vote in support of this measure? Please answer as soon as possible. We intend to support those who support us.

With personal regards and thanking you, I remain.

Sincerely yours.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN (insert name): I write to ask you to support H. R. 7376, the special emergency immigration bill that will aid many needy Italians, Germans, Greeks, and others.

I have voted for more than ----- years and have never before asked for any consideration. I want to know how you will vote for this bill, yes or no.

Please answer. Thank you. I won't forget you in the coming elections.

Sincerely yours.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN (insert name): On behalf of my organization of ----- members, all voters in this district, I respectfully write to inquire your views on the Celler bill, H. R. 7376, which seeks to enact special emergency immigration legislation that will greatly benefit our relatives and friends.

We are anxious to know whether you will support this bill. The undersigned members will be grateful for your early favorable reply. They won't forget you in the coming elections.

Grateful for your courtesy and prompt answer, I remain,

Sincerely yours.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. PRIEST. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 76]

Aandahl	Hall,	Moulder
Albert	Leonard W.	Multer
Allen, Calif.	Halleck	Mumma
Anderson, Calif.	Hand	Murphy
Anfuso	Harrison, Va.	O'Brien, N. Y.
Baring	Harrison,	O'Toole
Bates, Ky.	Wyo.	Passman
Beckworth	Hays, Ohio	Perkins
Belcher	Hébert	Potter
Berry	Hedrick	Poulson
Betts	Heffernan	Powell
Boggs, Del.	Heller	Prouty
Bonner	Hoeven	Redden
Boykin	Hoffman,	Ribicoff
Bramblett	Mich.	Riley
Buckley	Hunter	Robeson
Buffett	Irving	Rogers, Tex.
Burnside	Jackson,	Roosevelt
Carlyle	Wash.	Sabath
Carrigg	James	Sasser
Celler	Jarman	Scott, Hugh
Chiperfield	Johnson	D. Jr.
Cole, Kans.	Jonas	Sheehan
Combs	Jones, Mo.	Shelley
Crosser	Kee	Sheppard
Davis, Ga.	Kelley, Pa.	Sikes
Dawson	Kelly, N. Y.	Smith, Va.
Denny	Kennedy	Staggers
Dingell	Keogh	Stigler
Dollinger	Kerr	Stockman
Donovan	Klein	Sutton
Dorn	Latham	Tackett
Doyle	Lesinski	Thompson, Tex.
Durham	Lovre	Van Felt
Eaton	McGrath	Velde
Engle	McIntire	Vorys
Evins	McKinnon	Watts
Fine	Mahon	Welch
Forand	Martin, Mass.	Werdel
Fugate	Mason	Wharton
Garmatz	Miller, Calif.	Wheeler
Gore	Mitchell	Wickersham
Granger	Morano	Williams, Miss.
Greenwood	Morgan	Wilson, Ind.
Gwinn	Morris	Wood, Ga.
Hall, Edwin	Morrison	Woodruff
Arthur	Morton	

The SPEAKER. On this roll call 289 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Mr. DOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I may have until midnight tonight to file a report on the bill H. R. 7800 and that the minority may have the same privilege.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

AMENDING SECTION 1774, SECTION 201, TITLE II, OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930

Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent for the immediate consideration of the bill (H. R. 7593) to amend paragraph 1774, section 201, title II, of the Tariff Act of 1930.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, will the gentleman briefly explain the bill?

Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, this bill was reported unanimously by the Committee on Ways and Means.

The proposed legislation makes a very simple and just change in the tariff laws.

Under the existing laws, a religious object can be imported into the country as a gift to a church or to a religious order duty free, but the church itself or the religious order cannot import such an article duty free. All this bill does is to make the law uniform. It was reported unanimously by the committee, as I stated.

Mr. JENKINS. I understand every restriction will be placed on this so that there will not be the common importation of articles to be sold later?

Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana. No; quite the contrary. It has to be imported for the specific use of the church or religious organization.

Mr. JENKINS. And the departments of Government admitting commodities of that kind will have restrictions placed upon them. The contention of the committee was that it ought to be regulated so that there will not be any abuse of the situation?

Mr. BOGGS of Louisiana. That is correct.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There being no objection, the Clerk read the bill, as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That paragraph 1774, section 201, title II, of the Tariff Act of June 17, 1930, is amended to read as follows:

"Paragraph 1774. Altars, pulpits, communion tables, baptismal fonts, shrines, or parts of any of the foregoing, and statuary (except casts of plaster of paris, or of compositions of paper or papier-mâché), imported in good faith for the use of, either by order of or for presentation (without charge) to, any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes."

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (S. 677) to fix the personnel strength of the United States Marine Corps, and to establish the relationship of the commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill S. 677, with Mr. DEMPSEY in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 45 minutes. Mr. Chairman, in explaining this bill to the Committee I am not going to yield to the great temptation of extolling at length the great

fighting qualities, the valor, the magnificent accomplishments of the United States Marine Corps during the past 175 years of American history. It is not easy to resist that temptation, for a discussion of the United States Marine Corps almost compels great flights of rhetoric extolling the virtues of this splendid fighting organization which has become the pride and glory of the American people.

But I think I can take that point of view for granted. The story of the Marine Corps is well known to all members of the committee. It is cherished by all Americans. I can see no purpose to be served by retracing that history now.

From a glance at the proposed bill, you can see that it is very uncomplicated. Its purposes are readily and easily understood without extended explanation. The bill would require that this Nation maintain at all times, until and unless the Congress determines otherwise, not less than four combat strength Marine divisions, four combat strength Marine air wings, and their supporting forces. A floor of not less than 300,000 Marines is established to keep these units up to strength. The bill would also make the Commandant of the Marine Corps a permanent member of our top military body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Two basic points underlying the bill should be clearly understood.

First, the bill is not before the House for the purpose of doing a favor for the Marine Corps. Neither is it here as a tribute to the Marine Corps for its magnificent service throughout American history.

The bill is drawn solely to strengthen our national defense. It is a defense measure involving the Marine Corps, not a Marine Corps measure only incidentally involving the national defense.

Second, I want to make it clear that this is in all respects a congressional measure. It is not sponsored by the Department of Defense. Our Defense leaders are, in fact, strongly opposed to the enactment of this bill. The Deputy Secretary of Defense sent correspondence to the committee in opposition to the bill, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified against it. They also testified against the bill in the Senate, but the Senate approved the principles of the bill unanimously despite that opposition. The House Committee, with the same testimony before it, has favorably reported the bill to the House with only one dissenting vote.

So there can be no doubt but that this bill, as much as any measure ever to come before the House, is by and of the Congress and not a bill drawn up in the Pentagon and passed up here for the Congress to enact.

Now, why have the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees almost unanimously approved the concept which would establish as a permanent American policy the maintenance of four Marine divisions and four Marine air wings? And why do the Senate and your

Armed Services Committees take the position that the Marine Corps Commandant should be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

I will try to explain these two issues as briefly as possible.

First, what is the need for the Marine Corps strength proposed in this bill?

I think it is a fair statement that no fighting force in the world today commands more universal respect and admiration than the United States Marine Corps. It does not detract from the accomplishments of our other Armed Forces to say that in every war the enemies of the American people have learned, with very good cause, to fear the United States Marines. In the past 175 years the Marines have landed more than 200 times to execute missions of war and peace. They have planted the American flag in both hemispheres and on all continents. The Germans knew them as devildogs; the Japanese, from first-hand experience, learned about them long before Pearl Harbor; the bandits of Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo knew them as fighting leathernecks, when the rest of the world was at peace. Tripoli, Mexico, Samoa, and Cuba—even Korea 80 years ago as well as today—have heard the sound and seen the fury of American Marines in battle.

From March 2, 1776, to today in Korea, they have fought in almost every major military engagement in which our country has been involved. Their battle streamers are a panoply of America's military history.

I think we can benefit from the story of the United States Marines. In that valorous history we can see clearly painted the picture of things to come. A student of history of the Marine Corps can only conclude that America has a vital and continuing need for the maintenance of a finely coordinated powerful ground-air fighting team in constant readiness. There is no doubt that such a force, highly versatile, fast moving, and hard hitting, in which attributes the Marine Corps has always excelled, will have a continually powerful impact in relation to lesser international disturbances of such types as Admiral Sherman, our late Chief of Naval Operations, evidently had in mind when, some months ago, he forecast a series of small wars over an extended period in the future.

The maintenance of such a ready force, with the powerful punch so characteristic of the United States Marines, may produce two highly important results for our people.

It may well prevent the growth of large wars by prompt and vigorous action during their earliest stages. A number of witnesses advised the Committee on Armed Services of their conviction that had such a force been in existence in June of last year, the Korean war might not have commenced in the first place; and at all events, it could have been promptly terminated by such a powerful fighting team as is potential in a strengthened Marine Corps.

Second, such a ready combatant force, with its highly integrated air arm

trained to work in the most painstaking coordination with the ground forces, with a proud tradition of being immediately ready in time of crisis, may well be in a position to stay the progress of a full-scale aggression long enough for our country to mobilize its vast defense machinery.

In the committee report on this bill you will find a full discussion of this underlying concept, upon which the proposed bill is based. It seems to me that all American history emphasizes the extreme need for this type of fighting organization. If our remote history does not adequately teach it, certainly the events of June 1950 have made it apparent beyond all doubt.

I want to remind the committee that almost all of our defense leaders have publicly and repeatedly warned that the present world strains and tensions confronting the United States may well last for 5, 10, or 20 years in the future. This being so, and I can see no reason to doubt it, it accentuates far beyond any other period in American history the need for a superbly trained, immediately ready, highly integrated combat team of United States Marines, whose function for 175 years has traditionally been the meeting of just the type of crises that may threaten our vital interests for years in the future.

As General Cates, former Marine Corps Commandant, told the committee:

The clear need for such forces has been demonstrated beyond question. The capability of the Marine Corps to provide these forces should be fully exploited.

With his views the Armed Services Committee is almost unanimously in accord.

Now, the defense people had this to say about the strength proposed for the Marine Corps in this bill.

They are strongly opposed to the strength features of this bill, and their arguments can be reduced to these major objections:

First, the Congress should keep the strength of the Marine Corps tied to the strength of the United States Navy.

Second, they testified that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and not the Congress, should determine the minimum size of the Marine Corps—in other words, the idea was that this is not a suitable subject for legislation by the Congress.

Third, they contended that the maintenance of a constantly ready, enlarged Marine Corps would be duplicative of any competitive with the Army and the Air Force, and, therefore, that the proposed bill would hurt those branches of the Armed Forces and result in unnecessary cost. We carefully considered these objections and have set out our views in respect to each of them in the committee report, which I hope the members of the committee have read. As regards the tying of Marine Corps strength to Navy strength, nothing could be more absurd.

The strength of the Marine Corps has no direct relationship to Navy strength. Now, to be frank about it, the only reason why the defense people maintain

this argument appears to me to be this: They are afraid of the budgetary impact. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are afraid that if the Congress maintains a large Marine Corps, this will hurt their budgets in the future. We might just as well be blunt about it. That is all that this argument amounts to.

I know this: No military man can soundly maintain that the functions of the Marine Corps, as performed today in Korea, or as performed throughout American history, which involve the use of the Marine Corps under Army command time and again, which involve their use in small and large-scale amphibious operations which may or may not relate to naval campaigns, and which involve the extended use of Marine Corps aircraft solely to support ground troops, can in any way be sensibly geared to the size of the American Navy.

It is sound, of course, to have the number of Marine Corps detachments assigned to Navy ships increase and decrease according to the number of ships in active commission. It is likewise sound to vary the size of Marine Corps security detachments according to the security obligations imposed upon the Marine Corps in protecting naval shore establishments.

But it makes no sense whatsoever to try to gear to the size of the Navy the number of marines to be used in support of ground operations of a nonnaval nature, and our history is filled with instances of such use of the Marine Corps. More currently, with marines under Army command in nonnaval battles in Korea, how ridiculous it would be to say that the size of that organization should be related to the size of the fleet.

No, this argument is based on one thing only, and there is nothing at all military about it. It is designed to keep on slicing the budgetary pie downtown in the same proportions as heretofore. The Armed Services Committee has rejected that argument accordingly.

I am not going to spend much time contesting the second argument that the Defense Department and not the Congress should determine the minimum size of our fighting forces. Of course, the Congress should listen very attentively to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these matters, and the Congress has consistently been very responsive to them in almost all instances in the last few years. This does not mean, however, and I think it is time we made this clear, that the Congress has abdicated its constitutional obligations to determine the size and composition of our Armed Forces.

It is ironic to see this and that armed force, or the Defense Department generally, seek the assistance of Congress in writing its composition into law when it conceives that action as furthering its interest of the moment; and then to see the same services argue against doing this, basing their arguments on conjured up military considerations, when they are asked for views on legislation that they do not feel is entirely to their benefit.

No, here again the Committee on Armed Services, and the United States Senate, have concluded that the argu-

ment advanced by the Defense leaders is entirely unsound. It is the function of the Congress to legislate on these matters under the Constitution, and it does not do much credit to our Defense leaders. I must say in all frankness, to offer this argument against this measure and then advance the directly opposite argument when they conceive a different bill to be in their best interests.

As for an enlarged Marine Corps duplicating the other Armed Forces, nothing could be further from the truth.

In the last war the Marine Corps grew to a size of 486,000. There were no charges of duplication or competition then, but it is now argued that this bill, which proposed a much smaller Marine Corps, will produce undesirable competition.

The National Security Act spells out these things pretty well.

It states that the Army shall prepare land forces for the effective prosecution of war, and by that the act meant all-out war.

The act states that the Air Force will be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of the war, and here again the intent of the act was that the Air Force shall be prepared to apply its air power, as distinguished from Naval and Marine Corps air power, in an all-out military effort.

The purpose of insuring a ready Marine Corps of four divisions and four air wings, which, speaking relatively, is certainly not a formidable force, is not to provide either the land forces or the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of all-out war. Its purpose is, rather, to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign, and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large-scale war.

It is the view of the Armed Services Committee that, rather than being duplicative or competitive, the maintenance of such a Marine force would better enable the Army and the Air Force to concentrate on their major responsibility of preparing for all-out war.

Of course, none of us knows what tomorrow may bring in a military way. We can hope that the hostilities in Korea will cease. They may not. We can hope that large-scale military action will not recur in Indochina, or commence against Formosa or the tremendously vital petroleum areas of the Middle East. We can hope that there will not be Communist inspired and controlled insurrections in the Philippines. We can hope that there will not be grave disturbances in this and that nation in Europe over the coming months which would require immediate protection of Americans by American ground and air forces.

But we do not know about the likelihood of such matters with any degree of assurance.

What the Armed Services Committee is convinced of is the very evident need to maintain in constant readiness this powerful Marine Corps fighting force in today's troubled world, and we propose that the Congress accomplish this goal by the enactment of this bill.

Let me read to you now what the Unification Act defining the mission of the Marine Corps provides:

The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy—

And I want to say right now and impress this fact upon every one of you, the Marine Corps is not part and parcel of the Navy. Get that in your minds. It is a separate organization, created by act of Congress. However, it is within the Naval Establishment. Now, there is a big difference legally and in the bills between being in the establishment and being a part and parcel of the Navy. The Marine Corps is a separate entity. It is administered by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He makes his reports not to the Chief of Naval Operations but to the Secretary of the Navy, just as separate an entity as language in statute can possibly make it.

The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of Naval property at Naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. Will the gentleman read the rest of that provision?

Mr. VINSON. Yes. I will be glad to read it.

Provided, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force are afraid that if Congress maintains a large Marine Corps it will hurt their budget in the future. We must just be blunt about that. That is the whole truth about the situation.

The Marine Corps, fixed by Congress, has a mission to perform any duty that the President may direct. Who for one moment can think that the Navy's activities and the Marine Corps activities in Korea are equal and that we should only do that which is tied to what the Navy is doing today in Korea?

Mr. COUDERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COUDERT. Before the gentleman exhausts his time, there are a number of questions I would be very much interested in hearing the answers to.

Mr. VINSON. All right. Let us have them right now.

Mr. COUDERT. My mind is quite open on the subject. I do not pretend to be an expert as is the distinguished gentleman from Georgia on military affairs.

Mr. VINSON. Ask the question because time is running.

Mr. COUDERT. The gentleman has control of the time so that is not serious.

Mr. VINSON. I have to yield to others.

Mr. COUDERT. Let me say at the outset I yield to no one in my respect and high regard for that distinguished military body known as the Marine Corps. I would certainly do nothing to in any wise reflect upon its prestige or to affect its ability to continue its great military service to our country.

The Marine Corps has been an elite corps. It has always been in the very front of battle, it has always had the best there is in the armed services. You are now proposing a mandatory floor of 300,000 men. My first question is, What is the present strength of the Marine Corps and does the Marine Corps now resort to the draft for its manpower?

Mr. VINSON. In answer to the last question I may say that for the first time in the history of the Marine Corps they are under the draft to get certain personnel.

Mr. COUDERT. What is the present strength?

Mr. VINSON. I might just as well take that question up now. I propose to offer an amendment by direction of the Committee on Armed Services that the Corps be reduced from 300,000 to 235,000 enlisted personnel. That is the approximate amount the Congress has appropriated for in the fiscal year 1953. Now, get this in your mind: According to my information, it will not cost one dollar if the committee adopts this amendment to maintain a floor of 235,000 enlisted men.

Mr. COUDERT. I congratulate the gentleman because that goes a very long way toward meeting that particular question in my mind. I have one or two other questions. There is another problem that concerns me even more than that and that is the provision for adding the Commandant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. VINSON. I am going to discuss that right now.

Mr. COUDERT. May I make the point because the point does not appear in this bill. As I read the unification law the top policy committee or group in the Defense Department is the Armed Forces Policy Council. That is section 171 (e) of section 5 of the United States Code. That Council is composed of nine members—five civilian Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary and the Secretaries of each of the three services on the civilian side, and four of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. To be sure, that act does specify that the Secretary of Defense shall have the decision, but it would be a very extraordinary man who is not very largely influenced by the eight men who sit around him, four of whom are professional soldiers. In my judgment that set-up seriously jeopard-

izes civilian control of the Armed Forces of the United States. Now you are proposing to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, making five. This act does not by its own terms make the Commandant also a member of that policy committee, but can there be any doubt, I ask the gentleman from Georgia, that if you make the Commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs and every other member of the Joint Chiefs is also a member of the Council, the Policy Council, that next year a bill will be brought in and there will be great pressure to make that Commandant also a member of the Council so that you will have five military men and five civilians?

Mr. VINSON. Let me assure the House of one thing, there will always be civilian control.

Mr. COUDERT. I doubt whether there is very much today.

Mr. VINSON. Well, the gentleman is in error, because there is complete civilian control, and here is a statement of what we are trying to do right now.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. The gentleman stated that the present law provides that the Marine Corps shall be 20 percent of the Navy, and as I understand that law at present is suspended; is that correct?

Mr. VINSON. That is correct.

Mr. TEAGUE. Would the gentleman tell the House what the maximum strength of the Army is today?

Mr. VINSON. I am glad the gentleman raised that question. This is nothing new in legislative procedure. We brought in a bill here not long ago setting up the composition of the Army. We said what the Army should be. We brought in a bill setting up the composition of the Air Force. It has been on the statute books for a year. We set up the composition of the Navy. We even go to the extent of saying that the shipbuilding program should be of many tons. We even go to the extent of saying that the composition of the Air Force should consist of so many planes. Now we are doing the same thing in the Marine Corps, in principle, that we have done heretofore, except we are saying that the minimum strength shall be what is fixed in this bill.

Mr. TEAGUE. Well, the gentleman did not answer my question.

Mr. VINSON. I think it is 800,000 men. I have not the figure here, but I can furnish it.

Mr. TEAGUE. And this bill would make the Marine Corps what strength?

Mr. VINSON. The Marine Corps under this proposal as amended would be 235,000, for which the gentleman from Texas has already voted to appropriate the money.

Mr. TEAGUE. The gentleman did not answer my question. What is the maximum strength of the Marine Corps provided by this bill?

Mr. VINSON. The maximum strength, the ceiling, would be 400,000.

Mr. TEAGUE. Four hundred and forty-eight thousand.

Mr. VINSON. That is the maximum strength. The minimum strength would be 235,000, with the amendment I propose to offer.

Mr. TEAGUE. One other question. Is it not true that the maximum strength of the Army today is 837,000? There is no floor under them. It is up to the Committee on Appropriations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to set the strength.

Mr. VINSON. That is right. Now we all understand there is no floor under the Army; there is no floor under the Navy and no floor under the Air Force. The reason why is sound. The justification for putting a floor under this is to keep in readiness at all times a mobile force, a virile striking force that we can use while you mobilize the defense of this country.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The gentleman from New York brought up the question about draftees in the Marine Corps. I think it ought to be brought out that the condition of the Marine Corps in Korea was due to the action taken by the Committee on Appropriations on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; that had the appropriation bill that year been passed, the Marine Corps would have been reduced approximately 65,000 men.

Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. MANSFIELD. And when the Marine Corps was called on, they called on their reserves.

Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Last August they began calling their draftees. In order to give the Reserves a break and get them out they went into the draftee business; but beginning next month they are not calling any more draftees.

Mr. COUDERT. If the gentleman will yield further, is it not a fact that the sum and substance and purpose of this bill is to set up the Marine Corps as a fourth and co-equal military department?

Mr. VINSON. No, not at all. The purpose of this bill is to give the country a strong defense arm by keeping in readiness a small group while America is being mobilized.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. SCRIVNER. In the contemplated built-up strength of the Marines, does the gentleman anticipate that their medical service will still be furnished by the Navy?

Mr. VINSON. Everything that under the law the Navy furnishes to the Marines will be furnished under this bill.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Will the Navy still furnish the same supply system?

Mr. VINSON. They will furnish everything the Navy furnishes the Marines now.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Those of us who sit on the appropriation measures, and I think we are perfectly entitled to this information, should not then ever anticipate as a result of this bill any request for a separate medical corps for the

Marines, a separate hospital system for the Marines, a separate supply system for the Marines, or a separate engineer system for the Marines?

Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. SCRIVNER. It will continue to function under the Navy set up as it is at this time?

Mr. VINSON. Exactly.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Is it anticipated that if this bill is enacted it will be necessary to set up any new Marine bases?

Mr. VINSON. Not at all beyond those in the fiscal year 1953 program. That will not be necessary.

Mr. SCRIVNER. So if that is true, then we should not anticipate that there will be any increased cost to the Federal Government as a result of this bill?

Mr. VINSON. Not beyond fiscal year 1953. The gentleman is correct. We are today appropriating, according to my information enough to take care of the floor of 235,000 enlisted men.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I just wanted to get it clear.

Mr. VINSON. The gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. SCRIVNER. So many times those things are not clearly set out. Then, after the law is enacted proponents come in and say, "We have to have so many millions for this and so many billions for that," and then they tell us that they have to have it because Congress passed the law. The gentleman has answered that and has assured us that nothing like that will happen.

Mr. VINSON. I am glad the gentleman has raised the question. Let me assure the House that by passing this bill and putting a floor under the Marine Corps it will not cost, according to my information, 1 penny more than is being appropriated in fiscal year 1953, because the Marine Corps has almost 235,000 men today. There will be no additional hospitals, no additional bases beyond fiscal year 1953; there will be nothing of that character brought about on account of the 235,000 floor for the Marines.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Is it not true that during the last war the Marine Corps built up to six full combat divisions, and that they were supplied medically and in every other way by the Navy as they have been traditionally?

Mr. VINSON. That is correct. Let no one disturb himself about this, that there is going to be competition with the Army, that you are going to have two armies. You will have nothing of the kind. You will have the Marine Corps, and I hope that Congress will always keep it at 235,000. During the war we had a Marine Corps of 460,000. It was not in competition with the Army. The whole theory, the whole philosophy of this bill is to keep a force in readiness, a small, virile striking force, while the defense of this country is being mobilized.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Just to keep the record straight, is it not true that in ad-

dition to the 235,000 enlisted men you are going to have 23,500 officers?

Mr. VINSON. Yes. The ratio is 10 to 1.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. So the strength will be 258,500?

Mr. VINSON. That is right.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. The Marines are working up to that ceiling at the present time.

Mr. VINSON. They will attain about 243,000 under the fiscal year 1953 appropriation at the end of this fiscal year. So when you vote for this bill you can go home and say to your constituents that you put a floor under the Marines, but it did not cost any more money than is contained in the fiscal program for 1953.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Is it not true that this is being done somewhat to stop the sniping and underhanded attack to weaken the Marine Corps?

Mr. VINSON. No. It is done strictly to strengthen the defenses of this Nation. It is not being done as a tribute to the great Marine Corp organization. It is done because it is a sound military policy to do it. The only reason why, in my judgment, that some of the people in the Pentagon were against this bill is because they were apprehensive it might take part of their budget away from them.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. And you do not want the Marine Corps weakened; is that not correct?

Mr. VINSON. We do not want the Marine Corps weakened. We want a strong defense, and through this measure you can get a strong defense. If any of these small wars break out in the days to come, then you will have an organization that can defend this country and keep the fire down until you get the resources of this Nation mobilized in order to carry on a large war, if that should become necessary.

Mr. SADLAK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VINSON. I yield.

Mr. SADLAK. Inasmuch as the gentleman said we would be fully protected against any small wars, which might break out, would you call the present conflict a small war?

Mr. VINSON. No, of course not. But, I would say that if we had such an organization, a strong Marine Corps in June 1950, probably by moving in quickly you could have stamped it out. Look what we did in Nicaragua.

Now, I think what I have just stated is an adequate summary of the views of the Armed Services Committee as contrasted to the views of the defense leaders in the Pentagon on the question of strength. I would like to remind the committee once again that the same opposing views I have just related were also presented to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, but, after due consideration, that committee, as your House committee, rejected those views, and the Senate unanimously supported the measure substantially in the version that this committee has brought it to the floor of the House today.

There is only one remaining issue in the proposed bill. That is making the Commandant of the Marine Corps a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The genesis of this recommendation is the investigation of unification and strategy conducted by the committee in October 1949, and the recommendation is expressly contained in the unanimously adopted report of the committee which was issued on March 1, 1950.

At that time, that is, in March 1950, the Armed Services Committee was unanimously agreed that the national interest demands a broadening of the base of deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The committee stated in 1950, in its report, as follows:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff structure does not contain adequate checks and balances to insure an amalgam of service views as regards strategic matters; as constituted, it can result eventually, and for a continuing period, in the imposition of two-service strategic concepts upon a third service—a process in the early days of unification, that could, in the view of the committee, produce ultimately a seriously unbalanced defense program.

After that presentation of the committee's views in March 1950, the committee concluded that it would sponsor legislation to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a member thereof.

I again remind the committee that the recommendation I have just related was adopted unanimously by the committee.

The committee's hearings on this bill have reinforced the committee's views that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should attend all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and be a fully participating member thereof. It is our view that the admixture of the fresh and independent viewpoint of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, whose organization is trained to fight on land, on the sea, and in the air, will have the very beneficial effect of broadening and balancing the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I think there can be no doubt that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, with his broad experience in the three elements of warfare—land, sea, and air—and he is the only individual whose organization is so skilled—will serve as a catalyst in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His views and experience should be very helpful in bridging the gap of experience and viewpoints which have existed between the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is not contended by the Armed Services Committee that the Commandant of the Marine Corps is as skilled as the Army Chief of Staff in the conduct of large-scale land operations, nor is he as skilled as the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Naval Operations in their large-scale air and naval operations. He is, however, the only Chief of Military Service in the Pentagon today who is not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and of the Chiefs of Services, he is the only one whose mode of warfare fully encompasses, in one fighting organization, all three elements of warfare.

It may be helpful to the committee to make this observation:

While the Commandant of the Marine Corps does not know as much about large-scale air warfare as does the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, it is fair to say that he knows more about air warfare than does the Chief of Staff of the Army inasmuch as under his own command are very significant air elements providing close air support for Marine ground units.

It is correct, I am sure, that the Commandant of the Marine Corps does not know as much about large-scale ground warfare as the Chief of Staff of the Army, but I am quite confident that he knows considerably more of this type of warfare than does the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Unquestionably, the Commandant of the Marine Corps knows far less about the problems of large-scale naval warfare than does the Chief of Naval Operations, but I am sure the Chief of Naval Operations would be among the first to agree that the Commandant of the Marine Corps knows more about naval warfare than does the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force; and I am equally sure that the Chief of Naval Operations would agree that the Commandant of the Marine Corps knows more about ground warfare and about providing close air support for ground troops than does the Chief of Naval Operations.

I might also point out to those members of the committee who, like the members of the Armed Services Committee, are eager to make unification a complete success, that it was primarily for the attainment of that objective that the Armed Services Committee recommended in March 1950 that the Commandant of the Marine Corps be made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I think it is evident to all of us that the leadership of our Defense Establishment, from the top down, is composed very predominately of individuals whose training in the art of warfare has largely been identified with land warfare, as contrasted to the maritime school of war. It is no derogation of any of the individuals whom I am about to mention to point out that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has spent his entire lifetime dealing with Army strategy and tactics and War Department organization concepts; that the Chief of Staff of the Air Corps has had nearly all of his military experience, including his schooling at the United States Military Academy, in the service of the United States Army; and, of course, that the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, is at the culmination of a lifetime of service in the Army. It may be relevant also to point out that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces likewise has had only Army service in his experience.

By these remarks I do not mean to imply, for I do not believe it, that such a background on the part of these distinguished men whom I have mentioned would make them intentionally respond to any given set of military circumstances in any given way. But how obvious it is that extensive experience in

one mode of warfare will condition any person to approach the problems involved in the defense of the United States predominantly from the viewpoint with which the person is most familiar.

It is evident that in the entire hierarchy of our defense program there is but one voice reflecting the maritime school of war. He is the Chief of Naval Operations, who is today an exceedingly able and courageous man, and who is doing a magnificent job for the Nation as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But even the Chief of Naval Operations is not thoroughly schooled in the problems of the United States Marine Corps. Although the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations, who separately report to the Secretary of the Navy as chiefs of their respective and separate military services, do have in common a largely maritime concept of warfare, it is evident that the Chief of Naval Operations cannot reflect accurately the views of the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for today as repeatedly in the past, the Marine Corps is being used for strictly land operations which are not identified in any way with the conduct of a naval campaign.

The fact is that the late Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, testified to our committee that the Marine Corps Commandant should be present at all meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where Marine Corps matters are specifically discussed. The committee conceives that this in itself is evidence enough that the Chief of Naval Operations, no matter how objective and able, cannot be fitted by training and experience to speak adequately for an organization, the United States Marine Corps, which so frequently in our history has served in non-naval activities and entirely apart from the forces under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations.

I think it will be of further interest to the committee for me also to point out that the Chief of Staff of the Army also testified that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be consulted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Marine Corps matters are under consideration.

Of course it is evident that all matters considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a greater or lesser impact on the Marine Corps. Therefore, from the logic of the viewpoint of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Staff of Naval operations themselves, it can only be concluded that adequate representation of the Marine Corps and its valuable viewpoint can only be achieved by making the marine commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The opposition of the Defense Department to this proposal is based on the idea that the Chief of Naval Operations can adequately represent the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but as I have just explained, and as the former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Sherman, himself as well as conceded in our hearing, he is not fitted by training and experience to perform this function adequately.

The Defense Department also argued that the Marine Corps is a component part of the Navy and, therefore, it would not be sound to have the Marine Corps represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But here, again, the Defense Department has shown more enthusiasm in its opposition than accuracy. The fact is that the Marine Corps is and always has been, since its inception 175 years ago, a separate military service apart from the United States Army, the United States Navy, and United States Air Force. The Commandant of the Marine Corps reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy, as does the Chief of Naval Operations. The Chief of Naval Operations commands that part of the Marine Corps which is assigned by the Secretary of the Navy or the President to the operating forces of the fleet, but this is no different from any unified command established anywhere else. There is no doubt that the command of the Marine Corps is vested in the Commandant under the President and the Secretary of the Navy.

Next the Defense Department argued that the Marine Corps is a specialized Service and is comparable, therefore, to airborne troops, submarines, the strategic Air Forces, and so on, and so should not be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The fact is, the Marine Corps is the only military service trained and equipped to fight on the land, on the sea, and in the air. I think it is a very fair and accurate statement that this training is breadth, not specialization—that it is, in fact, greater breadth of military training than is encompassed in any of the other armed forces.

Perhaps in some desperation after the committee had dealt with these objections, the Defense leaders then said that adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would make the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unwieldy, and that the enlarged staff required by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to assume these added burdens would be duplicative of the staffs maintained by the Army, the Air Force and the Navy.

Now, I might as well be frank about this. This last objection is utterly absurd.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff now consists of four men. The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have testified time and again that they do not vote in their deliberations, and by law they do not make decisions but simply make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President. This being so, it cannot be soundly argued that increasing the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from four members to five members would make it unwieldy. Incidentally, it is interesting that this argument about making the Joint Chiefs of Staff unwieldy by increasing its membership was never raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff nor anyone else when the Defense Department itself recommended the increasing of the membership of that body from three to four members by adding the Chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Congress did this by law, at the request of the Defense Department more than 2 years ago.

And as far as increasing the size of the staff of the Marine Corps to handle the increased duties of the Commandant when he becomes a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant testified that the required increase would be negligible, and it is perfectly apparent that the so-called duplication this would entail would be, actually, no more duplicative than the present Navy staff duplicates the staff of the Army and the Air Force, than the Air Force staff duplicates the staff of the Navy or the Army, or the Army staff duplicates those of the Navy and the Air Force.

So, to sum up, the bill is opposed by the Defense Department, but it is almost unanimously supported by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the United States Senate, and the House Committee on Armed Services. The Commandant of the Marine Corps strongly urges enactment of the bill as a measure necessary to the national defense. The bill is also supported by the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American Veterans of World War II, Disabled American Veterans, Reserve Officers Association of the United States, the Navy League of the United States, and the Daughters of the American Revolution.

As passed by the Senate and as reported by the House committee, the bill provides for four full strength combat divisions, four full strength air wings and supporting units. This would entail a total strength of officers and enlisted men of approximately 335,000. As of today, funds are already programed in the fiscal 1953 budget for almost three full strength combat divisions, three full strength air wings and supporting units. The strength required for this force is approximately 235,000 enlisted persons and 23,500 officers, for a total strength of 258,500. The Marine Corps will nearly reach this strength during fiscal 1953. Obviously, if we increase the Marine Corps strength from three to four divisions and three to four air wings, plus the additional supporting units which would be required, there would be a corresponding increase in the cost factors which admittedly would be quite substantial. Since the objective of the committee is to establish by statute a divisional organizational structure for the Marine Corps and to keep the Marine Corps at sufficient size to provide a substantial and always ready force of shock troops for the Nation, the committee has reappraised its position with reference to the question as to whether there should be three or four divisions and comparable air wings. It has come to the conclusion that the presently planned forces within fiscal 1953 would almost meet the committee's objectives.

Therefore, at the proper time, I shall offer an amendment which will provide that the Marine Corps shall consist of three full strength combat divisions, three full strength air wings and supporting units. As previously noted, this will require little additional appropriations above those already programed for fiscal 1953.

The Armed Services Committee is convinced that this measure is badly needed in order to have a sound and balanced national defense program. It is needed to provide the type of military power immediately available at all times that Communist nations will respect. In my many years in the Congress I have fought for a large Navy, a large Army, and more recently, likewise over the opposition of the Defense Department, for a 70-group Air Force. I want to say to the committee that I know of no project of more immediate importance for the continuing security of our Nation than the enactment of this measure.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has consumed 45 minutes.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. Chairman, how sweet it is to dwell in brotherly love. I am glad that on this measure there is very little difference at all between the members of the Armed Services Committee of the House and the Senate, and I think the membership of the Congress as well. The distinguished chairman of our House Armed Services Committee, the very able gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON], who is going down next week to receive his twentieth term nomination, which he so richly and well deserves, without any opposition, has given you a comprehensive, clear, and concise analysis of this particular bill. God bless him.

I do not stand here this afternoon to pronounce an encomium on the Marine Corps of the United States. The Marines need no panegyric from anyone. They have written their record in blood. It seems to me that anything I or anyone else might say after the chairman's analysis of the bill would be "carrying coals to Newcastle." Certainly I would not want to attempt to gild the lily or add to the brightness of the sunrise or the glorious beauty of an Ozark sunset. We all know the splendid, inimitable and incomparable record which the Marine Corps has established in 175 years of our history. All the way from the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli, and in more recent years at Tarawa, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Bougainville, Guadalcanal, and on every battlefield, not only in the Pacific and Atlantic, but practically on every continent, the Marines, with indescribable valor and, superb heroism have written a chapter not surpassed, if equaled, in the history of our armed services. We are all agreed on that. It is a great temptation, of course, to indulge in emotionalism at such a time as this, particularly after you have walked through 5,000 white crosses on Iwo Jima, and you had a nephew who landed the Marines who planted the flag on Mount Suribachi. I shall not yield to that temptation, but I want to talk about this particular bill. Hard facts.

In my humble opinion, after days and weeks and months of effort and exhaustive hearings, and after mature consideration and deliberation, this measure was reported unanimously out of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, passed unanimously by the Senate, passed out of our House committee by a vote of 26 to 1.

This bill does two things: First, it sets the size of the Marine Corps which immediately after World War II had dwindled to 65,000. That was not the fault of our committee; it was not the fault of the Congress.

I might take time without trying to inject any politics into this discussion to say that the awful Eightieth Congress—have you ever heard about the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress? We voted for a 70-group air force which was cut to a 48-group and was really down to about 36; and who did it? President Truman and Louis Johnson. We voted for an aircraft carrier. Who canceled the construction of that after we had spent several millions starting it? This administration. We voted a ceiling of 2,000,000 men on our armed services, and who cut them by 600,000, down to 1,400,000? This administration. Truman and his advisers.

Who was it that withdrew our troops from Korea? A subcommittee went to Korea in 1946, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SKES] and myself, reported to our committee and the Congress and over a radio hookup with Ernest K. Lindley as moderator and told the American people that the minute we withdrew General Lodge and our 40,000 troops from Korea the Communists would move in.

The State Department said Korea and Formosa had no military value, although it was contrary to the advice of MacArthur and our great military leaders. When we moved out the Communists did move in after we had reduced our forces. I am going to forget that because I do not want to jeopardize the passage of this bill; I prefer to say that on the stump in the campaign. But we want to keep the record clear. It is unmistakable.

Our Marine Corps was cut absolutely to the irreducible minimum of 65,000 men. Indeed, some people wanted to liquidate it. If we had had a hard-hitting, mobile, fast-moving, virile, striking force in June or July 1950, Korea perhaps would never have happened, and I say that with no disparagement to the other branches of our armed services.

Let me say that in World War II there were enough victories, enough honor and glory to go to them all. In modern mechanized warfare you have got to have ground, air, and sea forces; you cannot get along without any one of them; but certainly today in the light of modern invention and the lessons of recent experience, we should place the emphasis and spend the money on our air and sea forces. I think it does not require a Member of Congress, a doctor of philosophy or a Philadelphia lawyer to see clearly that obvious point. We have got to have it. All of them are needed.

There is one branch of our Armed Services that is acquainted with all types of warfare and that one branch is the Marine Corps. I will admit that the Commandant of the Marines does not know as much about land warfare as the Chief of Staff of the Army, that he does not know as much about aerial warfare as the Chief of the Air Force; but when it comes to fighting on land, in amphibious operations, on the sea and in the air,

the Marine Corps instead of being a specialized service like the Artillery, Signal Corps, and so forth, is typical warfare. It is a separate service, which the chairman has pointed out, and it is acquainted with all of these operations.

May I say this to the Members: One of the boys I appointed to West Point, a captain in the paratroopers, was killed in Korea. Another one I appointed was a captain in the First Marine Division and another was a captain in the Seventh Infantry Division and on the retreat from Changhun Reservoir over a year ago and from Hagaru-ri, Koto-ri and Hungnam, when they were evacuated to Pusan, I talked not only to these boys out in Percy Jones Hospital but I talked to others, and I asked this captain in the infantry, Who made possible your escape? He said that it was the air force of the Marine Corps. Thank God for the air arm and the tactical support of the Marine Corps. Let us never forget that.

I thought that was pretty good coming from a man in the infantry.

Now, we all know that the Marine Corps is the one segment or branch of our services that is highly trained and usually pretty well equipped to fight an immediate attack. If we believe Winston Churchill, and if we believe all of the military witnesses who have appeared before us, in these times of tension and of uncertainties, when these little sideline wars are breaking out all over the world, if there is one branch of the service that we ought to build up—not to supplant an Army, not to take over the Navy but to be given a voice in its operation on land, on sea, and in the air—it is the Marine Corps.

In my very humble but honest opinion in order to have a sound and well-balanced defense force, this bill must be enacted. I hope that all of you will vote for it.

I hate to mention names, but I want to point out to you that the Commander in Chief of all our forces was a captain in the artillery. He is a land-trained soldier and he has a good record. I admire him. I was in that infantry myself. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one of the most brilliant strategists this country has ever had, a five-star general, and I pleaded and begged and voted to make him that, being a fellow Missourian, among other tributes. He was a ground soldier, the Chief of the Air Force, a nephew of a great Senator, but a graduate of West Point. He was educated in the Army. The Chief of Staff of the Army—a gallant soldier—is a graduate of West Point. You made your present Commander in Chief, your Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you have the Chief of Staff of the Department of the Army and of the Air Force, and you made one, just one Chief of Naval Operations, and a great man he is, who sits on the Joint Staff. In this day, when most of our fighting is not on land, you know what won the war in Japan; anyone knows who has ever flown over Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, and Nagasaki. It was air power—the Air Force and naval aviation. All of you know who have ever traveled down the Rhine from Ludwigs-

hafen, Mannheim and down through Darmstadt and Frankfurt and Koln, or through the Ruhr to Bremen and Hamburg down to Berlin, Leipzig, and Dresden, back to Hanover, to far off Karlsruhe, Stuttgart and Muenchen and Regensburg and Augsburg. You know why we were able to run over them. It was the 8th and 9th Air Forces, with the assistance of our gallant Navy, just as Lemay had blasted them off the face of the earth, weeks before Tokyo surrendered. This is a tribute to the Air Force, not to the Marines solely. Now that is where we are. We shall not argue about what each service did. All of them were magnificent.

We have got to build up a strong marine force. I am not going to try to sing their praises any more than I would try to describe the lusciousness of a fair maiden's lips. It just cannot be done. But it is not on sentimental grounds that we are supporting this measure. As our chairman has said, it is strictly from the standpoint of our national defense and for our own survival; and, by all means, let me pay tribute to General Cates; Vandegrift was a great man, but Cliff Cates, after the summary dismissal of Denfeld and MacArthur—had the nerve and patriotism and courage before our committee to stick his neck all the way out and tell us that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should sit in with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army and the Navy and the Air Force. I think it would be a good leavening influence; I think it would be a broadening influence; I think it would give them ideas on fighting on land, sea, and in the air that they never dreamed of.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHORT. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. AUGUST H. ANDRESEN. The gentleman has correctly described the attitude of the Marine Corps. I want to ask him this. We know that it has been the traditional policy of the Marine Corps and other branches of the service to fight to win. Now I want to ask the gentleman if it would be appropriate and germane to offer an amendment here that we should remove the Secretary of State from the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. SHORT. I absolutely refuse, I will say to my dear friend, the gentleman from Minnesota. I know that I could argue that with him in private, but I do not want to discuss it publicly. I want us to pass this bill, and there is no reason why we should take four full hours to do it. But we will.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE].

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I find it difficult, indeed, to stand in this well and oppose a bill that was introduced by 70 Members of the House and about 40 Members of the Senate, and reported out of the House Committee on Armed Services with one vote against it, but there has not been a bill before Congress since I have been here on which I have done as much work and about which I am as convinced that the House is making a mistake as this bill.

There has been much said here by the gentleman from Georgia and the gentleman from Missouri about the glories of the Marine Corps. I am not going to restrict those glories to the Marine Corps. If you want to see an American man, if you want to see him in the image of God, then you go to where he is dying. Whether he is in the Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, or any place else, you will see that. The Marine Corps is not the only component of our Armed Forces that suffers casualties. If you want to talk about casualties, there have been many more men killed in the Army than the Marines. Whether he be in the Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, the American man, when it comes to dying, is just about the same. They are all Americans who have given all they can.

I wish I were the orator the gentleman from Georgia is, or the gentleman from Missouri. I am not. I recognize that. But I do feel that I have some facts that this House ought to listen to. If I had the oratory they have to combine with the facts I have, I am convinced I could change this bill into one which would be more in accord with the principle of unification.

Back in 1947 this House wrote a unification bill. In that hearing, which was held by the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, General Vandegrift, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, came before the committee and said that he was a little concerned about what was going to happen to the Marine Corps under unification. He asked one thing. He asked that the Congress spell out the functions of the Marine Corps in certain amendments which he recommended. The ultimate result was those functions that were read by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services today from the Unification Act. Let me read those to you again, and do not forget them because they are most important. The first and primary one of them is that the Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide a fleet marine force of competent arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases, or for the conduct of such limited land operations as are essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

This function and this primary mission of the Marine Corps has changed since 1947. As I go along I want to point out to you the changes in the concept of the Marine Corps' primary mission that have occurred since 1947.

Remember, the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services said this bill today is to set up a readiness force to be used by the President. However, the last mission that General Vandegrift suggested in 1947 was that they shall perform "such other duties as the President may direct," with this proviso, and this proviso is most important, "that such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operation for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized." That primary duty for which the Marine Corps is organized is as a fleet marine force for the Navy.

In his testimony before the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments these statements were made by General Vandegrift—and I quote from the record at pages 243 and 244 of the hearings on the National Security Act of 1947:

Since submitting my statement to you, I have found that there has been some question as to just what the Marine Corps is and what its mission is and whether or not it is trying to be a second army.

I can assure you we are not trying to be a second army, so I thought I would like to read into the record just what we feel we should do and just what we feel we should not do.

In addition to its other duties, I feel that the Marine Corps should be organized to perform amphibious tasks such as the seizure of a beachhead or the capture and occupation of small island positions and coastal areas.

Its organization should not be developed to meet the requirements of a protracted campaign in a large land mass, nor should it include matériel thereof such as 240-millimeter howitzers, heavy engineer equipment, motor transport, and logistic lines for deep penetration into large land masses.

In this bill you are setting up a marine force with a maximum authorized strength of 428,000 officers and men. Your maximum authorized strength in the Army today is 837,000 men.

General Vandegrift defined a fleet Marine Corps. General Vandegrift said:

A fleet marine force is a fleet-type command of combined armies comprising land, air, and service arms of the United States Marine Corps which is integral with a United States fleet, and which is organized, trained, and equipped for seizure and defense of advance naval bases and for the conduct of limited and amphibian land operations essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. CHENOWETH] asked General Vandegrift this question:

What do you propose to have during peacetime?

General Vandegrift said:

The authorized strength of the Marine Corps as passed by Congress is 100,000. The appropriated strength for this year, what we set down as an estimate for the Marines, was 95,000 to begin with and 85,000 to end, and a 90,000 average.

The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. CHENOWETH] said:

You will average about 90,000?

General Vandegrift said:

We do not know, sir. We have not seen the appropriation bill.

The gentleman from Colorado [Mr. CHENOWETH] said:

Would that figure be the ideal strength? Would that be your recommendation?

Listen to this answer that General Vandegrift gave to Mr. CHENOWETH:

General VANDEGRIFT. Yes, sir; because that is 20 percent of the Navy and the law says that the Marine Corps shall be 20 percent of the Navy, enlisted strength of the Marine Corps shall be 20 percent of the enlisted strength of the Navy. And that will put us in line with that.

On page 258, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WILSON] asked General Vandegrift this question:

Mr. WILSON. The Marine Corps, I take it from your position and have read several of your speeches over the country, do not want autonomy, do not want an independent organization from the Navy, do they, General?

General VANDEGRIFT. No, sir. We want to be just as we always have been, an integral part of the Naval Establishment, because without a navy there would be no reason for us.

There are many statements throughout the testimony as to what the Marine Corps mission was understood to be in 1947. This bill today is completely changing the Marine Corps. This bill is setting up a second army with a primary mission which involves the capability of operating on a land mass instead of being primarily organized for land operations in conjunction with a naval campaign.

The chairman of the Armed Services Committee said a great deal about what would have happened if we had had four Marine divisions when Korea broke out. What would have happened if we had had four divisions any place? It was not only the Marine Corps that was cut down at that time, it was every other branch of the service too. Actually the Marine Corps, next to the Air Force, suffered less of a reduction after World War II than any branch of the service.

After the Unification Act of 1947 was written, we had a hearing on unification and strategy in 1949. What happened then? At that time General Cates came before the committee as the new Commandant of the Marine Corps and testified that he was afraid that the provisions put in the Unification Act in 1947 were not sufficient to protect the Marine Corps. He made two recommendations. I am going to offer an amendment to put these recommendations of General Cates, or similar ones, into the bill before final action is taken upon it. General Cates said he wanted to make a recommendation "that the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall have a voice in all discussions, plans, and reports of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to amphibious warfare and other matters relating to the Marine Corps" and "provide definite assurance that the Fleet Marine Force will be maintained at a peacetime strength of two fully equipped Marine divisions, including 6 infantry battalions each; and 2 fully equipped Marine aircraft wings, including 12 tactical squadrons each; together with the necessary service elements."

That was 2 years ago. General Cates wanted two understrength divisions and air wings only and the consultation right. Back in 1947 they just wanted their functions spelled out. In 1952 they want four full-strength divisions and air wings plus membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nineteen hundred and forty-nine is the first time that any great emphasis was placed on the marines being a national readiness force for our entire Armed Forces.

Later, in 1951, during hearings in the House on S. 677, General Cates testified,

"I am now convinced the Commandant should have full membership and not a qualified status on the Joint Chiefs of Staff." At this time, he also testified that four full-strength divisions and air wings were necessary. As time keeps passing, the Marine Corps keeps expanding more and more on what they need until today you have a situation where they think 428,000 men and officers are necessary.

Just recently General Shepherd wrote an article, I believe, which was put in the RECORD of April 23, 1952, by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. VAN ZANDT]. The title of that article was "As the President May Direct." In that article, General Shepherd completely departs from the primary mission of the Marine Corps—that is, a fleet marine force for the Navy—and goes to an overall ready force for all the services under the theory that the Marine Corps shall perform such other duties as the President may direct.

If the Armed Services Committee is trying to change the mission and stature of the Marine Corps within our Armed Forces, it seems to me this bill should be recommitted to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, inasmuch as they were responsible for the Unification Act.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KILDAY. I only mention this because it has been mentioned a number of times. The bill was reported out of the Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, by a vote of 26 to 1. I was necessarily absent in Texas, so that I was not able to vote at that time.

I would like to ask the gentleman whether he can recall any time in the history of the United States in which we placed a floor under the Military Establishment in any of its branches?

Mr. TEAGUE. Of course, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY] probably knows more about our armed services than any other Member of the House. He has rendered long and distinguished service in the Armed Services Committee and is one of the most able congressional students of military affairs I know. I think we all recognize that and know what distinguished service he has rendered to this country in that capacity. Therefore, I know he is aware that there has never been a floor placed under any of our Armed Forces before, and, as Admiral Sherman testified, that it is conceivable that a Marine Corps with a floor as proposed in this bill would completely swallow up the Navy.

Mr. KILDAY. I would like to have this in the RECORD: That at the time immediately preceding World War II we had a provision under which the Army and the Air Force should not exceed 268,000. We never got to 268,000.

Mr. TEAGUE. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. KILDAY. Simply because the Congress never appropriated enough money to reach 268,000. So when we attempt to put a floor under any military

establishment, I do not care whether it is the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines, or whichever it may be, you are never going to get more people than you appropriate money for.

Mr. TEAGUE. But is it not true that if you put a floor under this bill the Congress is obligated to bring out appropriations to take care of that floor; while if you put on a ceiling, as you do on the other services, we are not obligated to bring out an amount of money to take care of that maximum number? In other words, a ceiling leaves the size of our Armed Forces flexible while a floor freezes it to a great degree.

Mr. KILDAY. I just heard the chairman say there would not be any danger about doing it, but is that the way we are supposed to legislate?

Mr. TEAGUE. No, sir; that is not the way to legislate, in my opinion. If you freeze military concepts that are best left flexible, you have a difficult time adjusting the situation when conditions change.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Mr. VINSON. The idea of putting a floor on a military bill is to be a guide to the Appropriations Committee that in the judgment of the Congress that is the minimum military unit of that organization that is required.

Mr. TEAGUE. Why do you make this exception for the Marine Corps and not the balance of the Armed Forces?

Mr. VINSON. On this theory: The whole theory of this bill is to keep a force in readiness, and that is the underlying mud-sill of the bill.

Mr. TEAGUE. Yes. I certainly caught the gentleman's idea. I said you are trying to set up a ready force for our entire Armed Forces—something that involves a new primary mission for the Marine Corps at the expense of the Army.

Mr. VINSON. Because the military function is entirely different from that of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Corps.

Mr. TEAGUE. You are taking the last function assigned to the Marine Corps in the Unification Act of 1947 and trying to make it No. 1 and primary. That is what you do under this bill.

Mr. VINSON. I am talking about the mission that the President may send them on, using it as the proper guide for building the Marine Corps to be used in any capacity he may see fit.

Mr. TEAGUE. Would the gentleman comment on the proviso that the Marine Corps may not be used for these additional Presidential assignments and duties if it interferes with their primary mission in any way?

Mr. VINSON. The primary mission is to do that which the President may send them to do, and the President may give them any mission that he sees fit.

To get back to the question raised by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. KILDAY]: Assuming that it has not been done in the past is no justification why we should not do it now, and it is a guide for the Appropriations Committee; in the judg-

ment of the Congress authorization has been made, and it is the duty of the Appropriations Committee to carry out the authorization if the economic stability of the country permits it.

Mr. TEAGUE. One other question. General Shepard in the speech he made and which is in the RECORD stated that the Marine Corps is quite different from any of the other armed services in that it may be likened to a Presidential fire brigade that can be used under conditions of employment that do not apply to any of the other components of our Armed Forces due to this function of such other duties "as the President may direct."

Mr. VINSON. That is exactly the point we are driving at; and it will be a most beneficial thing; it can be used to stamp out bonfires all over the world.

Mr. TEAGUE. In other words, you are setting up a private army for the President to use.

Mr. VINSON. By no means are we setting up any private army for the President to use; it is a branch of the Armed Forces and the defense of the Nation.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. Before I yield to the gentleman from Kansas I would like to say that in the House hearings on this bill the statement was made that the Appropriations Committee had emasculated the Marine Corps. Would the gentleman care to comment on that in his statement?

Mr. SCRIVNER. The gentleman is talking now about the 1950 appropriations for the military service which was \$13,500,000. Just 6 weeks before Korea the President had said we were nearer peace than ever before and the following year he was going to cut the military appropriation another billion and a half. The question I want to ask, if the gentleman will yield for a direct question to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, is this: Does this floor tie the hands of the Appropriations Committee?

Mr. VINSON. Of course not; no authorization ties the hands of the Appropriations Committee or the Congress, but it is a good guide to go by.

Mr. SCRIVNER. All right; suppose it is a guide, is it not possible under this bill—it is in accordance with the answer the gentleman has just made—that if the Appropriations Committee sees fit not to appropriate for 235,000 enlisted men, they do not have to.

Mr. VINSON. The gentleman is absolutely correct, absolutely correct.

Mr. TEAGUE. Will the gentleman agree to a proportionate floor for the other services?

Mr. VINSON. But the burden and the responsibility would be on the Appropriations Committee not to cut out the mandate of Congress in a previous authorization by legislation.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one further question?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I may state to the gentleman from Georgia that here is one member of the Committee on Ap-

propriations who as far as he is concerned has always accepted that responsibility and will continue to do so; and I was glad to have the gentleman's assurance that it was not a tie.

Mr. VINSON. Of course it does not tie the Appropriations Committee; and it does not tie future Congresses.

Mr. SCRIVNER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for just one observation?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield.

Mr. SCRIVNER. I wish to commend the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE] upon taking the floor on this occasion. It is just another proof of the courage that he has demonstrated so well in times past as evidenced by the outstanding record he made in World War II.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KILDAY. For the purpose of developing the facts of the situation I see a number of very distinguished Marines on the floor of the House.

Mr. TEAGUE. Yes; they are certainly lined up.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds in order to say that there is no finer man or greater soldier in this body or this country than "TIGER" TEAGUE, of Texas. Now I am going to show my appreciation by yielding the gentleman, although he is voting against it—if he had heard the hearings as a member of the committee I do not think he would—yielding the gentleman 5 minutes, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say to the gentleman from Missouri that I have read every word of those hearings and read them more than once. I believe I have read them more than most members of the Armed Services Committee. I am very familiar with them; and not only the current hearings, but the hearings as far back as 1947 on the Unification Act. Evidently the gentleman from Missouri has not read those hearings, particularly on unification, for he is going completely away from them in supporting this bill.

Mr. TABER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield.

Mr. TABER. The appropriations bill that was passed through the House carried funds to provide for 216,767 average enlisted personnel in the Marine Corps. That was all that was asked for. The estimate was that at the beginning of the year they would have 214,931—that is as of July 1, 1953—and at the end of the year they would have 222,000.

Mr. TEAGUE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I want to compliment the gentleman for the speech he is making and to say that I was a member of the Expenditures Committee at the time and helped to handle the bill on the floor, the so-called unification bill. The purposes of the Congress at that time have never been obtained, unification has not been obtained due to the fact that the Armed Services Committee is now handling amendments on that and I charge them with the responsibility of seeing that unification does obtain.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. If the gentleman will yield further, this is a step toward quadruplication of unification.

Mr. TEAGUE. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You are setting up a fourth arm of the services and in place of there being one unified service this will result in creating four.

Mr. TEAGUE. The gentleman is right.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. KILDAY. I wonder if the gentleman agrees with me that the United States Marine Corps hold a special position in the military forces of the world?

Mr. TEAGUE. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. That the Marine Corps can land in Nicaragua, Puerto Rico, Haiti, or anywhere else. It is not regarded as occupation of the country by a military force. It has been my belief—and I have studied military matters for only a short time—that the reason that you have that situation is because it is a small force. It does not come in by divisions. There are only a small number of Marines and they come in to quell disturbances or any internal disruption there might be at the time. Then they pull out; they leave. The people of the world accept the Marines. It is my view that should we get the Marines into a tremendously large organization, then they are going to lose that status.

Let me point this out further: There is no such thing as a quartermaster corps—a logistics organization—in the Marine Corps; there is no such thing as a chaplain's corps in the Marine Corps because the Navy supplies all of that. It might be surprising to most Members of this House to know that if you see a marine in uniform who is a medic he is wearing Navy chevrons. If you make them into an army, as a percentage of the Navy, then you create a second army—you cannot get away from that—and this bill ought to be defeated.

Mr. TEAGUE. The gentleman is exactly right. Now, may I ask the chairman of the Armed Services Committee one question? The chairman of the Armed Services Committee told the House that this bill would not cost an additional dollar.

Mr. VINSON. What I said was this: That the bill providing 235,000, and making it 215,000, including officers, is the amount that is carried in fiscal 1953.

Mr. TEAGUE. I do not know what amendment the chairman is going to add or what he is going to add.

Mr. VINSON. I will tell the Committee. I am going to offer an amendment.

Mr. TEAGUE. I do not yield any further.

Mr. TABER. It would require an additional appropriation to provide for 20,000 extra if 235,000 are provided for.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman one additional minute.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, this is what Admiral Sherman said before the House Armed Services Committee about this bill, and he was not talking about any amendments. He said that the enactment of the bill, S. 677, "would require a force of about 327,000 marines and 9,075 naval personnel" and that "it would require the acquisition of additional aircraft" and that "it would require the expansion of training facilities and bases and air training stations." He further said that the estimates he had received indicated "that during the first year of build-up to the forces contemplated by the bill S. 677, the direct cost at present prices would amount to approximately \$4,332,000,000" and that "a breakdown of this figure is attached." He also said that "it is estimated that after the first year build-up, the annual direct cost at present prices would be approximately \$3,361,000,000."

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ARENDS].

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, this bill fixes the statutory size and establishes by law the proper status of the United States Marine Corps in our national defense establishment. In my judgment, it is one of the most important defense measures to come before the Congress. It is no less important than any of the various defense measures we have adopted in the interest of national security.

The Congress clearly recognizes the existing threat to our national security. We will recognize the grave uncertainties in the existing international situation. Our objective is to establish a well-balanced national defense in the light of these uncertainties and the realities of present day warfare.

We must also be realistic as to how heavy a defense burden our economy can stand. We must make the most of the limited funds available. Our greatest source of strength is a healthy economy based on a sound fiscal policy. And we cannot allow our economy to be destroyed under the stress of military preparedness.

In determining the type of defense we should establish I think it should be borne in mind that our over-all program should not be one for all-out mobilization. Our defense program should be based on the premise that we are not preparing for a war but placing our country in a position of readiness.

No one knows when, how, or where we may be compelled to resist armed aggression in defense of our freedom. Some speak of the possibility of a full-scale atom bomb attack upon us. We are making some preparations for this possibility. Others claim the long-range strategy of the Kremlin is to promote

through its satellites a series of wars to entrap us into military operations that will dissipate our strength. This seems to me to be one of the greatest dangers.

Frankly, one of my grave concerns is that our present national leaders will allow us to become involved unnecessarily in a series of international traps that will ultimately exhaust us and make us a ready prey for a full-scale military operation against our own people. Our people are perfectly willing to defend our freedom, but they are not willing to defend other people's territorial possessions and fight other people's wars in the name of freedom.

The United Nations may have its value. But it can readily become the instrument by which we will be led to self-destruction lest it be made clear, definite, and final that the Congress of the United States, and the Congress alone, has the power to commit our people to war. Not even the President of the United States, as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has the constitutional authority to commit this country to other people's foreign wars, big or little.

Nonetheless, there is the existing threat to our own security. The world situation is such that we are faced with the painful but simple fact that, in our own self-interest, we must prepare our defense to meet every conceivable contingency. Our defense machine must be well-balanced and fully coordinated. It must have flexibility and be readily adjustable to every possible contingency that may arise.

In devising our defense program we must take into account our geographic position and the fact that the United States has become a maritime Nation. We must evaluate our potential enemies and our allies. Our own domestic defense program should be coordinated with the defense programs of those countries who are allied with us in the mutual-defense program for which we have been supplying extensive aid.

As I pointed out at the time we had the universal military training bill before us, for a proper defense based on all these strategy factors our emphasis should not be on great masses of men to compete on the Continent of Europe and Asia but rather upon our having hard-hitting forces in readiness.

That we may have just this type of defense, our Committee on Armed Services has been constantly laboring. And to this end the pending bill is presented to you by a committee vote of 26 to 1.

This is not an administration bill. It is not a Republican bill. It is not a Democrat bill. It is not even a Marine Corps bill. Approximately 75 Members of this body, on both sides of the political aisle, introduced bills more or less identical to the one before us. In the fullest sense of the word, this bill has its origin in the desire and the determination of the Congress to see that our people have a balanced defense, that it be of such strength and flexibility as to be able to meet promptly and effectively any and all possible emergency threats to our security, whenever and however they may arise.

To be sure, the Department of Defense and the individual members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their

opposition to the bill. While their views are entitled to great weight, the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department is not necessarily infallible on questions of our defense needs. This should be obvious to all of us from the deplorable condition of our defense machine at the time of the outbreak of the Korean war.

When the Korean war broke out on June 25, 1950, and the President made what amounted to an overnight decision to commit the United States to the war, we did not have a force in readiness that could immediately move in even to deter, much less repel, the initial aggressive action. We found ourselves in a shocking state of unpreparedness. Had we been properly prepared, with a defense based on the realities of the world situation, it could well be that a settlement would have been reached in Korea without any intervention by the Chinese Reds. We probably would not have had this prolonged fighting and heavy casualties.

The point I wish to emphasize is that the shocking state of our unpreparedness at the outbreak of the Korean war was not the fault of the Congress. On the contrary, it was due to the deliberate refusal of the President, the Department of Defense and our Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out the defense program as set up by Congress. We are determined that shall not happen again. It is this fact that makes this bill necessary.

I need hardly to remind you that under our Constitution the Congress—not the Commander in Chief, not the Defense Department and not the Joint Chiefs of Staff—is vested with the responsibility for the size and nature of our national defense. It is our prerogative, not theirs, to say how large our Armed Forces shall be, and of what kind and character.

With the advent of the Korean war and our commitment to it by the President, we were shocked to the realization we were not prepared for such immediate action. We had no highly mobile, completely integrated, superbly trained striking force in readiness for just such a contingency. That has been the traditional mission of the Marine Corps. But the Marine Corps has been emasculated. It had been reduced to only 8 battalions, with 16 squadrons of supporting aircraft. This was done contrary to the expressed will of Congress. It was done as a part of the administration's predetermined policy, the Congress to the contrary notwithstanding, to make the Marine Corps no more than a police force.

During the consideration of the National Security Act of 1947—sometimes known as the Unification Act—which was enacted by the Eightieth Congress, it came to our attention that the administration was seeking to eliminate the Marine Corps as an effective combat element in our defense establishment. The Congress took cognizance of this fact. We took the pains to write into the National Security Act language designed to insure the Marine Corps its continued existence for the performance of its historic functions as a powerful mobile striking force poised in readi-

ness. The then chairman of the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HOFFMAN], whose committee had jurisdiction over the legislation, even went to the trouble to file individual views as a part of his committee's report to point out specifically our determination to preserve the Marine Corps in its traditional role.

But even that unequivocal expression of the will of Congress did not deter the President, the Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department in their fantastic, wholly unrealistic plan to make the Marine Corps a police force.

And so, the pending bill has become absolutely necessary for insuring that the previously expressed policy of the Congress and the wishes of the American people are carried out with respect to the place of the Marine Corps in our national defense organization.

Section 1 of the bill as reported by our Armed Services Committee specifies both a ceiling and a floor for the Marine Corps. By this provision we will insure by unmistakable law the maintenance of a versatile combat force of four full-strength Marine divisions and four full-strength air wings. It is my understanding that a committee amendment will be offered fixing the floor in the size of the corps at three full-strength marine divisions and three full-strength air wings. This is the approximate strength of the Marine Corps today. To maintain it at this strength assures us of a basic force in readiness, which can increase as the need may arise.

In fixing the size and character of the Marine Corps we are simply carrying out our constitutional duty and prerogative. It is the function of Congress to determine the size and composition of the Armed Forces. It is the function of the Executive to command them.

In establishing the size of the Marine Corps as proposed by this bill we are doing exactly the same thing as we did when we enacted legislation for a 70-group Air Force or authorized a specific number of ships of a specific tonnage to be built. We are in no way transgressing upon the rights and prerogatives of the President and his Chiefs of Staff. And I am sure the Congress has no intention of abdicating our authority to them.

Section 2 is, in my judgment, the most important part of the pending bill. This section makes the Commandant of the Marine Corps a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For over a year, our Committee on Armed Services is on record as believing that our national security demanded that the Marine Corps Commandant be a full-fledged member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After an extensive study beginning in the fall of 1949 of the various problems relating to the unification and strategy in connection with our Armed Forces, our committee filed in March of 1950 a unanimous report in which we stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should include the Marine Corps Commandant as a member. We were definitely convinced then as to the desirability of putting the Marine Corps Commandant

on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We are even more convinced today that this should and must be done.

By making this proposal we are not seeking to confer any particular honor on the Marine Corps. We are simply trying to give our people the best possible defense set-up obtainable. It just doesn't make sense to deny the country the benefit of the specialized training, knowledge, and experience of the Marine Corps Commandant in the deliberations and formulation of our over-all defense plans and strategy.

From the testimony presented before our Committee it appears that the present Joint Chiefs of Staff have no particular objection to having the Commandant of the Marine Corps placed in the legal status of a consultant to them on matters affecting the Corps. But how and by whom it is to be determined what meetings the Commandant should attend? As pointed out in our committee report accompanying the bill, it is a significant fact that on only six occasions since 1947, when we created the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has the Commandant of the Marine Corps been invited to their meetings. And all six of these occasions occurred after the Committee on Armed Services unanimously agreed to sponsor legislation to make the Commandant a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the Commandant of the Marine Corps can contribute as a consultant to the deliberations of our military leaders on over-all planning and strategy for the defense of this country, he will be in a much better position to make his valuable contribution if he is given permanent membership. This is not a question of dignity, stature, position, and rank. That may have its place in military protocol. But this is a question of making certain that in all matters pertaining to the defense of this country the best available brains from experience and training are utilized. And no one can plan a proper defense in these days of many uncertainties and undeclared wars without having the benefit of the viewpoint of the man who commands our shock troops, with the mobility to act on a moment's notice until the larger and less integrated forces can be brought into action.

As I stated at the outset, this is one of the most important defense measures to come before us. This bill reaffirms the position previously taken by this Congress. It helps us establish the kind of defense we must have if our people are to have real security. By the passage of this bill we are seeking neither to reward nor to punish. Our sole objective is to have a well-balanced, fully coordinated, highly flexible, basically sound defense machine prepared for every conceivable contingency. This bill is a real step in the accomplishment of that objective sought by all of us on both sides of the political aisle.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. In proportion, was the Marine Corps emasculated?

Mr. ARENDS. From information available to me and also from a conversation held with the chairman of our committee, I understand it became necessary that some members of our committee go down to the Defense Department to see to it that the Marine Corps be not further reduced in force or abolished.

Mr. BROOKS. I would like to say to the gentleman that when this matter did come before the committee, I think I was the only member who did not favor putting the Marine Commandant on the permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. LYLE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. I yield.

Mr. LYLE. The gentleman has made an excellent statement, and I am certain it would be very difficult for anyone to disagree with the words he has used. Does the gentleman have any idea what General MacArthur thinks about this?

Mr. ARENDS. Unfortunately, I do not.

Mr. LYLE. You have asked him about everything else. I thought perhaps you had asked about this.

Mr. ARENDS. Perhaps I should have called the General for his opinion on the matter. Suffice it to say that whatever position the General might take, it would be sound and logical, and I would like to believe he would support this legislative proposal.

Mr. LYLE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. ARENDS. I yield back the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Ford].

Mr. FORD. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the Record.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

There was no objection.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as I was one of the original sponsors of a bill similar to the measure before the Committee, I favor the enactment of S. 677.

Any opposition to S. 677 to fix a minimum personnel strength of the Marine Corps and to establish a Marine Corps representative to the Joint Chiefs of Staff can only be attributed to a misunderstanding of the functions and responsibilities of the Marine Corps.

The Marines, in a sense, are a maverick group. They are not a Navy. They are not an Army. Furthermore, they are not the Air Force. Rather, the Marines have functions which incorporate each of these specialized operations—these and more.

"The Marines get there first" is not merely a phrase emanating from Marine Corps pride. It is a truism developed from the Marine Corps record, the Marine Corps mission as a separate and distinct part of our Armed Forces. From its very inception in 1775 the Congress visualized, and the Nation came to expect, that Marines composed a special type of organization which was ready to perform any and all duties of a military nature, be they duties ashore, afloat, or in the air.

This word "readiness," in my judgment, is the most important word in discussing the place of the Marines. It is this readiness which keynotes their necessity to a well-organized, well-coordinated Armed Forces defense program. The Marine Corps can be and is called upon first to go into combat to establish our defenses until the Army, Navy, or Air Force can be called to the scene. It stands to reason that a full-strength army, navy, or air force cannot be called into combat at the drop of a hat, so to speak. For one thing, our national economy would not permit subsidization of a full-time, full-strength standing armed force. Secondly, these specialized forces cannot be alerted to meet the first attacks. This is no discredit to the other branches of the service. However, it does point out the need for a ready force. This, gentlemen, is the Marine Corps.

I am firmly convinced that had a full Marine division with air cover been on hand to meet the first stages of the Korean conflict undoubtedly, we would have been in far better shape to meet the initial Communist attacks in the so-called police action. A strong Marine Corps as provided in this bill would have saved lives and equipment in those early stages of the Korean war.

The work of the Marine Corps, however, does not end with this preliminary stage setting on the combat field. The Marines follow through with coordinated air, sea and land strategy rivaling the coordination of the other branches and indispensable to them.

Because I am a Navy veteran of World War II and served with some Marine units at sea, I know first hand the capabilities of the Marines. My wholehearted approval of this legislation is in no way disloyalty to my own branch of the service. My decision to support this legislation is based on the safety of the Nation. The Nation in this crucial period needs S. 677.

To sum up, gentlemen, the Marine Corps cannot be discounted as a second land force or a second anything for that matter. The Marines are separate and distinct, and vital as is each of the other branches, to a successful defense program. Its long tradition and history of preparedness behind it, the Marine Corps stands alert today to meet the highest expectations of the Nation; expectations recognized and established by law—a force in readiness to perform any mission.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from California [Mr. McDonough].

Mr. McDONOUGH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the chairman of the committee a question in connection with this matter.

Many of the Members will undoubtedly recall that I wrote the President on this very subject in August of 1950. In his reply to me he stated that the United States Marine Corps was the police force of the United States Navy, and as long as he was President it was going to remain as such. He added, also, that it had a propaganda machine almost equal to that of Stalin's, which was beside the point, but nevertheless

created quite a furor across the Nation, and subsequently required the President to apologize to the Marine Corps League for his impetuous remarks about them.

In view of the President's expressed opinion just about 2 years ago, does the chairman of the committee believe that this bill may be vetoed by the President because he so expressed himself at that time?

Mr. VINSON. I wish to say to the gentleman from California that the responsibility for other officials to do their duty never enters my mind, because I feel that I cross only one bridge at a time. I have no comments to make about that. At least, I think this bill is so sound that the President of the United States would be amply warranted in approving a bill of this kind.

Mr. McDONOUGH. I want the Record to show that I am definitely in favor of both the increase in the personnel and the Commandant of the Marine Corps having equal representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I presume from what the chairman of the committee has just informed me, there have been no inhibitions or objections from the White House concerning the bill?

Mr. VINSON. Not at all.

Mr. McDONOUGH. And that it is not an administration bill?

Mr. VINSON. Of course not. All officers have been free to testify and give the committee the benefit of their views.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McDONOUGH. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. COLE of New York. In connection with the question which the gentleman from California has just raised with respect to the presently announced attitude of the Commander in Chief toward this bill, I would suggest to the gentleman the possibility that the President may have changed his mind or his conception of the purposes of the Marine Corps, in view of the fact that it is by direction of the President himself that the first Marine Division is fighting in Korea today. Unless he still insists that that is a police action in Korea, I think he would recognize that the First Marine Division is a fighting force and not a police force.

Mr. McDONOUGH. I think that is very evident from the fine record of the First Marine Division, and evidently it was the first fighting force that was equipped and ready to respond to the call in Korea. And they have so distinguished themselves in Korea that they are entitled to all the recognition that this bill will give them.

During the first session of this Congress, I introduced H. R. 2032 which provided for the Commandant of the Marine Corps to be a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and also to increase the United States Marine Corps to full strength of four combat divisions, and four full strength air wings.

I am glad to see that the bill—S. 677—under consideration makes the same provision.

The following is a copy of my letter to the President urging him to recognize the Commandant of the United States

Marines as a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his reply to me:

AUGUST 21, 1950.

HON. HARRY S. TRUMAN,
The President of the United States,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The United States Marine Corps has again on the battlefields of Korea demonstrated that it is an effective hard-hitting mobile force which can be depended upon to produce results on the battleground.

Over the past 180 years, the Marine Corps time and again have proved that they are invaluable to the defense of America and to fight the aggressors which threaten American security.

In my opinion, the United States Marine Corps is entitled to full recognition as a major branch of the armed services of the United States, and should have its own representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Department of Defense. I, therefore, sincerely urge that as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces you will grant the Marine Corps representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Very truly yours,
GORDON L. McDONOUGH,
Member of Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, August 29, 1950.

MY DEAR CONGRESSMAN McDONOUGH: I read with a lot of interest your letter in regard to the Marine Corps. For your information the Marine Corp is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's.

Nobody desires to belittle the efforts of the Marine Corps but when the Marine Corps goes into the Army it works with and for the Army and that is the way it should be.

I am more than happy to have your expression of interest in this naval military organization. The Chief of Naval Operations is the Chief of Staff of the Navy of which the Marines are a part.

Sincerely yours,
HARRY S. TRUMAN.

I trust the President has since changed his mind about the Marines and will not veto this bill.

MR. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES].

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I take this time to propound an inquiry to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE]. Something that has concerned a great many Members has been the additional cost; and, as I understand it, the amount of some \$4,000,000,000, which the gentleman from Texas mentioned, was made by Admiral Sherman, who testified before the committee.

MR. TEAGUE. It is on page 767 of the House hearings. He also says he is presenting a breakdown of the figure, but the breakdown was never placed in the RECORD.

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. On page 908 of the hearings is this statement by the chairman:

Admiral Sherman said that the cost would be four and a third billion dollars.

What does the gentleman from Texas understand as to the meaning of the cost of four and one-third billion dollars? Does that mean that is the additional cost of this bill during the fiscal year? Does he mean that is the total cost of the Marine Corps for 1 year or the total cost

of the Marine Corps, including the additions in this bill for a period of 2 years?

MR. TEAGUE. According to what the admiral said, he said that for the first year the build-up would be \$4,332,000,000.

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. What does the gentleman include in that? What is the cost for a year, the additional cost occurring because of this bill?

MR. TEAGUE. Presumably there will be certain camps and facilities constructed that will last throughout the years. He states next that it is estimated that after the first year of build-up the annual direct cost at present costs of material would be approximately \$3,361,000,000.

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. Now I want to get the record straight. On page 909 of the hearings appears this inquiry by the chairman of the committee:

What is the present budget of the Marine Corps, the entire budget?

General Cates replied:

One billion six hundred million dollars. Now, that is for an entire year.

The chairman then said:

That is for the fiscal year 1952?

And General Cates said:

Yes, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN. What would be the cost in fiscal year 1952 if this bill were enacted?

General CATES. That would be \$1,800,000,000.

Obviously the entire cost of the Marine Corps even with the addition of the four divisions—and of course we have an amendment which will reduce it—but even with that cost it will be only \$1,800,000,000. I fail to see how the gentleman gets a \$4,000,000,000 additional cost.

MR. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. I shall be pleased to.

MR. TEAGUE. We are told from one source that it will cost \$4,000,000,000; we are told in the budget that it will be \$2,000,000,000; the Commandant comes in and asks for \$1,800,000,000, and the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee says it will cost no more. So what is the House supposed to believe?

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. I asked the gentleman specifically what he has to back up the \$4,000,000,000 and the gentleman has not given me an answer.

MR. TEAGUE. I certainly did give the gentleman an answer.

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. Specifically, what is the \$4,000,000,000?

THE CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

MR. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to clear up this matter. The fact is there will not be one dime of additional appropriation because this all falls within the 1953 fiscal budget if we adopt the amendment offered by the chairman to cut it down to three combat divisions and three combat air wings as before reported.

MR. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

MR. SHORT. I yield.

MR. TEAGUE. I want to say that I am not trying to mislead anyone or misstate anything in this debate.

MR. SHORT. I am sure of that.

MR. TEAGUE. All I have done is to protect the record.

MR. SHORT. I am stating the fact.

MR. TEAGUE. The gentleman from Massachusetts intimated that I was trying to make a statement here that I have no basis for. I have the hearings and the bill.

MR. SHORT. I am stating the facts.

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. Certainly I would be the last one to accuse the gentleman from Texas of misrepresenting anything. I was never quite sure what the gentleman meant by the \$4,000,000,000. The only reason I rose at this time was to make certain that the House would understand just what the gentleman meant by his figures.

Specifically on page 904 of the hearings you will find this statement. The chairman said this:

How much increased cost will this be over the present budget; that is, with the four divisions?

And General Cates said this:

For the fiscal year 1952 it would only be \$200,000,000.

So obviously there is no such real figure as \$4,000,000,000 in additional costs.

MR. TEAGUE. What does the gentleman, a member of the committee and a very hard-working member of the committee, believe Admiral Sherman meant?

MR. BATES of Massachusetts. I can answer specifically. He meant this—but the cost not only of the Marine Corps at the present time at its present strength but in addition to that the new strength added by this bill, and not for 1 year but for 2 years because the entire budget figure with this bill will only be \$1,900,000,000.

MR. TEAGUE. What does the next figure mean, \$3,361,000,000 that he gives as the first year build-up?

THE CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

MR. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. PHILBIN].

MR. PHILBIN. Mr. Chairman, not only Congress but the American people strongly favor the objectives of this bill.

It is not necessary for me to laud further the great heroic contributions of the Marine Corps since the very inception of this Government. No eloquence, however powerful and lofty, no mere verbal commentary, however profound and comprehensive, no eulogies or encomiums, however inspiring and glorious, could possibly pay fitting tribute to the American Marines.

Their exploits are written in the eyes and minds of their defeated enemies. Their gallantry is inscribed upon the most glorious pages of American history. Their courage and Americanism is etched in human blood upon the finite record of great sacrifices and great victories for justice and freedom. Their fidelity to duty in the spirit of their moving motto, Semper Fidelis, strikes a

chord of admiration and gratitude in the hearts of all Americans who are deeply conscious of the unpayable debt the Nation owes to the Marines.

In this bill there is no reflection whatever upon any of the other armed services. The Marines claim no monopoly on patriotism, sacrifice or loyalty. All of our services on land, sea, and in the air have made their own special contributions to the country during its wars, just as commendable, and they too are and must be the sharers of our truly unpayable debt.

I do not propose to underwrite the mistakes that have been made in military policy nor to elaborate upon the many unfavorable results that have flowed from them. I would deprecate every effort to divide or embitter the various branches of our Armed Forces. Unity is of paramount importance—unity of action to combat the enemy and meet every emergency.

To my mind, the services must learn to get together, work together and stay together until the emergency is overcome. This is not the time to exploit interservice jealousies. We should not permit overzealous rivalry to alter or impair the unity that is so essential in our Armed Forces if we are to achieve safety and security for our people.

The Marines are a great, integral, recognized part of our defense organization. Historically, strategically, tactically, in every way the Marines belong in an illustrious and effective way to our defense program. The Marine Corps must be integrated and coordinated with air, sea, and land components in order to weld together not only an impregnable defense but a striking force that can strike swiftly and powerfully.

Korea points up this fact more than anything else. The situation there which I will not detail at this time should teach us the importance of preparedness and the need for having a ready, potent, overpowering coordinated striking force to deal with dangerous aggression from potential enemies and their puppets.

Much more should be done to round out such a force but this bill will help materially to insure improved coordination and effective functioning of our defense arms.

The Marines are entitled to a place on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Nation's safety and security requires that they should have it. I think this provision will improve and strengthen our armed services and believe it will make for broader and more intimate, more efficient cooperation between them.

This bill is not directed against any other service branch and cannot be so construed. It has general support from those who are aware of and disturbed by present shortcomings of our military policies and establishments and if enacted, as I expect it will be, should be most helpful in assuring fuller recognition, better representation, greater participation by the Marine Corps and hence a better implemented national defense so vitally required at present.

I will vote for this measure.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. CLEMENTE].

Mr. CLEMENTE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to assure my distinguished chairman and all the members of my committee that I hold all of them in the highest esteem. During all the sessions in which I have participated and through which I have sat I have never felt any animosity toward any member of the committee or any Member of the House. I would like to recite the history back of my vote against the Marine Corps bill. About 2 weeks before the bill was to be voted on our distinguished chairman appointed the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BATES] and myself members of a committee to take a trip to one of the camps out West. At that time I gave to the clerk of the committee my proxy to vote against the Marine bill. However, the trip was called off and, therefore, I was present at the meeting and voted against the bill. There was no animosity in my vote against the Marine Corps.

Mr. Chairman, I want to call the attention of the Members of the House to the Constitution of the United States. Article I, section 8, reads as follows:

The Congress of the United States shall have the power to raise and support Armies, and to provide and maintain a Navy.

My interpretation of those two statements is that if there is to be any floor placed on any of the services that floor should be placed on the Army and Navy by reason of the fact that the Constitution provides that we shall provide and maintain an Army and Navy. Nowhere in the Constitution do I find any provision that says we must provide and maintain a Marine Corps.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLEMENTE. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Is there any provision in there about maintaining and providing for an air force?

Mr. CLEMENTE. I have not so stated.

Following this provision which says that the Congress shall have the power to raise and support armies and to provide and maintain a Navy there is a phrase that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than 2 years."

I venture to say that if we pass this bill we are actually appropriating money for more than 2 years. If we establish a floor for the United States Marine Corps we are in effect appropriating money sufficient to pay for a Marine Corps figure of 300,000.

I am deeply conscious of the fact that the Marine Corps is a very sterling striking combat force. It is my belief that if we do establish a floor to the Marine Corps we will have to have some associated expenditures to go along with any increase in the Armed Forces, including pay for the enlisted men, pay to the officers, establishment of new bases of operation, new aircraft, new equipment, and so forth. So in my estimation it is going to cost us some money to enact this legislation.

Mr. Chairman, a statement was made here in connection with the readiness of the Marine Corps, that if we had had a striking force like the Marine Corps prior to Korea the story might be different.

Comparative readiness is a hard thing to judge, but the most equitable comparison I can find indicates that this is not strictly in accordance with the facts. The First Marine Division at Camp Pendleton, Calif., was authorized for Korea on July 4, 1950. Ships were spotted at the port for the movement on July 9, and the First Provisional Brigade of the First Marine Division sailed on July 14, arriving at Pusan, Korea, on August 2, 1950. The Second Infantry Division was authorized to be dispatched to Korea on July 9, 1950, 5 days later than the Marines were dispatched. The ships were spotted at the port for the movement on July 13, and on July 19 the Ninth Regimental Combat Team of the Second Infantry Division sailed and arrived at Pusan, Korea, on July 31, 1950, 2 days ahead of the Marine Provisional Brigade in spite of being authorized 5 days later and sailing 6 days later. Certainly the Second Infantry Division of Heartbreak Ridge has proven since it landed that it was equally as ready as the First Marine Division.

The Senate and House hearings indicate a rather widely accepted belief that the Marine Corps can operate independent of Army logistical support in land operations or Navy logistical support in amphibious operations with little or no change in the Marine Corps present organizational framework.

This proposal to put a legislative "floor" under the Marine Corps and to give special status also to the Commandant of the Marine Corps which contradicts all principles of command is one of the most single service preference pieces of legislation ever to be introduced in the House.

This campaign to elevate the Marine Corps above all the major services by legal guaranties has not been carried out by the Marines fighting in Korea. They have been too busy doing their job. The responsibility for this masterpiece of lobbying should not be charged against the Marine Corps as a whole. Most of the pressure has been generated and applied by former members of the Corps who have a justifiable pride, as everybody knows, in their organization. I believe they do not realize that in their efforts to get special privileges and to guarantee for themselves quantity at the expense of quality they are sacrificing the principal element that has made the Marines a great organization. They have a glorious history and the great pride that only a small organization can develop. The Marine Corps is justifiably boastful of its record and tradition and there is, at present, no hostility among the other services toward this boastfulness because Marines have been considered a special organization and not a competing one. This bill would change all that—it would set up the Marines as a second land Army—too big in peacetime in proportion to the Army and Navy for the amphibious task it was de-

signed to perform. It would make the Marine Corps a problem to the Navy by guaranteeing it a certain independence through the peculiar provision for representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it would also make the Marine Corps an organization competing with the United States Army in the performance of the same tasks and functions. As I say, the advocates of this legislation, do not realize that in their desire to do something big for the good old Marine Corps they are threatening to destroy Marine Corps' claim to distinction and they are creating hostilities in the military services themselves which will create bitterness against the Marine Corps and its special status of being the only force with a floor if this bill passes.

The late Admiral Sherman in his great wisdom pointed out the foolishness of such an error and he pointed out that several billion dollars would be required to pay the cost of this seemingly harmless little gesture that Members of the Congress are taking so lightly today. Not only was Admiral Sherman right in pointing out the great cost of this proposal and the fact that the Marine Corps would be made less useful to the Navy by such a move. He was also right in predicting that such a move would establish a precedent which may eventually result in endless confusion and immeasurable cost. The Marines are the amphibious force designed, trained, and equipped at great expense to help the Army and the Navy establish beachheads.

They accomplish the transition of military operations between sea and land. Now we have another kind of military service today—the Airborne Section of the Army that accomplishes the transition from air to land. It is certainly just as specialized and just as important as the Marine Corps and it deserves equal consideration despite the fact that it does not have, as yet, a group of overzealous alumni to put pressure on the Congress.

We have another military unit—the Strategic Air Force—which has responsibilities in case we are attacked calling for a far greater degree of readiness than even the Marine Corps can achieve and calling for a greater degree of independence in its preparation and training. The Strategic Air Force also will be justified in seeking special status of this type. Certainly, if a floor is to be put under any unit, the Strategic Air Force should be the organization to have it. It takes many years to create and it must be over the heart of enemy territory just a few hours after any war begins.

We have enough problems today without creating a minimum standing Army in any type of uniform. Out of respect for the Marine Corps, its great usefulness and great tradition, let us use judgment here today and see to it that the Marine Corps, despite the efforts of some of its over-reaching associates, remains the Marine Corps and does not become United States Army No. II.

Good legislation, as we all know, is based on factual material brought out in committee hearings. The Senate and House hearings indicate a rather widely-accepted belief that the Marine Corps

can operate independent of Army logistical support in land operations or Navy logistical support in amphibious operations with little or no change in the Marine Corps' present organizational framework. I can scarcely believe it. They have never done it before and all of our experience in Korea and every other war has indicated that sizable forces engaged in modern warfare must have artillery, armor, signal, and engineer services to supplement those in divisions. Today, in Korea, the Army is having to support the First Marine Division just like its own Army divisions. The Army is, or was recently, furnishing the following support there: One and one-third field artillery battalions, two engineer battalions, five transportation truck companies, one ordnance medium maintenance company, and one mobile army surgical hospital. Also, the Army was delivering to the First Marine Division, in its own area, rations, gasoline, vehicles, bridging material, oil, lubricants, weapons, ammunition, fortifications, and other items without which it is impossible to fight a war. The spectacular air drop of a bridge to the First Marine Division for the first time in history in December 1950, was accomplished by the Air Force and an Army Quartermaster Airborne Supply outfit. There are countless other examples which lead me to believe that the Marines cannot be self-sufficient and independent in their operations to the same degree that the Army, Air Force, or Navy can.

In the House hearings it was testified—in connection with amphibious warfare—that “the Chief of Staff of the Army knows, of course, about land operations, but I doubt that he knows about amphibious operations and the integration that is necessary.” In World War II, the Chief of Staff of the Army was responsible for many more and larger amphibious operations than the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The present Army Chief of Staff, J. Lawton Collins, was Commander of the Eighth Army Corps, which participated in the amphibious assault of Normandy—by far the largest and most complex amphibious assault ever conducted anywhere in the history of warfare.

The Navy or the Army builds all of the Marine air bases without cost to the Marine Corps. Medical services for the Marines are at naval expense. Many of the Marine supply services are not chargeable to the Marines.

They are in fact an inexpensive Army only because much of the cost of maintaining, supporting, and equipping them is borne by others. If we are comparing costs then ought we not to figure in the costs of all the things that go into supporting a Marine division in action, including those furnished by others. In an amphibious operation they receive a great amount of support, both air and logistics, from the Navy. In a landing operation, while functioning as part of a land force, they must receive the same type of support from the Army. Air strips must be built by the Army, some transportation, signal communications, and medical services must be furnished, along with artillery support and armored support. When you let the Army carry

those expenses and only charge this Marine division with what it provides for itself, yes; it appears inexpensive.

Now, if we were to accept the proposal of S. 677 at face value, the Marines should be capable of acting as a ready force for land operations independent of support from other sources. But, such is not the case because the Marine division, though larger than an Army division, has very limited Marine support for conducting sustained land operations. The Marine Corps can make no inland penetration under sustained combat conditions, for it cannot support itself alone inland. What happens? The Army furnishes many of the things that the Marines need to be successful in such cases, just as in Korea today, but all this multitude of supporting services are charged against Army appropriations, and Army Tables of Organization, and I don't think it is all together fair to make a virtue of this kind of economy or this kind of so-called independent operation.

Now, here is an outfit organized primarily for amphibious assaults which has been proposed as our combat ready force for land operations. I just do not think it will work. I think the Marines will still have to borrow things from the Army if they are going to engage in land warfare. Would not it be better to let the Army furnish its own ready forces just as it has in the past?

I question seriously the fulsome statements of the enthusiasts who want us to pass this bill in its present form, that herein we provide a fully integrated ready force and, yet, it is not a second Army. Unless the Marine Corps remains a part of the Navy it is not fully integrated; it is not capable of sustaining itself independently in land warfare. I would like the supporters of this bill to name one of the islands he thinks we will have to take with four divisions of amphibious specialists. Again I am forced to the conclusion that this ready force is intended primarily for operations on land, and when so used, it will have to be supported by some other service, or create a duplication of the Army organization and a second land Army.

I believe, at the present time, that the Military Establishment is sufficiently complex and the military situation from a strategic point of view is sufficiently difficult without Congress multiplying the difficulties through such steps as this. One can always spin a finely drawn web of technicalities and arguments around any situation to justify a certain line of action and hide the fundamental fact that 1 plus 1 still makes 2. I just do not think, however, that this is the time to do that sort of thing. Even if the Army were derelict in their duties and did not have a ready force, or even if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were avoiding the plain legislative intent of the Congress, or, in some manner, if anything else were wrong with the Military Establishment that has already been spelled out as legislative intent, I can see no sense in circumventing the basic issue through such maneuvers as this. If something is wrong with the Army's readiness, let us work at repairing, or reforming, the Army; if something is

wrong with the men on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and you lack confidence in their deliberations, let us replace them. If those are the real issues at stake—and I cannot believe that they are—let us face them squarely and realistically.

It has always been a point in the Marines' favor that their spirit has been high with a great deal of pride in their organization. This esprit de corps is primarily the result of the comparatively small size of their unit and the system under which they take their recruits—a voluntary system—by which they can be most selective in their choice. This has been the Marine philosophy for many years—comparative smallness with emphasis on quality. I cannot see why, all of a sudden, discrimination is being charged on this score of size unless they want to develop a second land army.

In closing, it seems to me that, regardless of what avenue this bill is approached from, it always leads to a second land army. It would be, indeed, an anomalous situation if we were to pass this bill and create a second land army and, at the same time, try to continue the original purpose of unification under the National Security Act. The two are inconsistent, and I think that there are enough inconsistencies in this world today without compounding them. The Army is not perfect by any means; however, neither is Congress; but I do not believe many of us would support a bill to set up a second national legislative arm. Instead, we work to make the one we have better.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BENTSEN].

Mr. BENTSEN. Mr. Chairman, we have before us this afternoon a very unusual bill. It is clear, I believe, that the proponents of this bill are sincerely convinced they are doing the Marine Corps, the Defense Establishment, and the Nation a service by presenting it and advocating its passage. In its briefest terms, this bill provides for a Marine Corps that will be no larger than 400,000, no smaller than 300,000, and whose Commandant shall be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now, at first glance, these provisions might appear to be a splendid guaranty that the Marine Corps, whose glorious traditions and enviable esprit de corps are famous, would always be available in adequate numbers, as an elite, first-line fighting force whose interests would be represented at the highest military and governmental level.

If in any manner I could bring myself to believe that the bill now before us would accomplish these ends, then I would most certainly support its passage.

A thoughtful appraisal of this bill, however, forces me to conclude that this bill, if enacted into law, would seriously jeopardize not only the peerless quality of the Marine Corps, but its very existence. The losers would be not only the officers and men of the Marine Corps today and tomorrow but every citizen of the United States, and perhaps the free world, too.

Let us for a few minutes speculate as to the outcome, if the bill now before us is approved by this body.

The first result of the formation of four full-strength marine divisions and four full-strength marine airwings would be to shift the center of gravity of the Marine Corps from within the naval establishment to the Department of the Army. This would be an unavoidable development. The augmentation of the Marine Corps to four full divisions and four airwings would inflate it all out of its proper relationship to the United States Navy. We in the Congress would indeed meet ourselves coming back if we were to pass this bill and create a second land army, and, at the same time, try to continue the original purpose of unification under the National Security Act. The two are inconsistent—and I think there are enough inconsistencies today without Congress deliberately compounding them. The Army is not perfect by any means. However, I do not believe many of us would intentionally support a bill to set up a second national army. Instead we would work to make the one we have better.

And would, then, this Marine Corps be the Marine Corps we envision with such a thrill of pride when we think of Iwo, Tarawa, and Okinawa? Would it be the same tough, spring-steel outfit that slowed the inundating onslaught of the Chinese Communists across the Yalu? Would it be the same men who retreated with such skill and courage, carrying their dead and all their unit equipment with them that they might return to fight again with the integrity of their organization unimpaired? The answer, gentlemen, the answer that none of us can crowd from his mind is emphatically, "No."

The Marine Corps has for many years, from 1910 until 1950, been maintained at a strength level of approximately 20 percent of that of the United States Navy. After the outbreak of the war in Korea, this percentage rose sharply to almost 30 percent and has been since maintained at an abnormally high level. According to figures I can find this is a higher ratio than has existed in the 40-year range of time prior to the Korean campaign.

I have heard reports that the proponents of this bill will seek to amend it to cut the number of allotted divisions from four to three but still leaving a base under this one service even though none of the other services has a base under them at this time. To me this is an admission of a mistaken principle. To me the proponents of the bill are saying, "Yes, we were in error in asking for a four-division base to be placed under the Marine Corps. This was bad, but it will not be quite as bad to have a three-division base under the Marine Corps."

This is fallacious arguing. If the principle is bad to start with, it remains bad even though we lessen it in degree. It goes back to the old analogy often made about pregnancy—that you just cannot be a little bit pregnant. We should leave the position of the Marine Corps as it is today in a rightfully proud

status as an integral part of the United States Navy.

Now, there has been one consequence of this expansion of the Marine Corps, an expansion, of course, below the level contemplated by the present bill, which might well forewarn us of the coming change in the character of the Marine Corps. You know what that consequence is—the Marines have been forced to turn to the draft to provide a substantial number of their personnel.

One of the historically great building forces for the Marines' esprit de corps was that every man was a volunteer—that the men in the corps accepted the tough discipline and the hard training because no marine could complain that he was drafted—he was there of his own free will and choice. Thus far, we have been assured, the hard core of voluntary regular leathernecks has brought the level of proficiency and morale of the draftee boot up to the level of their own. But how long a state of affairs can be maintained, where the change in quality of the draftee portion of that hitherto all-volunteer organization will always be in one direction—upward—one can only speculate. I fear it is inevitable—under an acceleration of these circumstances where the Marine Corps is part volunteer and part conscriptive—that there ultimately will be an averaging out of quality. Therefore, the result will be a level of proficiency and morale so far beneath that which we are accustomed to attach to the United States Marine Corps that the glorious history of the Marines may cease to be dynamic and growing and sooner or later we will find the word "finis" written on the final page of their annals.

A further consequence of legislation that relegates the Marine Corps to an adjunct of the Army would be a loss of distinct identity by the Marines, and ultimately, absorption by the Army. This absorption would be logically inevitable once the Marine Corps became nothing but a miniature edition of the United States Army. The economics of the situation would be such that the corps would be gobbled up the way the corner grocery store is gobbled up by a nationwide superchain.

Such an increase in strength would mean nothing to the Army, since by the time it occurred, all of us, you and I and the people of our Nation, would have come to think of our ground strength merely as the sum of Marine Corps and Army strength—a strength level we would maintain even though the Marines joined the Macedonian phalanx, the Texans of the Alamo, and the brilliant cavalry of the Confederate armies on a completed page of history.

If the force we know today as the Marine Corps began to fray around the edges and finally disappeared from view, the impact upon our military effectiveness would be serious enough. But there would be other impacts and other consequences. Consider the precedent that would be set, particularly, in the matter of Joint Chiefs of Staff representation, for other elite and specialized services. Why would not the commanding general of the Strategic Air Command, a mili-

tary force as elite, as highly trained, and far more striking power than that of the Marine Corps, have an equal place in the councils of the Joint Chiefs?

And if the commanding general of the Strategic Air Command, why not the Army's top expert in the employment of air-borne troops or armor? Certainly these two elite forces whose total strength is greater in peace and infinitely greater in war—why could not these leaders add their voices to an already overcrowded forum and slow down further the none-too-rapid pace with which the Joint Chiefs now complete their business before them?

There is the question of what the Marine Corps could contribute to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is the highest military board of strategy. Only the fundamentals in the broadest terms should be considered at that level. Otherwise its deliberations become cluttered with details to the detriment of important policy considerations.

The basic elements of military warfare are threefold, corresponding to the elements in which the war must be carried on. There can be no more—no more than the forces which operate basically in the air, forces which operate basically on the sea, forces which operate basically on the land.

It is obvious that if the Marine Corps Commandant is to contribute anything of major proportions to the strategic deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he must duplicate one of the principle concepts of warfare now included within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the argument is to be made that we are preparing a super-ready force to protect the Nation in the Marines, with their specialty of seaborne invasions, why cannot we just as readily argue and perhaps, even better, that we should develop and emphasize our airborne forces? If we want to single out any one specialist group, why not the airborne, so that we can drop into the enemy's homeland or anywhere and seize vital objectives in a matter of hours?

Those of us who have had experience with airborne units know the high esprit de corps with which these volunteer organizations carry on. Though the airborne corps has not the long tradition of the Marines behind it, I would venture to say that the airborne's fighting spirit and pride of organization is the equal of any service anywhere in the world.

The Marines are a special force organized, trained and equipped for special operations, particularly amphibious, in conjunction with the Navy. The Marines are unable to undertake land campaigns of any magnitude, without Army support. The Marines should not be considered as the Army's ready force or in any way construed as part of the Army, or forming a second land Army, as would obviously be the objective of this bill. I submit that when one considers the future type of warfare, the speed of transportability to any troubled area in the world, firepower, combat ability, effectiveness, and esprit de corps, you cannot help but arrive at the decision, that the airborne corps is outstanding as the Army's readiness force. As a matter of

fact, on that basis, I do not believe our paratroopers have any peers in the world. Incidentally, our paratrooper units are the only purely volunteer units that we have for ground combat in our Armed Forces today.

I need not discuss at any length my fear that to guarantee a minimum size for the Marine Corps, or for any service, might well lead us away from our traditional reliance upon the citizen volunteer in time of emergency and prompt us to take the first steps toward the perpetual maintenance of a large professional military force. Such a step, once taken, would commit us to support unnecessary large forces at some future date of little danger.

I have not yet mentioned the cost that would be added to the heavy burden now carried by the taxpayers if this proposed expansion were actually to be undertaken. It is obvious that this increased force to the Marines would result in more appropriations and a heavier burden to our taxpayers, heavier burdens at a time when we have just passed a military budget that most of us think we have cut to the very bone.

Along with the obvious costs of such expansion we have many indirect costs. There would be added the cost of some 200 additional ships for the Navy to provide the necessary amphibious lift and the budgeting of immense sums for the Army and the Navy to augment the logistic support and other services both now provide on a routine basis.

There are those proponents of the bill who argue that the Marine Corps is a much cheaper and more economical service to operate in the Nation's defense. The facts simply do not bear this out. Proponents, in their arguments, fail to point out the many supporting elements given by the other services to the Marine Corps so that the Marines may carry out their objectives. To compare the costs of the Marine Corps to the costs of the Army is like comparing the cost of the Army's airborne corps to the cost of the Navy because, obviously, the airborne corps receives many expensive services from the Army that would not appear in its costs alone. Such a comparison cannot be made fairly.

Let us go further. What does the Army do for the Marines in combat when the Marines are far inland, away from naval support? In such a case the Marines usually operate as part of the Army. Take a Marine division operating as a part of the United States Army Corps, as has been the case with the First Marine Division in Korea. The same support is afforded the Marine division by the Army as is rendered to an Army division. This support usually consists of engineers' support to build bridges, sweep mines, and do many of the other engineer-type tasks. It usually consists of artillery support to fire artillery missions. It is estimated that \$75,000,000 worth of food, ordnance equipment, and supplies alone were issued the Marine division by the Army by the end of fiscal year 1951.

This figure does not include other technical service estimates nor does it include ammunition. If these tremendous

additional expenditures were to be justified, the bill now before us would have to give complete assurance that the Nation would benefit proportionately. No such benefits are in prospect. On the contrary, I foresee increased taxation buying diminished military effectiveness.

Let me conclude with the reminder that our Nation is now confronted with the greatest challenge to its qualities of leadership that has ever occurred in our history. If we are to take up this challenge and answer it as we must—if we are to survive as a free nation—our military strength must be adequate to the task. If something is wrong with the Army's readiness, let us work at repairing or reforming the Army.

If something is wrong with the men on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if you lack confidence in their deliberations, let us replace them.

If those are the real issues at stake—and I cannot believe that they are—let us face them squarely and realistically. Let us then direct our energies to the building of adequate military power. In so doing, let us above all preserve those elements of strength, such as the United States Marine Corps, and let us refrain from any ill-advised acts that would tarnish the Marines' prestige, diminish their stature among the military forces of the world, and lessen the famous Marine fighting spirit.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. Mr. Chairman, I would like to associate myself today with those who have raised questions about the advisability of passing this bill, and those who have pointed out some of the dangers involved. I think there is a danger not only to the Marine Corps, as the distinguished gentleman from Texas so ably pointed out in his remarks preceding mine, but danger to the security program of our Nation.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. I yield.

Mr. TEAGUE. After it became known that I was going to oppose this bill, I learned that there are many more people in the lower ranks of the Marine Corps who are against this bill than there are in the higher brackets. Since it became known that I was going to oppose this bill, I have had many Marines come by and tell me that they are against it. Yesterday, one Marine Reserve said to me, "So, you are going to prevent me from coming back to duty," which means they will have to call up the Reserves, and the Reserves are naturally against it.

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi. There is a shortage of officers in the Marine Corps, and the Reservists are having to be called up involuntarily and they are having to be kept on duty for longer periods of time than they desire. The entire volunteer spirit of the Marine Corps is already endangered today because of the demands for personnel upon the Corps. If we act today to so enlarge it, what are we going to do to that morale of the Corps, which has been built up on this volunteer spirit? So much has been

made today about the great qualities of the Marine Corps as a fighting organization. I concur in what has been said about the Marine Corps. But, let us point out something else.

OTHER FIGHTERS

The other branches of our armed services are also fighters. They have also demonstrated on the field of battle that they are capable of fighting and defending this country of ours. There is no greater record achieved in combat than the record of some of these Army divisions in World War II and in Korea today where their personnel is made up almost entirely of draftees. There is no greater record of patriotism and courage and devotion to duty achieved in World War II than that demonstrated by the casualty lists of the Third Division, which received casualties nearly three times as much as the authorized strength of the division during the period that it fought in World War II.

Let us not get the idea that the only way we can fight a war is with the Marine Corps. We have fought our wars from our entire civilian population, drawn into our Armed Forces through the basis of the draft and voluntary enlistments. If we are going to establish a system which puts all of this priority upon the Marine Corps, which assigns it the first job of fighting, what does that mean to the working of the United States Army and the United States Air Force? Does it mean that the people in those services will believe that the Marines have to do all the fighting? Does it mean that the people are going to resist being drafted into the Marine Corps, just as today they resist being drafted into some of the units of the Army that are liable to see combat, and try to enlist in branches of the service that are not likely to encounter the enemy? We have to establish a system today whereby every citizen can be called upon to serve in whatever capacity it is deemed he can best serve our country. If we set up this system for the Marine Corps and decide they are going to have the primary share of the fighting, we are going to be establishing a type of force which is foreign to a civilian army system that we have fought with in this country down through the ages.

I raise the question that the wars which lie ahead of us, if we are to have any, the strength we are going to build up, if we are going to be able to avoid war and be able to resist Communist forces arrayed against us, must be achieved by drawing from all the mass of our population. We have to make use of the Army that is just as capable and just as ready to be an immediate striking force as any other branch. There have to be considerations as to what particular units are assigned to an immediate striking area, but our Army itself has to be thus prepared. That cannot be done with the idea of having just a few divisions from a special new army which we are setting up, ready to do this fighting.

We will make a grave mistake today if we forget the reality of warfare in our effort to commend the great record of the United States Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. VAN ZANDT].

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, this Nation has learned many valuable lessons from the war in Korea. Had it not been for Korea the Nation might still be proceeding on the theory of more defense for less money; we would still be pursuing the course that came perilously close to ending in disaster.

We were not prepared for Korea. It might have been Alaska or Western Europe. I shudder to think what might have happened. We were not ready.

But I am sure that those who previously viewed our defense program through rose-colored glasses are now well aware of our weaknesses. And I am confident that they will agree with me that the situation in which we found ourselves in June of 1950 must never be repeated.

Korea is the penalty we are paying for not having a force in readiness—a force capable of fighting immediately—a force fully equipped and continuously maintained at war strength. Mr. Speaker, we have the framework of that force in readiness in the Nation today—the United States Marine Corps.

Included in the bill now under consideration is a provision that will authorize the Marine Corps to expand to four war-strength divisions, and four air wings, along with the necessary supporting elements.

Mr. Chairman, we have within this Nation a potential force to police American vital interests throughout the world—the United States Marine Corps. I fervently hope that this Congress will see fit to authorize its expansion to three full-war-strength divisions of combat troops with the necessary supporting elements and three full war strength air wings. With such a force in being, ready to move at a moment's notice, I am of the firm opinion that we would deter future acts of aggression, short of total war.

Military weakness invites war. The very fact that the puppet government of North Korea and Communist China saw fit to match their strength against the United States must indicate that in certain parts of the world we are looked upon as being merely a potentially great military power—but incapable of immediately defending ourselves.

The time has come to recognize that a large police force, ready to move to all parts of the world to protect American interests, must be the responsibility of the United States. The fact that a combat team of the First Marine Division was under way to Korea within a few days after receipt of orders, fully equipped and immediately ready to fight on arrival, indicates the potentials of that great Corps. With proper transportation facilities available in the nature of ships and planes—always ready to move—we have within this Nation the potent nucleus of the police force necessary to maintain peace in all parts of the world.

I believe that the citizens of our Nation will sleep easier if they know that three

full-strength Marine divisions, fully equipped and always ready to fight, are in being at all times.

Communism respects only power, and three Marine divisions represent the type of power that a Communist respects.

I am not unmindful of the cost of maintaining three marine divisions and three marine air wings at full war strength. Nor have I overlooked the traditional 20 percent limitation of the size of the Navy, now suspended, but placed on the size of the Marine Corps, during the past 13 years. But we are not in traditional times. Unusual circumstances require unique remedies.

A Marine Corps strength of three full divisions with supporting aircraft and other necessary elements is programed in fiscal 1953 budget which the House has already passed. Thereafter, the annual cost would be slightly more than is planned for the Marine Corps in this fiscal year. If that strength could stop another Korea, it would more than pay for itself for many years to come. Such a force would require little over 258,000 officers and men. And I can reliably inform the House that these divisions, if authorized, could be ready for combat much sooner than many might imagine.

Mr. Chairman, in my years in Congress I have supported a large Navy, a large Army, and a large Air Force. But I know of no project of more immediate importance to the Nation than the formation of three marine infantry divisions, with their close support aircraft.

The war in Korea is a perfect example of the necessity for such a force. Nowhere in the history of modern warfare has there been a better illustration of the need for self-contained divisions operating with close air support. General Ridgway has only one marine division, and no more than that because our defense policy did not foresee a need for marines. But that relatively small force is a hard-hitting air-ground team. It is a balanced force of combined arms. This means that they have, within that force, the tools required to do the job. The only shortcoming of the Marines in Korea to date seems to be that there are not enough of them there.

And speaking of close air support, I think the House would be interested to know that practically every marine aviator has received extensive schooling in ground operations—and many of these pilots have actually served with ground troops. In fact, today, just as before World War II, no Regular marine officer is assigned to flight training until he has completed 2 years training with ground troops. How reassuring it is to the man on the ground to know that the pilot of the aircraft over his head understands his problems, knows his organization, and fully comprehends his capabilities and limitations. When an obstacle must be removed from the path of an advancing battalion of marines, the marine aviators called upon to support the attack know what that battalion can do, what it cannot do, and the help it needs. It is this close coordination, yes, this close family relationship, that makes close air support a reality in the Marine Corps.

Now, why do we need three divisions of marines to establish this objective of maintaining a hard-hitting, fast-moving police force?

I am not a tactician nor a military strategist, but I believe that you will agree that there should be contained in any task force, such as I have proposed today, the units capable not only of aiding in the defense of the United States, if necessary, but also of preventing the outbreak in other areas vital to America of the type of war that is now being fought in Korea. While the deployment of troops of this nature would be a matter for determination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, I submit that a war strength marine division on the east coast, and a war strength division of marines on the west coast, plus two marine divisions overseas, ready to fight at a moment's notice, would make any future aggressor think twice before moving.

If the situation warrants such deployment, I feel certain that two full Marine Corps divisions in Western Europe would go far to bolster the morale of the Atlantic Pact nations. The European recovery program and the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact are great projects in the maintenance of freedom, but it must now be obvious to all that dollars and equipment are not enough.

The marine is a professional soldier, trained in the art of warfare, and specializing almost to a man in the art of small wars, amphibious operations, and rapid movement. The Marine Corps is not burdened with the additional assignments usually given to the Army. They do not have to maintain large administrative forces. They procure nothing for themselves relatively speaking, and they can devote their entire energies to the unpleasant but necessary task of learning and perfecting the art of destruction. Korea has taught us, if there ever was any question, that bayonets, hand grenades, rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery are still very much a part of modern warfare. But above all, I think the thing that impresses the American people and the rest of the world more than anything else is the mobility of the Marine Corps. If ships are alongside, they can be combat loaded and on their way within 72 hours. The marines they carry can be in action almost immediately after the outbreak of hostilities.

Mr. Chairman, from a purely dollar and cents viewpoint, it seems to me that we have an investment in freedom throughout the world that must be protected. I know of no better guardians of that freedom than the Marine Corps.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the Marines have demonstrated their qualifications for the job as this Nation's force in readiness. They're a proud lot—these Marines—but with justifiable reason. They believe their corps to be the finest fighting outfit in the world. I don't know whether they are or not, but, looking at the record, I'm not prepared to dispute their claim. And if you want reassurance on this point—ask any marine.

I cite these things because I believe that that kind of spirit—that kind of

fierce pride—is essential to the force which we must have ready to go anywhere, any time, for any reason.

The chips are down—time is running against us. If we do not prevent further outbreaks, our military strength, our equipment, and our solvency will surely disappear. We can't afford to be caught napping again. Our prestige in the eyes of the world has been lowered; our inability to prevent Korea has invited similar performances in other parts of the world. We must act now—firmly and resolutely—and we must be ready to put down future outbreaks immediately where they adversely affect our interests. If we can demonstrate to the world our ability to stop aggression by Russia or her satellites in such regions, we can prevent their occurrence there and elsewhere.

The bill in addition to creating a Marine Corps of not less than three full-strength combat divisions and three full-strength air wings also makes the Commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have heard many arguments presented by Department of Defense witnesses in opposition to this feature of the bill. Some said that the Chief of Naval Operations can adequately represent the Marine Corps in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Others said that the addition of the Commandant would make the Joint Chiefs of Staff unwieldy. There is no question in my mind that the Chief of Naval Operations knows more about naval operations than do the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps but I do not believe that the Chief of Naval Operations would contend that he knows more about amphibious assault landings and land operations following an initial landing than the Commandant of the Marine Corps. In 1949 we were advised by the highest authority that large amphibious operations were a thing of the past. If that is the case then the Inchon landing began a new era in history. Korea is a perfect example of the type of war that entails amphibious assault landings in the initial stages. And there is no one in the Department of Defense who can guarantee this Nation that there will not be more Koreas. And I doubt very much whether any member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would again predict that amphibious assault landings as such are a thing of the past. Amphibious assault landings entail special training and that knowledge should always be available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the continued presence of the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a sitting member of the Joint Chiefs, not just as a guest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the spirit moves them to extend an invitation. I think the American people have too much respect and admiration for the Marine Corps, and too great an appreciation of their great importance in the science of warfare, to want them to continue to be relegated to the position of being represented by proxy at the Nation's highest military level.

To say that adding the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs

of Staff would make that organization unwieldy, obviously invites similar criticism of the addition of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which Congress authorized in 1949. I heard no such complaint from the Defense Establishment about that addition. In fact, they urged it upon the Congress.

Let me say one word of caution. This bill is not intended, nor should it ever be construed, as an effort for or an invitation to, a separate military department for the Marine Corps. The Commandant testified that he did not favor such a separation, and while there may be individuals with such ambitions, no Marine officer has ever suggested such a move in his official capacity. The Marine Corps will and should remain under the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with the harsh, cold facts of survival and petty service pride must be eliminated. I am convinced, as was the entire Committee on Armed Services in March, 1950, without dissenting vote, that the military strength and efficiency of our Armed Forces would be enhanced by the addition of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am confident that this bill, in its entirety, will receive the overwhelming support of the House and that if it is vetoed, as some forecast, it will be overwhelmingly passed over such veto.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. I yield.

Mr. SHORT. To have such an expanded Marine Corps would also enable us to mobilize all of our industry as well as our military might. Earlier in the day one of the speakers said that we were building up a special police force of marines. The President can call up any branch of the armed services at any time.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. That is right. To me the striking force this bill provides is designed to save for the American taxpayer a lot of money. Some day in the future I hope when this country of ours, if not the world, is at peace that we can skeletonize the Armed Forces of our country, and that applies to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. When this reduction takes place we will have in being at all times ready for any emergency the mobile striking force of the United States Marine Corps as provided for by this bill.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Is the gentleman arguing that the Marine Corps is trained any better or differently than the Army?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. The Marine Corps is trained in many phases of warfare, in fact in all phases of warfare, which includes not only land warfare but air warfare as well as naval warfare. They are all-around military men.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Speaking of the all-around soldiers and without taking anything from any other branch of the

service, I wonder if the gentleman, himself, a distinguished veteran, could tell us what he thinks would have happened on Kojima Island if we had had marines in charge of that camp?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. In a few words, I doubt if a Marine general would have been there without having an adequate guard. However, had a Marine general been captured I am sure there would have been 65,000 or 70,000 POW's liquidated in a matter of a few minutes and the Marine general would have been released.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VAN ZANDT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. I think if any general, whether he was in the Marine Corps or the Army, had been caught in any such ridiculous situation, the Communists should have been told to keep him, that we did not want him back. But if you refer to mistakes of the Army, we can refer to mistakes of the Marine Corps. All of the services make mistakes, including the marines as well as the rest of them.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. That is correct. We all make mistakes.

Mr. Chairman, I want to plead for the passage of this bill because I believe in the end it is going to give to the American people that type of striking force we will have to have in future years to protect our interests throughout the entire world. While we maintain this striking force it will be provided at a reduced cost so far as our military is concerned and it will save the taxpayers of this country a lot of money.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KEARNEY].

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill which assures the Nation of an adequate marine ready-combat force and places the Marine Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to whose councils I believe he can make a valuable contribution.

Permit me to say, at this point, that it is my considered opinion that our Armed Services Committee has done a particularly fine job in getting in all the interested parties on both sides of this question and permitting them to have their full day in court. Then, with all the evidence in, the committee analyzed the issues and presented this House with a carefully detailed analysis of the evidence and arguments for and against this measure.

The Armed Services Committee reported favorably on S. 677 with amendments by a vote, I understand, of 23 to 1. I submit that the greatest weight should be given to the recommendations of the committee.

This bill, with the amendment to be offered by the committee, provides for a floor of 235,000 enlisted Marines so that there will always be enough combat-ready Marines for the three divisions and three air wings authorized by the bill.

We have been told by the opposition that the Marine Corps should not be protected by a legislative floor. In this connection, may I remind my colleagues that not one of the other services has ever

been in danger of being reduced to a mere parade and police outfit. Within my memory and within the experience of most of my colleagues, the Marine Corps has been the target of repeated attempts to eliminate it as an effective combat force.

And as recently as 1950, Louis Johnson, then Secretary of Defense, told the Congress and repeated to the press that the Marine Corps would be maintained at a strength of two divisions. Yet he knew, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff knew, that plans were even then being written to reduce the Marines to six half-strength battalions. Any military man knows that this plan would have reduced the Marine Corps to about the strength of one good fighting regiment.

In view of the repeated attempts to reduce the Marine Corps, it is my opinion that the Armed Services Committee showed excellent judgment in recommending that the Senate bill be amended to authorize a minimum personnel strength for the Marines. Only in this way can the Congress insure that the Marine Corps will be maintained at a strength that will enable it to carry out the missions assigned to it.

I have heard the arguments of the opposition in the past and there is nothing new in these repeated attacks on legislation which would insure an adequate Marine combat-ready force. We heard the same kind of arguments in 1945, 1946, and 1947. At that time the opposition did not want the roles and missions of the Marine Corps written into law; they wanted the Marine Corps functions "flexible," as they called it, subject to change by an Executive order of the President. In 1948 and 1949, the Defense Department urged that we give the Secretary of Defense such unrestricted power that he could have transferred Marine infantry to the Army and Marine aviation to the Air Force. And there is considerable evidence that the Secretary of Defense had under actual consideration the transfer of Marine aviation to the Air Force, when the vigilance of Mr. Vinson, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee, brought this venture to a halt. It is to the everlasting credit of this Congress that the power of the Secretary of Defense to make any such transfers, or to transfer or assign the functions of the Marine Corps, was specifically restricted by appropriate amendments to the National Security Act.

Now we have before us a bill to provide and insure that this country will always have an adequate ready force of Marines to take the first shocks of aggression, which the late Admiral Sherman predicted we might well expect in a "series of small wars" in the next decade. When this legislation is so badly needed, I want to go on record as saying that I have very little patience—and I believe this House will have very little patience—with the kind of sniping that this bill has been getting from the Pentagon. The same kind of sniping that has been leveled against the National Guard of the United States. The argument of the opposition that the Marine Corps needs no legislative floor, that its minimum strength should remain "flex-

ible," or proportioned to the number of sailors in the Navy, is an old and worn-out argument, the purpose of which has been repeatedly obvious to this House. In regard to the Joint Chiefs of Staff question—the principal argument I have heard against placing the Marine Commandant on the Joint Chiefs is that the Marines are already adequately represented by the Chief of Naval Operations. This is refuted by the cold facts that by law the Chief of Naval Operations does not command the Marine Corps nor is the Commandant of the Marine Corps subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations. Also, the Marine Corps is not part of the Navy, but is a separate service by law, court decision, and opinion of the Navy judge advocate general. For these reasons the Chief of Naval Operations cannot and should not represent the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations has no more real reason to represent the Marine Corps than he does any of the other services. One can but imagine the reaction if the Chief of Naval Operations should claim the authority to represent the Army or Air Force in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should remember that like the Air Force and Army, the Marine Corps, too, is a separate service.

Logic as well as legal status demonstrates why the Chief of Naval Operations must not represent the Marine Corps in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Marine divisions are infantry. They fight on land; as they did at Belleau Wood, on Iwo Jima, and now in Korea. They use rifles, machine guns, bazookas, and tanks, and artillery. They are the ones qualified to represent the Marines particularly on the matter of weapons, for example, or in making war plans—on whether it would require a battalion or a regiment of Marines to capture a specified objective? Or how much artillery they will need—or how many tanks? Or how much time should be allotted for the assault and what the probable casualties will be?

The answer is that while the naval members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are undoubtedly experts on the employment of battleships, carriers, cruisers, and submarines, they are definitely not qualified to represent the Marines on their kind of fighting.

Now the Senate bill would make the Marine Commandant a consultant. The Joint Chiefs could consult him if they felt like it. But I call your attention to the fact that the Joint Chiefs never invited the Marine Commandant to their meetings until after Chairman CARL VINSON introduced his bill, and then they hurried up to get a few consultations on the record.

It is my considered opinion that the only way to get the Marine Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a status where he can do his service and the country the most good, is to make him a regular member. Let us permit him to go in the front door and speak his piece, not in the back door and sit in the back row, as a consultant, and speak only when the members of this exclusive club consider that their discussions are of any concern to the Marine Corps.

Before closing my remarks, I should like to make one brief observation. There has been some suggestion that the passage of this Marine Corps bill, or the advocating of its passage, is a reflection on the other services. That is far from the truth.

Never in my hearing and to my knowledge have any supporters of this measure ever cast any slurs on any other branch of the services or any organization.

However, I have noted with some surprise and concern, that many critics of this bill have gone back to World War I in search of an opportunity to make references which have no bearing on the merits of the bill but which exaggerate, distort, and attempt to rekindle some old-time interservice grievances. To my mind, such attempts to encourage and aggravate these interservice jealousies and animosities constitute a great and grave disservice not only to our Armed Forces but to the Nation.

Looking back over the military history of our country, I think we should be proud indeed that the Army and the Marines have fought side by side in every war of the United States against the enemies of our Nation.

And, out in Korea today our Marines and soldiers are again fighting side by side; digging into the same dirt, wallowing in the same slimy mud, and shedding the same American blood for their country.

As one whose entire military career has been associated with the Army and the National Guard, I deem it a privilege to support this bill and wholeheartedly recommend its passage by the House.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEARNEY. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Is there not a fundamental change of concept involved in this bill, as I understand it? Historically the Army has been the professional arm of the armed strength of our Nation. By placing a floor under the strength of the Marine Corps so that when the strength of the entire Armed Forces goes up or down the Marine Corps shall be fairly well stabilized, are we not deciding here today that the professional armed core of our country shall be the Marine Corps?

Mr. KEARNEY. I do not think so, but I should like to call the gentleman's attention to the fact that in one of the previous Congresses we placed a floor or ceiling on the Air Corps of 70 groups.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Would not the gentleman make a correction that it was a 70-group ceiling; it was not a floor, it was a ceiling?

Mr. KEARNEY. Call it a ceiling if you will.

Mr. YATES. The floor is a minimum force, will not the gentleman agree, as opposed to a maximum force?

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEARNEY. I yield.

Mr. COLE of New York. First I want to commend the gentleman on the very excellent statement he has made. I

compliment him on it, as it comes from him as a lifetime Army officer, who not only knows the operations and problems of the Army but also as a legislator is interested in national defense and our national security. But let me probe the gentleman's mind just in this respect: In my opinion, section 2 of this bill is by far more important than section 1. Section 2 makes the Commandant of the Marine Corps a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of right. There are two ways this can be done: Either let the present Joint Chiefs invite the Commandant to come in as a consultant when in their opinion matters relating to the Marine Corps are involved, or, on the other hand, let the Commandant of the Marine Corps come in on his own right, and then when he finds that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are dealing with something in which he has no interest, allow him to invite himself out.

Mr. KEARNEY. It is my understanding the only time the Commandant of the Marine Corps was invited to attend any sessions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff occurred since the introduction of this bill.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, we have just heard from a great general of the State of New York and the Army. I am happy now to yield 12 minutes to another great general, a hero of the Pacific war, General DEVEREUX, of Maryland.

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, in approaching this question, I think it should be looked at primarily as a question of what is best for the defense of our country. I do not wish to be repetitious on many things that have been so ably presented by other Members of this great body, but I have made a few notes as we have been going along in this discussion, and I may skip from one to the other, but I would like to cover them and give my answers.

First of all is the question of cost. The distinguished gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HEBERT] conducted a very effective investigation on various costs. If you people will refer to the hearings, you will find that the Marine Corps, though not absolutely clean, came out much better than any other branch of the services. The question was brought up as to what General MacArthur's position would be on this bill. I am not in a position to say, but this I do know. When General MacArthur called for additional planes in Korea, he called for Marine aviation so that they could furnish that wonderful close air support.

The question arises as to why we should have a floor under the Marine Corps. That is something which should be determined by the Congress, and not something to be left to those who are not directly responsible to the people of the country.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield.

Mr. TEAGUE. Is it any more proper to put a floor under the Marine Corps than it is for any other service?

Mr. DEVEREUX. It is a decision which is up to the Congress as to whether or not we want to have this ready force in being, and ready to go out at a moment's notice.

Mr. TEAGUE. Why should there not then be a floor under the other services as well as the Marine Corps? Is there any reason why the Marine Corps should be treated differently than the others?

Mr. DEVEREUX. Basically, yes. The Army is designed to expand in case of a national emergency. I might say to the gentleman from Texas, whom I respect and on whose side I am in many of our discussions in the Committee on Veterans' Affairs, I do not approach this in any manner of trying to pull down the other branches of the service. I have the utmost respect for the Army, for example. I am an Army junior, if you will. I have close relatives in all other branches of the service.

Mr. TEAGUE. I certainly do not want to pull down any of the other branches of the service, neither do I want to build up one at what I believe to be the expense of some other branch.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield.

Mr. SHORT. We are granting no favors to the Marine Corps at all, and we are not trying to place them above the other branches of the service. But, the Marine Corps by its very nature, and constitution and assignments of missions, does have a peculiar and particular job to perform.

Mr. DEVEREUX. There is no question about it.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield.

Mr. YATES. Is it not implicit in the question I asked General Kearney? Are we not here deciding that our professional army for the future, whether the rest of the forces go up or down, that our professional army shall be the Marine Corps rather than the Army proper?

Mr. DEVEREUX. No; I do not think so. First of all, we have professionals in the Marines, and professionals in the Army. The Army, as I said before to the gentleman from Texas, is primarily designed to expand in case of national emergency, and the nucleus upon which they will expand will be the professional army.

Mr. YATES. Is there not, nevertheless, a hard core of the Army that has been used in the past as the professional army of our Armed Forces, and do we not propose by putting a floor under the Marine Corps to now make it the Marine Corps?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I do not quite follow the gentleman's question. I have given the explanation as to why we should have this force in being, and I have also gone along with the gentleman that we must have a nucleus of professionals in the Army upon which to expand.

Mr. YATES. But are you not saying you must have two professional armies; one, the professional army that we have had in the past, the United States Army proper, and now the Marine Corps, because the Marine Corps is primarily fighting the missions of war facing us in the future?

Mr. DEVEREUX. We have always had professionals in the Marine Corps.

That has been the most professional service we have had.

Mr. YATES. But has it not been a part of the Navy, the striking force of the Navy, rather than a professional standing army?

Mr. DEVEREUX. We can go ahead and talk around in circles all day.

Mr. KEARNEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEARNEY. There seems to be some thought on the floor of the House that this bill is intended as a sort of favor to the Marine Corps. Does not the gentleman agree with me that it is a favor in the interest of national defense?

Mr. DEVEREUX. There is no question about that.

Mr. SHORT. That is all it is. The Marine Corps has been in the "doghouse" and we are trying to get it out and give it an equal footing on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. JACKSON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. JACKSON of California. Touching on the point of a professional corps, it seems to me that since 1775, on more than 200 occasions when violence has flared, whether it is in the Everglades of Florida or in the Caribbean or Latin-America or anywhere else, the first group that has been called upon, because of a state of readiness, has been the Marine Corps, in excess of 200 different occasions. Had they not been readily available, the Seminole Indians might still be running Florida.

Mr. DEVEREUX. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield.

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. VAN ZANDT. Is it not true that the Marine Corps is a specialized unit by reason of the all-around training that the individual member receives?

Mr. DEVEREUX. There is no question about that. I think that has been brought out very fully.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Does the gentleman mean to infer that in the past Congress has let go of the control of the number of men in the Armed Forces? That is not the impression you mean to leave here, is it?

Mr. DEVEREUX. I certainly do, budgetary-wise.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Would it be possible for the Marine Corps to have more men in it than the Army and Navy combined? That is, if we went back as far as 1940?

Mr. DEVEREUX. No. I hardly think so, because the Congress still has control.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Would you say that the Army and Navy had just as much merit toward obtaining a floor as the Marines have, in view of the fact that the Constitution only recites that the

Congress shall provide and maintain an Army and Navy?

Mr. DEVEREUX. In that respect, I believe the Marines were established before the Constitution was even established.

Now let me go ahead with my observations, if you please.

The question comes up about unification. The gentleman from California said that perhaps we are going into more divisions. If there is unification, the Marine Corps definitely has that. They are supplied in many cases by the Army and the Navy with medical assistance. Their chaplains come from the Navy. The Marines go to all of the Army or Navy schools, where they recognize that they may have a particular ability to teach one particular subject. So I believe in that respect, the Marine Corps is in a little better position for establishing policies in our country; they could make a great contribution.

Some remarks were made about what General Vandegrift had to say as to the size of the Marine Corps. That was several years ago, before our thinking had been changed. I believe we must recognize that changes are necessary, and therefore I support this bill.

Now, we come to the question of the Commandant of the Marine Corps being on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Let me bring to your attention that every Commandant of the Marine Corps has been the product of cross education in the various armed services. He has probably attended either one of the high-level naval schools or Army schools in the past. Today we recognize that in the National War College right here in Washington, where all branches of the service are represented, including the State Department and the Department of Commerce. I think the Commandant, through this cross education which he has had, can contribute something to better thinking on higher-level policies. It has been so recognized throughout the entire world. The Amphibious Warfare School in Quantico is the best amphibious warfare school in the entire world, and many other countries send their students there to learn what they can in that respect.

Had we had the Commandant of the Marine Corps in a position where he could make contributions to our military thinking, it is probable that the statement made by the present Chairman of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff to the effect that we would have no more amphibious landings would not have been given such publicity. Perhaps if we had had the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, close air support would have been emphasized; perhaps if we had had him on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dive bombing would have been exploited like the Navy and the Marine Corps did.

I would like to touch now on one little thing in closing—something that is very basic: It has been suggested that if we have the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, perhaps we will have an overbalance of military control. But if you have more people up there representing different views

and in a position to present them to the civilian heads of our Government, if you can get a wider dispersion of thinking, that, in my personal opinion, is extremely safe; it is a safeguard for the best interests of our country. Suppose there were but one person in place of the staff—one person representing the entire military thinking—that one person could inject his ideas completely on the civilians who are the heads of our Government, but with four people reporting we have that division which, in my humble opinion, makes it extremely safe and the proper thing to do.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. ANGELL].

AMERICAN AGED BYPASSED

Mr. ANGELL. Mr. Chairman, I am strongly in favor of this bill and in maintaining the Marine Corps at full strength. I want briefly to discuss another matter.

Mr. Chairman, I am glad that both the House and the Senate are considering legislation which will give some increase in the allowances to our worthy citizens who are recipients of social-security benefits. As I have said in the heading of these remarks, America's aged have been bypassed by the Congress. While we have been spending billions of dollars for help to our neighbors overseas and hundreds of billions of dollars for armaments and war, we have failed utterly to provide even a minimum of assistance to the elderly citizens of America who are in need and who are denied the right to participate in remunerative industry. While we have enacted legislation for those retired from industry and some old-age assistance to others, we have completely ignored another large segment of our population who receive nothing from either of the programs.

As I have often said on this floor in my judgment, there is only one sound solution to this problem and that is the enactment of a Federal old-age security program, Nation-wide, which will provide security for all aged citizens who are unable to participate in industry or remunerative employment and who are without the bare necessities of life. H. R. 2678, which I introduced February 15, 1951, and its companion bill, H. R. 2679, introduced by our colleague the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. BLATNIK] would, if enacted, provide such a program. This legislation would provide every adult citizen in the United States with equal basic Federal insurance, permitting retirement with benefits at age 60, and also covering total disability, from whatever cause, for certain citizens under 60; would give protection to widows with children; would provide an ever-expanding market for goods and services through the payment and distribution of such benefits in ratio to the Nation's steadily increasing ability to produce, with the cost of such benefits to be carried by every citizen in proportion to the income privileges he enjoys.

Having failed to secure committee consideration of this legislation, I filed Discharge Petition No. 4 to bring this

bill on the floor, and 179 of our Members have signed the petition. I most sincerely urge that every Member of the House interested in the welfare of these elderly citizens sign this petition at once so that this legislation may be brought on the floor at this session for consideration.

This is particularly apropos in view of the fact that the Ways and Means Committee of the House is now considering amendments to the social-security program and there has already been introduced in the Senate amendments for a similar purpose.

In support of the Senate amendments it was observed in the Senate that since 1948 the Federal contribution for public assistance has remained virtually the same, although some States have been able to improve their programs so that they are qualified for more Federal aid. In 1950 Congress extended the program of aid to the permanently and totally disabled, which has added some 130,000 persons to those who receive this indirect Federal aid. Federal contributions would be raised by approximately 20 percent, but since the Federal Government pays only 53 percent of the total amounts paid to those in the four assistance categories, the direct effect of these amendments would be to increase the average recipient's payment by only a little more than 10 percent. Also included in the classification of public assistance is general assistance, which is financed entirely by State and local funds, and which gives aid to some 336,000 persons per month. If we take this into consideration, the Federal share of all public assistance is reduced to 46.6 percent.

These amendments make no new requirements of the States, except to prohibit them from reducing their share of the load. We certainly should not want to give them added Federal funds, only to have them cut down their own contributions. The Senate amendments also stipulate that, in determining need, the States need not take into consideration the first \$50 per month earned by a recipient in agricultural or nursing pursuits. This provision would apply only for 1 year, and is designed to encourage public assistance recipients to seek part-time work in these fields where there is a critical shortage of personnel. The States should match this additional money with funds of their own, thus giving the aged, blind, and disabled \$10 more. Twice before we have raised the Federal share of public assistance by the same method, namely, by revising the matching formula under which the grants are computed and raising by \$5 the limit to which the Federal Government participates in the State programs. Briefly, the effect of this amendment would be as follows:

For individuals receiving aid to the aged, blind, and disabled, the Federal Government would put up four-fifths—\$20—of the first \$25 per month, rather than three-fourths—\$15—of the first \$20, as at present. Thereafter, the Federal Government would provide one-half of the amount in excess of \$25, and up to \$55, per individual per month. At

present, the Federal share is one-half of the amount in excess of \$20 and up to \$50.

With regard to dependent children, the Federal Government would be directed to put up four-fifths—\$12—of the first \$15 per month, rather than three-fourths—\$9—of the first \$12, for each dependent child. Thereafter, the Federal Government would pay half the amount in excess of \$15, up to a maxi-

mum of \$30 per child per month, where there is only one child in a home receiving assistance, and to a maximum of \$21 each for additional children in the same home.

The following chart shows a few pertinent statistics regarding the Federal-State public-assistance program and the effects of these amendments. The figures given are the latest available from the Federal Security Agency:

Public-assistance amendment to H. R. 7230

(Amounts in thousands)

Category of aid	Current number of recipients (February 1952)	Amount annually paid by Federal Government (fiscal year ending June 30, 1951)	Federal portion of total paid to recipients (percent for fiscal year)	Increase proposed by this amendment			
				Per individual per month	Federal cost per year	Percent increase in Federal share	Percent increase to recipients
Old age.....	2,685	\$794,013	54	\$5	\$161,100	20	10.8
Blind.....	97	24,453	45	5	5,820	24	10.8
Permanently and totally disabled.....	132	114,944	46	5	7,920	153	124.4
Dependent children (individuals).....	1,531	288,784	51	3	55,116	19	9.7
Total.....	3,445	1,122,204	53		229,956	20	10.6

¹ These figures are not representative because the program of aid to the permanently and totally disabled did not go into operation until October 1950.

The Senate amendments do not constitute a yardstick in respect to the cost of living. Certainly if we were to adopt a yardstick it would provide for assistance far greater in amount than that provided by these amendments, which provide for a very meager sum to enable these people to eke out a bare existence. We could not properly regard amendments of this sort, providing for such small increases in assistance, as a yardstick. The 53-cent dollar has cut in half old-age assistance. High living costs make their problem critical.

These elderly persons are "up against it," and something should be done at once. One assistance we could give them would be to check some of the administration's reckless-spending policies which are deflating every dollar and are putting these elderly people "behind the eight ball." We must not forget that those who are not covered by social security are likewise suffering, and would get no assistance from these amendments. If we are to consider expenditures, the United States should be willing to do its duty by these needy people, regardless of what other expenditures may be.

I regret very much that this necessary increase in assistance has been delayed so long, because these needy aged and blind persons and dependent children should certainly be given increases now proposed. How anyone could object to it, I cannot understand.

During the past 18 months, since the war in Korea began, and during which time the elderly people of our country have been suffering from inflation which resulted in an increase in the cost of living, the United States Government has been destroying large amounts of good, edible food which these needy people could have used. For instance, since the outbreak of the Korean war the Government has destroyed more than 58,000,000 bushels of potatoes. This is enough to make a solid trainload of potatoes over

500 miles long. Today the housewife cannot find potatoes. That has occurred since the outbreak of the war in Korea. Many of these elderly people need potatoes. At the same time, more than 300,000,000 dozen eggs have been destroyed, at a cost of millions of dollars to the American taxpayers. It is wrong.

Those who do not wish to have the Federal Government take care of these needy persons can always find some excuse. I call the attention of my colleagues to the fact that before this session ends we will have an opportunity to show by our votes whether we are willing to have the Federal Government take care of the aged and blind persons and dependent children.

Mr. Chairman, as shown by the foregoing observations made on the floor of the Senate, the time is overdue for an overhauling of the whole social-security program with reference to old-age benefits, and the enactment of a Nation-wide Federal plan giving equal consideration to all elder citizens throughout the Nation and thereby remove the restrictions in the present program, which is applicable only to a few selected groups. I urge that Petition No. 4, on the Speaker's desk, be signed at once so that such legislation may be considered by the House without further delay.

Mr. WALTER. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Flood] may extend his remarks at this point in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Chairman, the legislation which you are considering today is freighted with importance for the Marine Corps. It is also freighted with importance for the defense policy of the United States.

The bill would do two things. First it provides a Marine Corps organization of

four Marine divisions, four supporting air wings, and the necessary supporting units. It places a ceiling of 400,000 and a floor of 300,000 on the strength of the corps. Second, and more important, in my view, it would seat the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There can be little argument on the general proposition that the Marine Corps makes a quality contribution to American arms, or that we shall always need Marine ready-combat forces. From the nineteenth century on, through Veracruz, World War I, Iceland, Guadalcanal, and now Korea, Americans have come to depend on the Marine Corps as a national force in readiness—not ready 2 years from now, 6 months from now, or even a month from now, but ready now. For this reason, I cannot see much ground for opposition to the objective of the bill's first section. That objective, as I read it, is simply to make it mandatory that the Defense Department always remembers to maintain a Marine Corps force in readiness—an air-ground force commensurate with the national responsibilities of the United States. Certainly if England had had such a force—if her own Royal Marines had not been forced to the wall—the Gallipoli fiasco, or the loss of Norway could have been averted.

A strong argument for the four-division concept was well stated before the Senate Armed Services Committee by a distinguished former Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable John Nicholas Brown. Mr. Brown's argument, if I recall it precisely, was simply this: The Marine Corps' salient contribution, historically, has been as a national force in readiness. For this reason, the need for Marines will always be proportionately greatest when the other Armed Services are at low ebb. As the other three services mobilize, the need for Marines returns to normal.

In my view, the national need for Marine divisions and Marine tactical air, should be the yardstick of our strength. If—as Congress seems to feel today—we need certain Marine forces, let us have the Marine Corps we need.

You will see that I do not regard this legislation as a horizons-unlimited signal for Marine Corps expansion. One of the best aspects of section 1 is its 400,000 ceiling on the Marine Corps. No Marine wants his Corps to become a second land army; that is not the Marine Corps' job. In World War II, we discovered empirically that we could field six excellent Marine divisions, but I doubt that we could have raised many more without real dilution in quality. And quality, not size, is the objective of the Marine Corps.

At the outset, I emphasized that I regard section 2 of this bill as much the more important, not only from the Marine Corps viewpoint, but from that of the Nation.

It is far more necessary now than before unification that the Marine Corps be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Before passage of the National Security Act, the top level of the Navy Department was the level at which im-

portant decisions affecting the Marine Corps were made.

I now believe firmly that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be a Joint Chiefs of Staff member. I believe this, because an effective Marine Corps requires a voice at the levels—now high in the Defense Department rather than in the Navy Department—where armed services policy and all major decisions affecting the corps are determined.

I have mentioned the benefits which this would give to the Marine Corps. There are larger benefits, not only for the Naval Establishment, but for the Nation.

The United States is a maritime power, and its strategy is maritime in character. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as now organized, includes today only one voice for sea power as against three for land and land-based air. By adding to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Commandant of the Marine Corps, you will add not only the professional experience and versatility of the Marine Corps in all elements—land, sea, and air—but a voice which can speak with authority and knowledge for the maritime interest of the United States.

Now the cross-service experience of the Marine Corps is traditional, and perhaps we take it too much for granted, but the fact is, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is probably the only professional military man in this country, on the average, who really understands the major problems of all three other service chiefs. As an example of this, I need only point out that 17 out of 19 Commandants of the Marine Corps to date have served at sea as officers of Navy combatant ships; and that 15 of those 19 have served on shore in combat immediately beside or under command of the Army. In recent times, since we have had a modern system of professional education in the service, it is a fact that, with one exception, the Commandants of the Marine Corps have graduated from many professional schools conducted by services other than their own; more so, I believe, than have any of the officers so far seated on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thus, not only because of continual cross-service experience, but by virtue of continual cross-service education, the Commandants of the Marine Corps seem to be natural choices for Joint Chiefs of Staff membership. And I believe that inclusion of the Commandant among the Joint Chiefs of Staff would add a broadly catalytic element by no means now always present.

In conclusion, I favor the bill. I favor its organizational and strength provisions because they will make an effective, useful Marine Corps available for the common defense. I am now convinced that the corps needs representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and I believe that such representation is strongly in the national interest.

The marines have never asked for anything but the right to fight for their country. Today, we are asking something more for the Marine Corps: Not only the right to fight but the right to

render a broad military contribution to America's defense.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD].

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my colleagues, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. THOMPSON], the gentleman from Washington [Mr. JACKSON], and the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. CHATHAM], may extend their remarks immediately following mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Montana?

There was no objection.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that certain questions have been raised here today, I would like to call the attention of the House to the support behind this particular measure by the Marine Corps Reserve Officers' Association and by the Marine Corps League. I would like also to say in response to the statement made by the gentleman from California [Mr. HOLIFIELD], that this bill would create a new service, a fourth service, that that is entirely in error; that the Marine Corps is already a service so established and so noted in the annals of the Navy as well as in the annals of the Defense Establishment.

I have here in my hand an advertising brochure put out by the Department of Defense with reference to a report to the people on America's first Armed Forces Day, May 20, 1950. You will note in the picture on the front of this folder a soldier from the Army, a sailor, a soldier from the Air Force, and a marine, indicating, of course, that the Defense Establishment recognizes that there are four services.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. In the National Defense Act of 1947, H. R. 2319, we specify the Army, the Navy, the Department of the Air Force. Then, for the Joint Chiefs, in that same act, we specify the Chiefs of the three services. Does the gentleman contend that the Marine Corps is a completely separate and a different service?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Not in the manner that the gentleman has in mind. It is in a certain sense, but ever since the beginning of time, almost, the Marine Corps has been recognized as a separate service, and there are opinions handed down by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to the effect that this is so.

Mr. TEAGUE. I think it is most interesting that on the Navy stationery, across the top, it says "United States Navy," and underneath, if it is the Marine Corps, it says "United States Marine Corps." Of course, we do not ever expect the Marine Corps to hide their light under a bushel; but if it was a separate unit, it would have its name across the top, I am sure.

Mr. MANSFIELD. A separate service which has been established in law and in precedents. Unfortunately, Members of Congress, or at least some of them, do

not seem to want to admit that fact, but a fact it is.

Mr. CANFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. CANFIELD. Will the gentleman tell the House what is the oldest branch of the military service in the United States?

Mr. MANSFIELD. It is, as the gentleman, a real friend of the Marine Corps, knows, the United States Marine Corps.

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted with the high plane on which this debate is being conducted. Of course, as we all know, everyone has the highest esteem for the different services which comprise the fighting force of the United States.

The bill which we are now considering is one with which you are all familiar. I will not go into the details which have already been presented to you, but will cover broadly the philosophy underlying the Marine Corps bill.

I had the distinct honor of testifying before both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees in favor of this legislation. I did this because of my firm conviction that this legislation serves the best interests of our beloved country at a time when forces throughout the world are pecking away at her very vitals. I took the time and energy to thoroughly explore the background and history, not only of the United States Marine Corps, but of all our Armed Forces, especially in the light of the National Security Act of 1947. I arrived at the conclusion that the legislation before you for consideration today is a means of forever insuring to the people of the United States the services of that great force of fighting men, the United States Marine Corps.

There are three things which stand out in the concept of this legislation.

First and foremost, as is so clearly enunciated in the report of the House Armed Services Committee relating to the purposes of the bill, this legislation is designed to give this country a versatile expeditionary force in readiness, always combat ready to serve this country and its commitments wherever the President or the Congress of the United States directs.

Secondly, this bill is designed to maintain that force in readiness at a strength level which will prevent the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department from making the mistake which they had perpetrated immediately prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict when they had emasculated this force to a point where the action of the First Provisional Brigade in the Pusan perimeter and the landing of the First Marine Division at Inchon approached the realm of being military miracles. No other force in the world could have done the deeds in the time allotted and with the initial drawbacks faced by these gallant marines of both the regular and reserve.

Thirdly, and as important as any part of this bill, is the placement of the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This Congress has had warning after warning from its Armed Services Committee

that the Joint Chiefs of Staff structure is inadequate in its present form. It must be obvious to us that some of its past performances have revealed a weakness in certain areas. The House Armed Services Committee unanimously recommended that the Commandant should become a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949. This recommendation was not made solely on the basis that the Commandant of the Marine Corps is the head of one of our services, but it was made upon the additional basis that the Commandant of the Marine Corps commands a service so wholly integrated in its combat functions that he is the one person in our entire military establishment who has, under his command, forces in the air, on land, and at sea at one and the same time. By the very nature of his position within the Department of the Navy he must maintain a knowledge and understanding of the activities which are the principal activities of the other three services. It seems to me that there can be no argument but that this man's presence on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would serve as a broadening and catalytic influence and that his views would render a real service.

I do not want to burden you with all the details of the defense establishment. You all are just as familiar with those items as I. I do want to call to your attention the fact that this bill had the support of more than 70 Members of the House and Senate when it was introduced in January of 1951. I want to point out to you that it has had opposition from only two sources, the Defense Department and, because of the advice of that Department, from the administration itself. The people of this country have asked their Representatives, whom the Constitution charges with the duty of raising the fighting forces of our Nation, to enact into law S. 677. I state to you that there is no need for us to go behind the clear intent and purpose of this bill as stated. The House Armed Services Committee did its job thoroughly and well. Its report is clear and succinct. I commend it to you. I want to state to you that the reasoning behind this bill is sound defense legislation to further insure the safety of our Nation. There is no thought on my part in supporting this legislation that this is done purely because the Marines are a most gallant fighting body of men. Their virtue in the field of battle stands before you and the people of our Nation, untarnished in any way. Nothing that you, nor I, nor any other Member of this august body could say would increase the stature of the Marine as a citizen of America. He has created his place in the history and hearts of our country by his deeds, beginning in the Revolution down through the Korean conflict.

In closing let me state that, with our country continuously faced with incident after incident, we would be remiss in our duty as Congressmen if we did not take every step necessary to quell these incidents at their very inception.

The Marine Corps bill is the strongest step we have yet taken to do this.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. At the present time is the Commandant of the Marine Corps subject to the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. He is subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. RIVERS. Only, when attached to the Chief of Naval Operations, as an operating force.

Mr. MANSFIELD. But he reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. SHORT. Just as the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. RIVERS. That is right.

Mr. YATES. Will this bill change his status in any respect?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No.

Mr. YATES. In other words, it places him on the same operating level as other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the same responsibility that he presently has.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right. I might point out that prior to Korea the Commandant of the Marine Corps was called into a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff just once, and that was about a month after a recommendation had been made by the Committee on Armed Services to the effect that the Commandant should become a member of the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. RIVERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from South Carolina.

Mr. RIVERS. The reason we insisted that the Commandant of the Marine Corps hold membership in JCS, along with the Chief of Naval Operations, is because we contend the only individual who can speak for a marine is a marine himself.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, who really knows what he is talking about and can represent three different points of view.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. Is it not fair to say that the Chief of Naval Operations did have in his immediate office a marine general?

Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes.

Mr. TEAGUE. To intimate that he was not consulted at all because he did not come into the meeting, does not give the true picture. Is it not also true that on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff there were a number of marines assigned there; eight or ten, something like that?

Mr. MANSFIELD. What rank is the gentleman talking about now?

Mr. TEAGUE. As I remember, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a staff of approximately 100 officers. I do not know what rank they were, but I understood there were eight or ten marines assigned there. Maybe the gentleman can tell.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I would be prone to say that those marines were not very high in rank; that they were not taken into the inner councils, and only after Korea and the action of this committee was the Commandant called in for consultation and was a marine of general

rank given any kind of responsible position within the Office of the Joint Chiefs.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. The gentleman mentioned that this bill has had opposition from only two sources, the Defense Department and, because of the advice of that Department, the administration itself. I do not know whether I am classed in either of those two groups, but I know a lot of Members are opposing the bill because they believe it is wrong, not because the Defense Establishment or the administration is opposed to it.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Of course, the gentleman is making a statement which I would assume is true, but what I am saying is that the bill in committee had opposition from only two sources. I am not talking about what opposition there is on the floor here. Certainly anyone who opposes this bill does it, I am quite sure, on the basis of his belief as to whether or not it is a good or bad thing.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. CLEMENTE. Will the gentleman go along with the theory that if we pass this bill no additional expense will be incurred?

Mr. MANSFIELD. No. I should like to bring out that fact. I am glad the gentleman brought it up, because I almost forgot it. Additional funds required to maintain such a force as is contemplated above that contemplated in the fiscal year 1953 budget would be \$111,000,000 a year. I think there has been a misunderstanding about that. It should be brought out that these additional funds will be required, but it is cheap insurance and you are getting your money's worth by this expenditure.

Mr. VINSON. That is, if you maintain four divisions.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Three divisions.

Mr. VINSON. The Marine Corps personnel will level off at 243,000 in fiscal 1953. If we put a floor of 220,000 under the Marines, you will not have to spend 1 penny more than set out in the fiscal 1953 appropriations.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The distinguished chairman, the author of this bill, is correct, but if he uses that figure he is going below the figure we were led to believe he would advocate.

Mr. VINSON. That is practically three combat divisions. It is just a little shy of three combat divisions, and you accomplish both things. You will not incur any additional appropriation in fiscal 1953 and you will have practically three combat divisions of the same combat strength you have today. It will be just a little supporting strength that is not there.

Mr. MANSFIELD. On the basis of the figures just given by the gentleman there would be no additional increase?

Mr. VINSON. That is it. May I say that, after consultation with the distinguished minority member, the gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], I pro-

pose to offer an amendment that the floor will be 220,000 enlisted personnel, or a total of 243,000 enlisted men and officers, and it will not cost anything additional.

Mr. CLEMENTE. In this sum that you said would be expended, if we did pass this bill today, you did not include the funds which will be expended by the Navy in purchasing matériel for the Marine Corps.

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is understood. We are not trying to get away from any responsibility. The Marine Corps has likewise furnished support to the Army and the Navy, which you should keep in mind. What about the Marine planes which are supporting the Army in Korea today?

Mr. CLEMENTE. I meant to qualify the statement that this money which was going to be expended was only chargeable to the Marine Corps fund that you are talking about.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No, it applies to the Naval Establishment in which the Marine Corps is incorporated.

Mr. THOMPSON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, to understand the reason for a Marine Corps, it is necessary to consider the nature of naval warfare. The United States has never been willing to settle its wars on its own soil and I know it has no intention of changing this traditional viewpoint. A fleet or a naval task force must project its operations far into enemy waters. Its plan of action does not contemplate remaining close to the home shores merely to repel an invader.

The modern fleet consists of a number of carriers which are necessarily very large vessels. There are usually some battleships and cruisers—both heavy and light. There are destroyers and probably submarines. There are the usual cargo vessels, tankers, and transports. Thousands of men are involved. They leave the home shores fully equipped and outfitted. The consumption of food and fuel is tremendous, as is the consumption of ammunition when action starts.

A fleet operating far from home and without any intermediate bases necessarily arrives at the point of action with its supplies depleted. The operations must be broken off in time for the vessels to return home again to be re-outfitted. It is perfectly obvious, therefore, that an effective fleet operation makes necessary advance bases, located just as close to the enemy shores as possible.

This calls to mind an old naval saying that "a fleet is tethered to its base."

It is the primary responsibility of the Marine Corps to furnish the Fleet Marine Force to go with the fleet and to seize and hold the necessary advance bases. This is the prime mission and the basic reason why we have a Marine Corps.

The National Security Act, of 1947 directs that the Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide a Fleet Marine Force of combined arms together with supporting air components for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advance naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

The Corps is given the additional duty of providing detachments and organiza-

tions for service on vessels of the Navy and of providing security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases. The law further reads, "and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct provided that such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized."

In order to perform its mission, the Marine Corps must be prepared to land its forces on a hostile beach, coming in under fire, and against such strongly held enemy defenses as Tarawa, Eniwetok, or Iwo Jima. The operations may involve only a small island such as the ones I just mentioned, or they may be larger like Guadalcanal or Okinawa where the enemy had to be pursued far into the back country; or it may involve seizing a beachhead on some part of a large continent in order to permit the establishment of a base.

All supporting arms, artillery, engineers, and aviation are a part of the Marine Corps combat team. Aviation, as a general rule, is first carrier-based and operates from the carriers until the landing is consolidated and an airstrip provided ashore. The pilots must be versatile and fully qualified as naval aviators. Anyone who has ever commanded a considerable number of troops knows how essential to success in battle is the combined training of all of the elements of a combat team. Each of the specialists, be he artilleryman, aviator, engineer, or other, is first a marine and second a specialist. This is essential because of the nature of the operations of an amphibious force. The numbers are limited and officers must be so thoroughly trained as to enable them to take over the duty of any other officer. The closest possible teamwork is demanded in this form of operation, and the Marines have that teamwork. As a matter of fact they have the only true air-ground team in all of our Armed Forces. They make wonderful use of this team as our records from Korea will demonstrate.

I think it is unnecessary to dwell on the excellence of the training that is traditional in the Marine Corps. I think it is also unnecessary to point out how essential have been the functions of the Marines, particularly in the Second World War. The advance across the Pacific spearheaded the drive which took our troops to the shores of Japan and which would have landed them there had the war not ended when it did.

No one has discounted the individual bravery of the Marines nor has anyone argued that it is unnecessary for some body of troops to be prepared to do the job which is done by the Marines. Nor does anyone disagree that in the Marine Corps a job assigned is a job accomplished.

The questions which confront us today involve the size of the corps and presumably the determination by the Congress of the minimum number necessary to maintain and to have in instant readiness at all times. There is another more obscure question and one which escapes all except those who are vitally interested and who have watched

with zealous care the security and the future of the Marine Corps.

This deals with the ambition of the Army to take over the Marine Corps lock, stock, and barrel. You have heard in the present discussion the references to a second army, duplication of effort, and so on. You have also heard, or you will hear later, that the Army is perfectly capable of conducting amphibious warfare.

Let us consider the ability of the Army to do the job. Of course they can so far as the individual men are concerned. All of the men come from the same pool of young Americans. The Army can do the job except for one very important consideration—they are not trained in amphibious warfare. It is not their function to have a division or two or three divisions ready to move on an instant's notice, to go aboard ship, and live there until the hostile shore is reached and then go over the side, scrambling down a cargo net with full equipment.

There is a very definite know-how necessary when you go ashore under fire and have to scratch out a toehold, or a beachhead as we call it. It is a job for experts and even when each man in the landing force knows his job, it remains a dangerous and precarious operation.

The Army plan, as I understand it, is to have a certain number of divisions trained in amphibious warfare and ready to go with the fleet. Let us see how that would work.

I think you will agree with me that the troops, whether they are Army or Marine Corps, must be trained to a very fine point. Since they are to function with the Navy and live with them for perhaps a long time, they will have to learn how to live afloat. There, like the marines, they will have to pick up Navy usages and Navy talk. Because they are bound to be picked troops, they will develop a very high esprit de corps—again, like the marines. Because they are highly trained specialists, they will remain with the Navy and there you have all the makings of another Marine Corps. The Army would pay and equip them instead of the Navy; but that would not be the principal difference. The principal difference would be that the command would not rest with the Navy, with whom the troops would serve, but rather with the Army. The Army would tell the Navy when they were ready to go and how and where and when to land, and there you would have the cart before the horse. The time may come when some ambitious Navy brass will conclude that it is just as well to let the Marine Corps go overboard. They may think that they will thus insure some advantage, some good trade for the Navy, maybe a new supercarrier or something like that. I hope that it will never happen, because the day that the Navy sells the Marine Corps down the river, that day the Navy will become the ferry command for the Army.

It will probably be argued here that under the National Security Act of 1947 the future of the Marine Corps is assured, but it is not anything of the kind. Since that act was signed, there was a well-laid plan to so whittle down the Marine Corps as to make it entirely in-

effective and leave it nothing but the ignominious functions of the navy yard guard and such as that.

The first to go was to have been Marine Corps Aviation. The order was on the desk of the man with the authority to destroy it. The story of what happened can be told by the gentleman from Georgia, the distinguished chairman of the committee, Mr. CARL VINSON.

An interesting part of it, in these days when we would like to see more economy, was the maneuvers that were performed in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Someone told the Secretary that marine aviation was bound to be vulnerable and that its costs would have to be higher than either Air Force or naval aviation. Someone wisely suggested checking the figures. They found that it cost considerably less to operate the Marine Corps planes than either of the other services. The plan to destroy marine aviation was, at least, postponed for a while.

However, the gradual whittling down of the corps continued, and when Korea exploded in our laps, the only way the Marines could put the necessary troops in the field was by calling in the Reserves, most of whom were already veterans of World War II and virtually none of whom could return to service without great personal sacrifice. I should add at this point that under no stretch of the imagination is Korea a Navy show. The only reason why the Marines were called in at all was that they were closer to ready than anybody else and so, as has happened so often in the past, they were called upon.

The Marines have been looked on for 175 years as the Nation's most dependable force in readiness. They have been called upon to face many Koreans in the past and when they answered the call in 1950 with the help of their Reserves they were merely doing what they have done many times previously during our history. It was unfortunate, indeed, that they had to rely so heavily upon their Reserves to meet their responsibility to the Nation; but there was no other way. They had been so whittled down that their regular fighting forces were too small to meet the crisis alone. And, of this I am sure—had there been three Marine divisions available in June of 1950 instead of only eight understrength peacetime battalions, I have no doubt that we would have found the Korean war finished and done with today.

Now, let us suppose that on the day the Marine First Division landed in Korea, an outbreak in the opposite part of the world—the Mediterranean, Africa, the Middle East—had necessitated naval action. There was no other Marine division in readiness and yet the world conditions were and are such that the fleet might have to go somewhere on very short notice. We have another division now ready on the east coast today, and there is one on the west coast which is partly up to strength and nearing the point of readiness. That makes three divisions and that is what we ask in this bill.

The ideal situation for the Marine Corps would be to have a division ready

for action in the Pacific, another in the Atlantic, and a third somewhere in the United States ready to move wherever necessary.

The nature of the Marines' duties requires that this force be immediately available. If naval action develops, it is apt to come very suddenly and the advanced bases which must be taken or held must be in hand without delay. It is very unfair to rely for any portion of this particular force on members of the Reserve. Certainly I, for one, do not ever want to see another call like that of June and July of 1950. The only way you can prevent it is by having a suitable force of regulars.

Some may argue that the apprehension which we entertain over the future of the corps is a figment of our imaginations. I wish this were true; however, I have just told you of the most recent policy of whittling and whittling and whittling, and I have told you of the results and the effect when the marines were called on to go to Korea.

Prior to that, in 1946, the then Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of the Air Force proposed that the Marine Corps participate only in minor shore combat operations of interest to the Navy alone and that the Army in the future undertake the land aspects of Navy amphibious operations. They further recommended that Marine Force was not to be appreciably expanded in time of war, and that Marine units be limited to the size of a regiment with a total size of the corps to be limited to 50,000 or 60,000 men.

In 1932, President Hoover, with the full concurrence of the Chief of Staff, conceived the idea of transferring the entire Marine Corps, by executive order, into the Army. Representatives Melvin J. Maas and Fiorella J. LaGuardia led a group of other Representatives in a protest vigorous enough to put a stop to the move.

In 1894 there was a move in the Congress to establish a corps of what they called marine artillery within the Army, transferring all functions of the Marine Corps to Army command.

In 1867 there was a resolution to abolish the Marine Corps entirely and detach its members to the Army.

In 1864 there was a similar move, and in 1837 another.

Just today, I received a telegram from the adjutant general of one of the States which reads in part:

National Guard opposes S. 677. Request you oppose passage. Marines are not supermen, but good American fighting men like other components. Bill is asinine, unnecessary, dangerous, costly. This country needs only Army, Navy, and Air Force. If saving money and efficiency desired absorb Marines into Army.

I need not emphasize that this adjutant general is wholly misinformed nor need I point out that somebody has been feeding him some false propaganda.

It is of particular interest to note that on each occasion when there was an attempt made to destroy the Marine Corps—or diminish its stature—or to remove some of its functions—or in any way to damage the corps, this Congress rose to its defense, and in the end took

action which had the effect of strengthening the position of the corps in our military structure. I need not tell you that in return, the marines have never let us down.

The efforts of various people to destroy the Marine Corps as such have been going on for a long time. In spite of the discouragement which might easily follow these efforts, the corps continues to do its traditionally superb job.

Those of us who have a sentimental attachment feel that the corps deserves better than this constant uncertainty. Many who are sponsoring this legislation were never in the Marine Corps and care nothing about it for other than practical reasons. These men feel that the security of the fleet may depend on the functioning of the Fleet Marine Force. They realize that if the fleet fails in this mission, then this country may feel the shock of an aggressor's attack. They do not want to take this chance.

We all join in asking that the legislation be enacted and that a floor be established beneath which the strength of the Marine Corps may not go in these perilous times. We ask it in part out of fairness to the brave men who have from time immemorial carried on the tradition of the corps. We ask it in consideration of that military service which has never demanded anything of its country other than the right to fight; but mostly, we ask it because the security of the Nation may well depend upon it.

Mr. JACKSON of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I am in full support of the measure now before us to set a floor of four divisions and four air wings for the Marine Corps and to place the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have appeared before the Armed Services Committee in behalf of this legislation as I feel it is very necessary to have a force in being such as the Marine Corps in readiness at all times. I feel also that this legislation is necessary to make sure that the strength of the corps is not reduced through appropriations but is kept strong and ready through legislation of this kind.

Mr. CHATHAM. Mr. Chairman, I have served in the Navy in both World Wars and have been closely allied with the Marine Corps. I know of their high morale, their pride in their branch of service, and of their fighting ability. Every red-blooded American is proud of our marines. I am for this bill because I think it will add to our defenses and help us keep world peace. I am for anything and everything that keeps us strong and peaceful. As the prophet said, "When a strong man, armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace."

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. DAGUE].

Mr. DAGUE. Mr. Chairman, as an inconspicuous and undistinguished expatriate first class of the Marines, I approach this whole subject with considerable humility and plead guilty, if you will, to some bias but very little tech-

nical experience. But, inasmuch as partisanship is not entirely absent from this floor, I hope I will be excused in this instance. There are three groups to whom in fairness credit must be given for bringing this bill before the House for our consideration today.

The first group consists of those enemies of the Nation with whom the Marines have been engaged on the field of battle down through the years, and from the Halls of Montezuma through Belleau Wood and Guadalcanal to the wastes of northern Korea the minions of aggression have grudgingly attested to the might and valor of the leathernecks.

The second group are those who have seen service in the corps and, indoctrinated with that esprit de corps so peculiar to the Marines, have served and fought—thousands to die that an indomitable spirit might be enriched—and thousands more to live out their days in peace but with a devotion to their cherished outfit that is second only to their love of God and country. And that is why the most stalwart champions of the Marine Corps today are those who have worn its khaki, its green, or its blue and, having returned to the pursuits of peace, continue to live again their service and thereby indoctrinate their fellow citizens with the conviction that of the world's fighting men the Marines are the peers.

The third group to whom we are indebted for an aroused citizenry, who have demanded this legislation, are those in the other services of our Nation who through envy or a misunderstanding of the mission of the Marines have persistently tried to belittle the exploits of the corps and who have by devious methods and at times by frontal attack attempted to whittle it down to the point where there would be little left except our beloved band and a few scattered legation guards. And it is little to their credit that numbered among those who have tried to wreck the Marine Corps are the otherwise distinguished names of Eisenhower, Marshall, Bradley, Collins, Vandenberg, and more recently a Commander in Chief who, a little more direct than most, would have relegated the corps to the role of naval police and ascribed to them propensities for propaganda akin to that of Stalin. Suffice to say that the United States Marines stand today secure in the esteem of their fellow countrymen on the basis of the enemies they have acquired—both domestic and foreign—and we who so vigorously support the pending bill are grateful for the attacks that have unwittingly strengthened our cause.

Admitting to a measure of sentimentality on the part of many of us when the corps is concerned, the judgment of the public at large rests on what they see and know and they have only to look back a few short months to Korea where admittedly the Army learned to fight but where the Marines were ready to fight when they landed—where even Douglas MacArthur ordinarily not an enthusiastic witness for the leathernecks—stated unequivocally that the Marines were the best equipped and best trained for the job at hand of any of

the troops that had landed on that God-forsaken peninsula.

Be it said to its credit, however, that the Marine Corps has never officially sought expansion such as is provided in this bill. Traditionally, they have done the job assigned to them and have accepted augmentation of their forces as a recognition of an organizational genius which has planned in advance for the needs of an expanding conflict. And their planning is not just happenstance. It comes from a century and a half of fighting a lot of little wars from which has come the principal development we call amphibious operations. And it was this valuable experience, molded and developed in the years between World War I and World War II, that made the Marines at the outset of the latter struggle the sole repositories of amphibious know-how and enabled them to train the armies—not only of this Nation but of our allies as well—in that technique which made possible the landings on Normandy and the island-by-island come-back from Guadalcanal to Tokyo.

Prior to Korea it was pretty generally accepted in certain quarters that our future wars were to center around strategic bombing with the B-36 as the primary weapon. Indeed, the supporters of that school of thought went so far as to suggest that such strategic strikes had outmoded the aircraft carrier, the tank, as well as the Marines with their amphibious operations and particularly their tactical air operations. Here again, however, the Korean campaign has confronted the arguments of the strategic concept and we find that we have had need, and in increasing quantities, for all those things that were supposed to have been outmoded by the intercontinental bomber, including tactical aviation.

The development of tactical air by the Marines was a natural corollary to their amphibious program and received impetus from the effective use of air support of ground troops by the Germans in the invasion of France and later by the Russians in repulsing the invasion of their country by the Nazis. Undoubtedly Marine Corps planners learned much from the operations in Europe but at the same time they unquestionably brought to their tactical air training their own peculiar ideas of organization and their appreciation of the use that could be made of this aerial form of artillery. In the first place the Marine Corps' concept of close support of ground troops is that such support shall range from 100 to 600 yards and they firmly reject a greater distance as not being close support. In the second place your Marine pilot is required to serve 2 years as a Marine infantry officer before he may even apply for aviation duty which I submit qualifies him completely for his assignment since he not only knows his own job but is also thoroughly familiar with the needs of the ground commander he is supporting. In Korea this dual training has been enlarged so that in alternating periods your Marine pilot is delivering the bombs and rockets as directed by the controller on the ground and later is filling the role of air controller himself. And I submit that no

other branch of our service has developed or even tried to develop this close coordination between ground and air.

In summation, then, what I have been trying to do is to justify the pending bill—S. 677—on the simple basis that the Marine Corps has clearly demonstrated its competency to train and equip for the specialized operations in which it excels the four full-strength combat divisions, together with the four full-strength air wings the measure encompasses. There are those who will, of course, argue that what we are doing here is creating an additional land army but I submit that with these divisions and wings placed, say, with one in the Middle East, one in the Far East, one on our Atlantic coast and another on our west coast we will have stationed them so strategically that their very presence will be a powerful deterrent to aggression. We can plan to build up our reserves through UMT or any other means of recruitment, but despite such planning there will always be need for a limited number of professionals such as the Marines if we are to be instantly ready to quench at their inception periodic conflagrations such as Korea. Indeed, it is my firm opinion that had the outfits herein planned been available in the spring of 1950, with at least one division with its over-all strength at 23,000 effectively based in Japan or in Okinawa, the North Koreans would never have struck. My friends, riots are not prevented by police reserves but instead are stopped before they start by trained cops who are on the beat. That is the traditional role of the Marines and I feel that the strength they will acquire through this bill will better enable them to discharge their historic mission as the Nation's trouble shooters.

As regards section 2 of the measure it is pertinent to observe that the traditional General Staff-Pentagon envy of Marine economy, courage, and performance of duty has resulted in the well-planted observation that the Commandant of the Marine Corps does not command a large enough organization to justify placing him in the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

My reply to this is that the Commandant of the Marines is the most qualified member of the armed services for Joint Chiefs of Staff membership. Remember that the Joint Chiefs of Staff must plan for the coordinate employment of all arms—land, sea, and air. Remember, also, that as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commandant of Marines would be the only member whose organization included infantry, artillery, tanks—the major land weapons—and combat aviation, all of these Marine arms being employed both in land and amphibious operations. In short, he would be the most qualified to advise as to the joint employment of all weapons. The Marine Commandant possesses the kind of experience and qualifications so urgently needed in the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The country must not be deprived of benefits that would accrue by injecting the broad military wisdom of the Marine Corps into our strategic planning by

placing the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

By passing this bill, you will strengthen the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enhance the development of better battle methods, and assure this Nation of the continued service of the world's most efficient fighting organization, the United States Marines.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. JACKSON].

Mr. JACKSON of California. Mr. Chairman, first I would like to comment on the high tone of the debate up to this time, and the fact that relevant material has been discussed.

I would also like to apologize to Florida for my remark about the Seminole Indians. I think Florida is much better off the way it is.

I should also like to pay a word of tribute to our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE]. It is not very pleasant to be on the opposite side of an argument with Mr. TEAGUE after having traveled many thousands of miles with him, and having argued the Army-Marine Corps matter ad nauseam, to say nothing of colloquies having to do with Texas against California and Democrat versus Republican; but I admire his courage in taking the well of the House today and in leading opposition to this measure, which opposition, I am sure, springs from deep conviction on his part.

Mr. Chairman, in consideration of S. 677, it is possible for the average American to become sentimental. It is particularly difficult for one who has had the privilege of service in the United States Marine Corps not to wander from the proper area of cold reality and dollar-and-cents facts into a realm which is highly colored by past associations and present memories of service in the corps. I shall attempt to be entirely factual, although the debate today must, of necessity, enter at times an area which defies the precise nature of fact, an area which has to do with what is known as tradition and esprit de corps. These essential elements of high military efficiency in a first-rate fighting force are difficult to define, yet these factors are, in truth, the essence of the present legislation. Pride of service, battle efficiency, and self-confidence are not a part and parcel of the military service per se, nor do they exist in every regiment or division, no matter how ancient its lineage, nor how decorated its battle standards. The discipline and the high state of organization which led to a successful attack upon a strongly fortified Okinawa or Tarawa, or the orderly withdrawal with weapons and casualties from a Chongjin Reservoir are but the outward trappings of a spirit and a morale that no amount of peacetime training and no legislative device can instill. These operations, no matter how brilliantly planned and ably executed, must depend in the final analysis upon the high spirit, the courage, and the devotion to ideals of the men who must carry or lose the day.

These operations, no matter how fully planned, how brilliantly executed,

must depend in the final analysis upon the high spirit of the individual, upon his courage and his devotion to ideals; that phase of a plan must be put into execution by the men who must carry or lose the day.

These are confused times for men who go forth to battle. Hundreds and thousands, possibly millions, of Americans today do not understand the necessity for the conflict in Korea; many others doubt the military or political necessity for the struggle. There is, as a matter of truth and of fact, no brilliant end goal, no ultimate goal of achievement to act as a guidon to the men who fight; and, as the controversy rages at home with respect to the war in Korea, it is inevitable that men confronted with a determined and well-equipped foe must on occasion call upon some inner urge, some higher directive in order to conduct themselves with valor and with determination. I think that tradition is germane to the debate here today because so much of the Marine Corps, so much of the individual marine's own attitude is concerned with tradition. Today's marine fights literally in the presence of and in the shadow of American history. He traces his military ancestry from Tun Tavern in Philadelphia in 1775, before the founding of this Republic; he recalls today that his predecessors fought in the forefront of the Bonhomme Richard; that his early counterparts fought on Lake Erie under Lawrence. He knows of the marine who interposed his body between the scimitar of the Tripoli pirate and the figure of Stephen Decatur; he remembers the Marine Corps trek on camels across the desert to attack the fortress of Derne, Tripoli.

It is a source of pride to the marine of today to know that the German field commander at Belleau Wood called the Marine Brigade "Hounds of Hell" after repeated and futile attempts to break the line held by the leathernecks had failed.

In our own day, Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Okinawa, Saipan-Tinian, Peleliu, Wake, and Midway Islands stand as living testimony to the effectiveness of the Marine Corps, and to the devotion of its men to duty.

When we speak of Wake Island I feel that I would be remiss if I did not call attention again to the fact that one of the heroes of Wake Island sits with us day after day as a colleague in this great forum, General DEVEREUX, of Maryland.

S. 677 should not become the medium for acrimonious debate, nor for onerous comparison. The measure should be considered solely on its merit as an adjunct to the national defense, and not cause Americans are proud of their Marine Corps. If it is too expensive to maintain the corps, or if it does not deliver 105 cents of service for every dollar of tax moneys invested in it, not only should the measure be defeated, but the corps should be disbanded. It is pleasant to languish in the shade of past glories, but every service should today be required to stand upon its own feet in the glaring light of present reality.

This the Marine Corps has done with added interest.

Efforts on the part of a few have, in the past, threatened the integrity of the Marine Corps. A general officer, speaking before a service group some months ago in Norfolk, Va., very adequately summed up the feeling of some individuals, when he said, in effect, that the Marines were a fouled-up army, speaking Navy talk, and that the organization should be integrated into the Regular Army Military Establishment.

What are the substantial arguments which have been presented against this pending measure? First, I believe, is the fact that there is no precedence for putting a statutory floor under the Marine Corps.

Second, is the claim that the legislation will destroy the esprit de corps of this great combat organization. I think the best answer to that argument is the fact that during the war the Marine Corps went to six combat divisions, probably six divisions which were never matched before in combat efficiency either in the Marine Corps or anywhere else. It expanded beyond the wildest dreams of any marine who ever lived and they still delivered the goods out in the Pacific.

The third point is that passage of the bill will create a second land mass Army. I think that point has been pretty well destroyed in the debate today. After all, 200 landings or in excess of 200 landings which required not the process of slow mobilization, not the process of taking a leisurely trip to the scene of action but action on the instant has never in the history of this country found the Marine Corps unwilling or unready to move.

What is the present threat? What is the situation with which we are confronted that requires an effective trained force in readiness at all times? It is not a situation in which mass forces will be engaged on land masses. It is more apt to be a situation in which there are islands to be attacked, islands to be defended. It is very likely that the threat of the Soviet will be directed against the vast periphery of islands throughout the Pacific. Such actions will not require large land masses but it will require able and effective forces which can be dispatched in early moments of aggression.

I hope that this legislation will be passed by an overwhelming majority.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. ARMSTRONG].

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman, I assure the members of this Committee I do not speak in order to drag out the time but, rather, to bring up a matter that I consider quite important. I hope that the passage of this bill will help to strengthen our Joint Chiefs of Staff in their work. At least I hope our action will bring some morale strength to this organization.

I have always thought of our military leaders, and particularly the Chiefs of Staff of our armed services, as being the bulwark of our national strength; in peace the bulwark of strength in planning for our continued defense, and in war a bulwark of strength in the active direction of our efforts toward victory.

I say to you that events since the beginning of the Korean war has greatly shaken my confidence in our military leaders as represented by our Joint Chiefs of Staff. My estimate of them and their ability was rudely jolted when they agreed to the firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur without granting him a hearing or a single notification to him or his staff that he was to be summarily dismissed. My estimate of the present Joint Chiefs of Staff was not only jolted but pushed to a new low when these gentlemen came over here during the MacArthur hearings and said their pieces in justification of the firing of that man who stood as a bulwark of strength against communistic aggression in the Far East even before the Korean war began. The one prime target of our enemy, the Communists, and their fellow travelers, was Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Ah, but you say these members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are captives of our foreign policy. They must conform, against their will. I measure my words when I say that I hope the inclusion of a marine on the panel of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will help to reestablish our confidence in the decisions and plans of our military leaders.

From the beginning of the Korean war, our Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed to the policy of fighting a "stalemated war." That means a war we do not intend to win, and is something new in American policy—and history. To implement this policy, the Chiefs of Staff agreed to the plan of refusing to blockade the China coast, an absolute essential to cutting off the supplies going to the Red regimes in China and Korea. I cannot blame this on the Chief of Staff who represented the United States Navy, and I am told upon good authority that he desired to put that blockade over China and make it stick.

Then our leaders refused to use the loyal Chinese troops who are still standing and rotting away on Formosa. Does anyone here want to stand up and defend that pusillanimous policy, that refusal to use our loyal allies, the Chinese? There are at least 350,000 effective fighting men on Formosa ready and anxious to be used in this fight for their own freedom, for the liberation of their homeland from Communist domination, for the freedom of their relatives from Soviet slavery, and for the protection and defense of the Free World—including the United States. Why are they not used. Will anyone tell me why? Do the Chiefs of Staff know why? Maybe a marine on the staff will be able to stiffen the backbones of his comrades and change that dismal policy of inaction and appeasement.

Next great mistake on the part of our military staff was to refuse to permit the one thing necessary to the ending of the war, namely, the bombing of the enemy lines of communication, their routes of march, their airdromes, and their depots of supply. There they all lay, easy targets for our strategic bombers. Had that been done, it is very likely that there could have been no further build-up of their fighting strength. Had that been done, we

might well have knocked them out of the war. One thing is sure—we could not knock them out of the war unless those tactics were followed.

Then, to make matters utterly tragic for the free world and utterly hopeless for our fighting men, our military chiefs granted discussion of a cease-fire at the request of the aggressors. The request was voiced by the chief Communist spokesman in the United Nations, Soviet Delegate Malik. That should have been notice to our leaders that no good could come of giving the aggressors a cease-fire on their terms. Any schoolboy knew that the only reason for the request for discussing an armistice was that the aggressors were hurt, reeling, and ready to be defeated; they only wanted time to recover and to build up for more aggressive action. We knew that. The Chiefs of Staff knew that—if they are worthy to represent their Government and people any longer, they knew that.

Now, since the fake cease-fire talks began, the aggressors in Korea have built up tremendously; they have more than doubled their air power; they have rebuilt their material; they have brought in vast numbers of troops; they have equipped themselves with the latest artillery and other weapons; they are ready to move upon the defenders of freedom who have been told they could defend freedom only in a limited and stalemated way.

I say, let us put a fighting marine on the Board of the Chiefs of Staff and we shall at least have a little more action than we are getting today. If our Chiefs of Staff are captives of the policy makers, following these policies of a stalemated war, permitting our enemy to build up constantly as they have since July 10, then let us change the composition of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I only hope that the inclusion of a marine will bring that about.

The gentleman from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] was quoted the other day as saying that they did not need a brigadier general to run that prison camp at Koje; what they needed was a top sergeant marine. If the gentleman from Montana was correctly quoted, I agree with him entirely and I commend him for that statement. What that whole group in the Far East needs is a policy that will untie the hands of our military. We should either permit our fighting men to win that war in Korea, or we should bring them out of Korea and admit that our weaknesses, our mistakes, our regrettable lack of leadership has lost us the war. If I interpret the temper of the people back home correctly, it must be one or the other. Maybe—just maybe—a marine might be able to help along the decision.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. WOLVERTON].

Mr. WOLVERTON. Mr. Chairman, I strongly favor the adoption of this legislation. I commend the Committee on Armed Services on the splendid bill they have brought before the House.

The main objectives of the legislation are to require: First, the maintenance of

a versatile expeditionary force always ready for combat, to consist of four full-strength Marine divisions, four full-strength Marine air wings and other forces incidental and necessary thereto. Second, to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to broaden the base of planning and deliberations of that group as well as to provide the Marine Corps with direct representation at this level.

It has been made plain time after time during our history, and particularly so in recent years, that this country needs a mobile force ready to move at a moment's notice and ready to go into action on land, sea, or in the air whenever and wherever the national necessity or security requires. The Marine Corps, ever since it was first formed, has been the arm of the service that was organized for performance in these varied fields of activity. It has always been ready on a moment's notice to serve faithfully and effectively wherever duty called. The men who served in its ranks have always been men who in spirit and fighting quality measured up to that of the minute men who met the challenge in the early days of the War of Independence. The American people have confidence in the ability of the Marine Corps to meet and successfully handle any situation that it may be called upon to face. Time may bring its changes in all things else, but time has never been able to dull the spirit or deteriorate the fighting quality of the American fighting man, and this has been proved by the men of the Marine Corps throughout its entire distinguished history.

Thus, the purpose of this legislation to definitely fix the number of enlisted men is sound and logical. It fixes the ceiling for active duty strength of the Marine Corps at 400,000, and a minimum of not less than 300,000 Regular enlisted men. I am convinced in the light of administration action in recent years in cutting down the size of fighting elements of our military forces below that fixed by Congress, that it is advisable to fix definite limitations. This requirement in the proposed bill is important from the standpoint of the accomplishments of the purpose intended by this legislation.

Furthermore, we should not overlook the fact stated by our colleague, Hon. JAMES P. S. DEVEREUX, the famous Marine Corps general who led the heroic defense of Wake Island at the very outset of the last war, that should we have such a force in readiness, we would not have to disrupt the lives of our Reserves as we did so recently. They would not have to be called in immediately but at a later date if we had to go into an expanded war. What we need in the initial stage is a force in readiness to be called into instant service and properly trained without the delay in time that is otherwise necessary. The clear need for such a force as has been provided in this bill has been demonstrated beyond question.

As to the second objective of the bill now before us, namely, the designation of the Commandant of the Marine Corps

to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am strongly of the opinion that the size and importance of the duties of the Marine Corps as part of our national defense entitles it to representation on the board of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I cannot agree with the objections that have been made by the present members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly that it would make the Staff unwieldy if a fifth member were added, and that the headquarters of the Marine Corps is not properly staffed to support the Commandant's membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to provide such a staff would be needless duplication. These objections are so inconsequential that they approach the ridiculous when seriously advocated.

If I correctly understand the thought of our people it is one of absolute confidence in the fidelity and ability of the Marine Corps under any and all circumstances, and that its record of achievement throughout its entire history has been such that it is entitled to the honor of having its Commandant sit with the other Chiefs of Staff and participate in the decisions that are made by them in the conduct of our national defense in times of peace or war. His presence and counsel will undoubtedly add much to the deliberation and decisions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly when it is realized that the Marine Corps has always had an important part in the joint operations of the different branches of our armed services. This experience can be extremely helpful in determining policies affecting the duties and usefulness of the Marine Corps, as well as the other services.

Recognizing as I do the great value of the service that can be rendered by the Commandant of the Marine Corps in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am at a loss to understand why there is objection made by other Chiefs of Staff to his inclusion, and why we have been so long in coming to a determination in this all-important matter. I trust that the importance of this bill will be recognized and the House give to it the support its importance entitles it to have.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mrs. ROGERS].

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I want to bring out one point again, and that is how extremely important it is to the Navy to have a Chief of Staff and for the Marine Corps to have a Chief of Staff on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. As it is today, the Navy has one vote only, and time and time again all of us who have followed the matter closely, those on the Committee on Armed Services especially, know that the Navy must have been outvoted again and again and again. So the Navy should be extremely grateful to have a Marine Chief of Staff on the Joint Chiefs of Staff who knows their problems. It will tremendously strengthen our national defense and will prevent the weakening of the Marine Corps that has been so often attempted, particularly during unification. I am very grateful that this bill is on the floor.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CURTIS].

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this bill. I think the entire issue involved here is the unification of the Armed Forces. I am no orator, so I cannot add to the oratory already given. I should like to point out, though, that in my opinion the trouble our country is facing today can be traced back to just this business of following expediency which is being urged here today by the proponents of this bill, instead of looking ahead not just a few years but for a generation. When will this philosophy of quick, ill-considered action born of imagined emergency end? It has been going on now for 20 years. Indeed life in its entirety may be viewed with alarm and treated as a never-ending emergency, but a person and indeed a nation that is to survive must have a calmer attitude toward the problems of the day and seek to solve them on a more permanent basis, looking further into the future than the day after tomorrow. The men who wrote our Constitution probably had more cause than we to view life as a series of emergencies which could be solved only by day-to-day improvising. Yet they had the courage and the calmness to resist this dangerous attitude and they hammered out a structure that has served their posterity well for over 16 decades.

In 1947 the Congress passed the Unification Act, which was supposed to try to bring the Armed Forces together. In my opinion, the bill before us is just one further step backward from that goal. A great many arguments have been advanced that the Air Force and the Army are sniping at this bill. I believe those arguments are well founded. I have no brief for them, only censure. Those same services have certainly been guilty of sabotaging the purposes of the Unification Act since its enactment. But it is not going to do any good to commit another sin to get back at the sins already committed.

There are two outstanding things that have come out in this debate. The first is that this bill means a very serious modification of the Unification Act of 1947. The subject of whether the Marine Commandant was to be included on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a subject that was considered by the Expenditures Committee when they held hearings on the Unification Act. I am sorry to see that the Armed Forces Committee that considered the bill now before the House apparently has not gone deeply into those hearings or made available to themselves the arguments pro and con upon which the Congress once based its decision that we would not put the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Second, this is a very serious change in the primary mission of the Marine Corps. I believe, with those who are opposed to this bill, that this will in effect create a fourth service.

I again say that we are going a step backward. I plead with this House to look ahead a generation and stop this

business of legislating for the expediency of the moment, for just a few years ahead. I ask everyone to consider this bill on the basis of whether or not it will further the unification of the armed services, and, if it will not further the unification of the armed services, to vote against it. Let us deal with these other problems each on its own base instead of trying to solve them by creating a more difficult situation that is bound to come back and haunt us in the next few years. Let us get away from hand-to-mouth legislation and in considering fundamental changes which this bill includes in that it changes the primary mission of the Marine Corps, and the structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, approach the problems from a long-range viewpoint. The long-range policy is clearly the unification of the Armed Forces. To vote for this bill is to vote against this policy merely to attain some immediate goals.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CURTIS of Missouri. I yield.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. It would seem to me the so-called unification has proved to be a merger rather than a unification and that both the Navy and Marine Corps have been submerged.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. PATTERSON] a member of our committee, and also a Marine.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, being the last speaker on the totem pole, it is rather difficult to tell the Members of the House any more than they have been told this afternoon by their colleagues about the attributes of this legislation. However, I do first want to express my appreciation as a Marine to our most distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON] and to our most distinguished senior minority Member, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

There are things, however, in this bill which I think should be highlighted at this time, and the first is this: Everybody has wondered why the First Division, which is now fighting in Korea, has had such a wonderful record. Well, the reason that this division has achieved such a great record is because the majority of the officers in that particular division have had combat experience. Also, the noncommissioned officers had combat experience. Therefore the enlisted men serving with the First Division had the opportunity to train under their experienced guidance. I think that in this bill, it should also be highlighted that the United States Marine Corps has been a basis for training and the advancement of military tactics used by all branches of our Armed Forces. For instance, the close air support which the marines have advocated for years at last came to light in Korea. I have been told by marines who were in Korea and who witnessed some of the close coordinated ground and air engagements, that it was a real lift to the morale of the marine, the fellow who is carrying the rifle, when he received this close ground-air support on some of

these terrific enemy mountain positions which they were attacking. Also, I think the marines should be complimented for the wonderful work they have done in bringing the wounded out of the front lines by the use of helicopters. They have also done great work in using helicopters to move fresh troops into the fighting line instead of requiring the troops to march 20 miles to the front lines, thus enabling the men to go into the fighting line feeling fresh and able to immediately attack.

By putting this floor under the present Marine Corps strength, I think that it will relieve this uprooting of our Reserves, because it will give the Reserve officer an opportunity first to train themselves at one of our posts while the regular troops are holding the line, and also give a Reserve officer and his family an opportunity to square away his personal problems.

Before I close, I want to quote a statement made by one of our most highly respected generals, a general for whom I have a great deal of admiration, General Spaatz. I quote:

I recommend, therefore, that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments.

General Spaatz changed his mind though, because on July 17, 1950, he wrote in Newsweek as follows:

Two or three Marine divisions, stationed at strategic locations ready for quick movement to any part of the world, also are essential.

Mr. Chairman, I will take the recommendations of a great soldier like General Spaatz, and also the recommendations of my chairman, who has been here in the Congress handling military affairs for practically 40 years, and who was handling military affairs when I was on this earth only a short 2 years.

I also compliment again the wonderful work done by our senior minority member, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SHORT].

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PATTERSON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. TEAGUE. I cannot allow to pass one statement which my friend made without consent. I saw the First Marine Division and obviously it was a good division. There is no question about that.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is a real compliment, coming from an Army man.

Mr. TEAGUE. I meant it as a compliment, because they were a great division. But I also saw our Army Seventh and our Army Third and our Army Second. Any American would be proud of all of those divisions over there.

Mr. PATTERSON. I would like to extend my compliments to the Army. I also think the Army should support this bill, because it would give the Army, which takes on greater obligations than the Marine Corps, an opportunity to train their troops if the Marine Corps had a ready, hard-striking force in case

of any national conflict. To the gentleman from Texas let me say that every soldier, sailor, airman, coast guardsman, and marine is held in high esteem by me.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Connecticut has expired.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the bill be read for amendment.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. [After counting.] One hundred and fourteen Members are present; a quorum.

The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Be it enacted, etc., That the first sentence of section 206 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947 is hereby amended to read as follows: "The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include four full-strength combat divisions, four full-strength air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein, and the personnel strength of the Regular Marine Corps shall be maintained at not more than 400,000."

Sec. 2. The commandant of the Marine Corps shall be a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all problems before the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On matters in which the Marine Corps may be concerned he shall be permitted to be heard and to file a supporting memorandum for consideration by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

With the following committee amendment:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert "That the following is hereby substituted for the first sentence of section 206 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 501):

"(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy as defined in this section, shall include not less than four full-strength combat divisions, four full-strength air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic thereto. Hereafter the actual enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps shall be not less than 300,000. The total active duty enlisted strength of the Marine Corps shall not be more than 400,000, which number shall constitute the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps: *Provided*, That this limitation shall be suspended during time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress. The actual permanent commissioned strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps, exclusive of commissioned warrant officers, shall not be less than 4 percent and not more than 7 percent of the authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the Regular Marine Corps. "Actual strength," as used in this subsection, shall be construed to mean the daily average number of personnel in the category concerned during the fiscal year and shall be attained as soon as practicable without impairing the efficiency of the Marine Corps but not later than 24 months after the date of enactment of this amendatory act."

"Sec. 2. Section 211 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 505), as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the chairman, who shall be the presiding officer but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force; and the commandant of

the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

"Sec. 3. Section 2 (b) of the Act of April 18, 1946 (60 Stat. 92), is hereby repealed."

Mr. VINSON (interrupting the reading of the bill). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the bill and the committee amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which is at the Clerk's desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. VINSON:

On page 2, line 12, after the word "than" strike out "four" and insert "three."

In the same line, after the word "divisions," strike out the word "four" and insert the word "three."

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, that is carrying out the statement which I made to the Committee this morning, that as a committee amendment we are asking that it be reduced from four combatant divisions to three combatant divisions.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, there is no opposition on this side.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a substitute for this amendment or for the committee amendment?

Mr. TEAGUE. A substitute for this amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be an amendment in the third degree, and would be out of order.

Mr. TEAGUE. I offer an amendment to the committee amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be done later.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON].

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. TEAGUE. I understood that my amendment was an amendment to the amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an amendment to the committee amendment in the bill.

Mr. TEAGUE. Is it proper to offer it as a substitute for the amendment?

The CHAIRMAN. You may offer it as an amendment to the committee amendment, later.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which is at the Clerk's desk.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. VINSON: On page 2, line 16, strike out "three hundred thousand" and insert "two hundred twenty thousand."

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, briefly I want to call the committee's attention to the fact, as pointed out by the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. TABER], if we had kept the floor at

235,000 enlisted men that would have made a strength of 258,000, which would entail an additional appropriation over and above what has been appropriated. But if we reduce the floor to 220,000 enlisted personnel it will not increase \$1 that which has already been appropriated for fiscal 1953, because the Marines will level off at 243,000 enlisted men and officers in 1953.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. VINSON: Page 3, line 3, strike out the figure "4" and insert the figure "3 1/4."

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, this merely fixes the percentage of Regular officers in the Marine Corps at 3 1/4 percent rather than 4, the former figure being more effective.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Georgia.

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TEAGUE: On page 2, strike out lines 10 through 22 and, on page 3, strike out lines 1 through 10 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"(c) The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, as defined in this section, shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The personnel strength of the Regular Marine Corps shall be maintained at not more than four hundred thousand."

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I will not take the full 5 minutes. All this amendment does is to leave the maximum strength of the Marine Corps at 400,000 and strike out the floor of 300,000 which is placed under it. No other service has a floor under it and it is manifestly wrong to place one under the Marine Corps. To my mind there is no reason why there should be a floor under the Marine Corps because it makes for inflexibility. As I say, Mr. Chairman, all this bill does is to strike the floor out from under the committee bill.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE. I yield.

Mr. COLE of New York. I am wondering if the effect of the gentleman's amendment would not be that in wartime the size of the Marine Corps could not exceed 400,000?

Mr. TEAGUE. As the gentleman from New York well knows, today there are ceilings on the Army, on the Air Force, and on the Navy. However, for the emergency, these ceilings have all been suspended. The same thing applies to the Marine Corps. Under present law, the Marine Corps is limited to 20 percent of the strength of the Navy; however, that limitation has also been suspended during the emergency.

Mr. COLE of New York. But the effect of the gentleman's amendment would be to impose a ceiling of 400,000.

Mr. TEAGUE. It does nothing that is not being done already in the case of all other components of our Armed Forces.

Mr. COLE of New York. It will mean that hereafter even in wartime the ceiling would be 400,000.

Mr. TEAGUE. No; that is not correct.

Mr. SHORT. I think it is very evident that it is correct. We reached around 436,000 marines in World War II and now the gentleman's amendment would put a ceiling that would hold them down to less than that.

Mr. TEAGUE. The same thing exists in the case of the Army. I think the present authorized ceiling on the Army today is 837,000 men and officers, but that ceiling has been suspended during the emergency.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment close in 1 minute and that the time be allotted to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I trust the Committee will vote down this amendment. As the gentleman from Texas says, the purpose is to strike out the floor which you just agreed should be 220,000 enlisted personnel. I hope the Committee will vote the amendment down.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. TEAGUE) there were—ayes 22, noes 72.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, if it was not already self-evident, my distinguished colleagues who have already spoken on behalf of this legislation have made abundantly clear the splendid opportunity we have before us. By enacting this bill, we can insure that this Nation shall henceforth have at its disposal a Marine air-ground force in readiness capable of instant and decisive action in times of peril which may lie ahead. We shall also, by seating the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a full-fledged member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, round out and strengthen the membership of that body on which our security so much depends.

I have been unimpressed by the arguments advanced against this bill by its opponents, who seem to be limited in number to the top command at the Pentagon, and its spokesmen. Insofar as the remainder of the public is concerned, where this measure has been examined without regard to interservice politics, there is overwhelming support. It is worthy of special mention that every major veterans' organization, as well as numerous other civic groups, have heartily endorsed this measure or others embodying the same principles.

Among the arguments advanced against this bill there is one, however,

which I want to discuss here, as I feel that its insidious character may lend it some color of credibility despite its lack of merit. I refer to the dire prediction that the establishment of the Commandant of the Marine Corps as coequal with the Chief of Naval Operations in the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be the first step toward a separation of the Marine Corps from the Navy with which it has been so long and closely associated throughout its existence.

This argument is wholly specious. It centers around a misconception of the historic and legally authorized status of the Marine Corps, and of the relations between the Marine Commandant, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Operations.

Even a cursory reading of the legislative and judicial history of the Marine Corps and Navy dispels this misconception. The United States Marine Corps was created as a separate military service, in addition to the other military services, in 1798. At that time it was placed in the newly established Department of the Navy, under the Secretary of the Navy, to give it an administrative roof under which to live. The United States Navy was, of course, placed under the same administrative roof. The Marine Corps was not then, and never has been, a part of the Navy itself. But within the Naval Establishment the United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy exist as separate military services, each under its own commander, who is individually and directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy.

This status has not been altered by the fact that specific Marine units are from time to time assigned by the President or the Secretary of the Navy to the naval operating forces, where they come under Navy operational control, just as they are frequently assigned by the President to the Army, thus bringing them under Army operational control.

Nor was the situation altered by the enactment of Public Law 432, Eightieth Congress, which broadened the statutory authority of the Chief of Naval Operations within the Navy. At the time that legislation was enacted the Secretary of the Navy assured the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in writing, that it was not in any way intended to modify the historic direct chain of command from the Navy Secretary to the Marine Commandant; nor to endow the Chief of Naval Operations with any authority over Marines beyond that which he already possessed over those Marine units specifically assigned to the naval operating forces. This disavowal was repeated by former Navy Secretary Matthews in the course of Senate committee hearings. Secretary Matthews, in his letter to the committee, again stated the official Navy Department position that Public Law 432 did not alter the historic direct relationship between the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps—a relationship which antedated the creation of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations by more than a hundred years.

It is clear, from this, that the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the

Chief of Naval Operations are already coequal as heads of separate military services. Thus the seating of the Marine Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff can in no sense be regarded as a step toward separation. Insofar as relations between the Navy and Marines are concerned, it is simply a much-needed affirmation of a coequality which has existed since the office of Chief of Naval Operations was affirmed by statute 37 years ago.

The more one examines this charge of "separatism," the more patently absurd it becomes. I have talked to many marines of many different ranks, and I have yet to find a single one who feels that the Marines should go a separate way. I have found among marines a unanimous satisfaction with their historic place in the Department of the Navy. The Navy and Marine Corps have lived together in harmony within the Naval Establishment for a century and a half, and there is no visible disposition among the Marines to leave that roof.

In any event, it is obvious to all of us, though not to the Pentagon, that Congress alone possesses the power to separate the Marine Corps from the Department of the Navy. And I can think of few things it is less likely to do. I hope that we shall hear no more about this ragged specter of "separatism." But if we do, I am sure my colleagues will recognize it for the man of straw it is.

We will find a great deal more of the same doubtful quality of building material if we probe the other arguments which have been advanced against this bill. I have examined them carefully and while they all possess some degree of plausibility they appear to me to be heavily outweighed by the important benefits which will accrue from the enactment of this legislation. We have before us a bill whose passage will do much to bulwark the national security at a time when we are surrounded by grave dangers. I therefore urge my colleagues to give this measure their wholehearted support.

Mr. SIEMINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last two words.

Mr. Chairman, the continued criticism of the United Nations handling of the Koje-do prisoners' revolt is only assisting Communist propaganda. For let us not be misled. The Koje-do mutiny was engineered by hard-core Communist organizers in the prison camp for the specific purpose of helping the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom out of their troubles. Let us review the facts.

Last Wednesday, General Dodd was seized by mutinous Communist prisoners while at a camp entrusted to his care. At that moment, some 600 miles to the north, at Panmunjom, the Communist negotiators were searching for ways and means of evading the package proposal made to them by the United Nations representatives. The Communists had wasted days already, trying to wriggle out of acceptance, and refusing to bring forth a sensible counterproposal. The meaning of this is plain: Acceptance would have brought about truce in Korea. Did the Communists not want the truce at all? There has been evidence that they do. But they want a truce

which they can exploit as being dictated by them. For propaganda purpose, for the sake of being able to say that it was their terms that were accepted by the United Nations, rather than having it known that they had accepted the United Nations proposal, they squirmed and evaded an answer.

I cannot from this distance say definitely that the Koje-do prisoners were ordered into action. I would be willing to hazard a guess that it was. The coincidence of their action with the dilemma facing the Communists at Panmunjom is significant. Indeed, no orders would be needed to experienced Communist agitators. They would know what to do. On Wednesday they seized General Dodd while he was at the camp. We know their plans: They intended to hold General Dodd and release him after 10 days, and force him, wreathed in flowers, to walk a gantlet of sardonic prisoners. This clearly shows the seizure was for propaganda and morale purposes only, not because they had real grievances that needed to be corrected. That sort of thing is a typically Chinese way of making General Dodd lose face, and, with General Dodd, the whole United Nations. Any Chinese would know that this losing of face would be used at Panmunjom to attack the United Nations screening of prisoners, and thereby offset the body blow of admitting that 73,000 Communist prisoners had publicly rejected the Communist way of life in their homeland.

I hold no brief for General Coulson's signing of the prisoners' demands. He was wrong to do so, and he had no authority. General officers do not permit prisoners to negotiate and make demands. But let us give a little thought to his position at the time.

There had been previous riots in this camp at Koje-do. They were instigated by the hard-core Communist agitators among the prisoners. These men are provocative agents; they know that riots mean people will get hurt. These riots were instigated precisely for this purpose. They knew that the prisoners injured in the suppression of the riots they had instigated would be arguments reinforcing their own control over the camp. They could say: "See, your friends have been hurt, listen to us, your Communist leaders, not to the United Nations or the Red Cross."

The demands of the Communists inside Koje-do were communicated to General Coulson outside the stockade. General Coulson had force at his disposal—flame-throwing tanks. He could have wiped out the 6,000 prisoners there in a few minutes.

Conditions are not perfect in prison camps. Conditions never are. But our camps have been open to the inspection of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the corrections they recommended have been made. Are the Communist prison camps open to the same impartial investigation? No. The Communists have consistently refused to admit the Red Cross—an impartial self-sacrificing group of men of the highest reputation.

And as for the screening of Communists in our hands, to find out which of

them would or would not want to return to Communist lands—the United Nations negotiators have repeatedly invited the Communists to participate in an impartial rescreening by any recognized international organization, such as the International Red Cross.

Let us not lose time in criticism, Mr. Chairman. Let us rather continue the open negotiations. Every time the Communists refuse impartial investigation, they prove themselves to fear the truth, the truth about the prisoners in our United Nations hands. This truth is one element of the continuing responsibility we have of carrying the campaign of truth to every part of the world.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. TEAGUE: On page 3, strike out section 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following:

"SEC. 2. Section 211 (a) of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 505), as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 211. (a) There is hereby established within the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which shall consist of the Chairman, who shall be the presiding officer but who shall have no vote; the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force. The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall be a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all problems before the Joint Chiefs of Staff which may concern the Marine Corps. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be the principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense."

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that all debate on this amendment close in 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, General Cates, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, asked in 1949 that the Commandant of the Marine Corps be made a consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters before the Joint Chiefs of Staff which concern the Marine Corps. That is what this amendment does. Mr. Chairman, we fight in the air, we fight on the water, and we fight on land. Those are the three basic elements of military warfare. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of representatives of those three basic strategies as the top men of the three basic services which deal with each particular type of warfare. Now, if you are going to make the Commandant of the Marine Corps a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you should probably make the Chief of Engineers, the Chief of the Airborne Corps, the Chief of the Strategic Air Command members and, as I believe one of our gentlewomen remarked, the head of the Women's Army Corps should be represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Chairman, I hope this amendment will be adopted because the bill as presently constituted will start us down the road to deunification—and beginning right with the top of our military structure, too.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. COUDERT].

Mr. COUDERT. Mr. Chairman, we are all very much interested in and are constantly paying lip service to the principle of civilian control of the military. We all pretend to recognize the wisdom of the famous wisecrack that traveled around the world, of that great old Frenchman Clemenceau who saved France in 1917. You will remember his observation that "war is too serious a business to leave to the military."

Well, we think we have civilian control of the military.

Mr. Chairman, I doubt it very much. The whole issue of civilian control is raised by the proposals in this bill to make the Commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs. It is necessary to read that section in the bill, as to which there is an amendment offered, together with the preceding section in the United States Code chapter V, section 171e, in order to understand the point.

Section 171 (e) provides for the setting up of the Armed Forces policy council. Now that is the No. 1 over-all governing group, committee, or body within the Defense Department, and it is to that body that everything ultimately finds its way from subordinate echelons. Now the membership of that top policy body consists of five civilian secretaries headed by the Secretary of Defense and four uniformed members, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and their chairman. In the section we pay lip service to civilian control by saying that the Secretary of Defense shall be chairman and have the power of decision.

That means precious little when a group of men are gathering around the table as full members of a committee, discussing proposals and making decisions.

The very next section in the United States Code dealing with this subject is section 171 (f). That provides for the setting up of the Joint Chiefs. That is the thing we are talking about now in this amendment. It provides that the Joint Chiefs shall gather together, the four of them, and shall make decisions. They shall make strategic plans. They shall deal with logistic problems. They shall reach conclusions.

Then those four Joint Chiefs pick up their marbles, having reached decisions and finished the game, and walk across the hall to the Secretary's room and sit down in the Armed Forces Council to consider the same problems upon which they have conferred, and thus, of course, become a caucus within a caucus. Inevitably, human nature being what it is, they become the dominant factor in the Policy Committee.

What the Committee on Armed Forces is proposing to do in this bill will aggravate what seems to me a dangerous situation now. They are proposing to add one more member to that caucus within a caucus, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so that when the Armed Forces Policy Committee sits around the table there will not even be a theoretical superiority of numbers on the civilian side. There will be five military mem-

bers, old school-tie members almost surely from West Point and Annapolis, and five civilian Secretaries. This bill does not expressly make the Marine Commandant a member of the Policy Committee. But once a member of the Joint Chiefs, there will be irresistible pressure to add him to the Policy Committee.

For that reason, Mr. Chairman, I am for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas and inclined to oppose the bill if the amendment fails.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. DEVEREUX].

Mr. DEVEREUX. Mr. Chairman, I am afraid I will have to reiterate some of the things I have brought out before, because all of you were not present then.

On the question of whether there should be four members on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee or three, let me direct the thought to you that, suppose you had only one member of the Joint Chiefs Committee, then the thinking without any question would be just one set of thinking, whereas if you have four members on the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are advisers to the civilian members of our Government, there is no question in my mind that you will have a difference of opinion. As a matter of fact, we have just witnessed from the hearings that have been brought before us today that there was a decided difference of opinion among the various officers who are the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. As a matter of fact, I think it was brought out shortly after Admiral Denfeld was given his walking papers that the Commandant of the Marine Corps came up and presented his position very clearly without fear of reprisals of any sort. That is the kind of thinking I would like to see on our Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to this amendment by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE] because it strikes at one of the most vital provisions of the bill.

There never has been a valid reason why the Marine Corps, occupying the role it does in national defense, should have been denied for a single day a full voice in the councils of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Have we forgotten that day—October 17, 1949, a few short months before the outbreak of war in Korea—when Gen. Clifton B. Cates, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, testified before the House Armed Services Committee and protested bitterly the shabby treatment that had been accorded the Marine Corps?

Permit me to repeat some of General Cates' testimony on that occasion:

There does exist within our Corps, a continuous feeling of apprehension and annoyance sometimes bordering on outright indignation. We know that we exist solely as an element of the national defense. That is our business. We understand it and we know there is much to be done. Yet, during the past 2 years, the time, energy and attention of our leadership has been steadily consumed by the effort necessary to resist the inroads and incursions of those who

appear to accept the verdict of Congress. . . .

It follows that, at a time when the great requirement within the services is for a continuous, integrated effort, uncertainty and instability are the rule. As long as this persists and the services are kept off balance . . . there can be no effective organization of the Nation's military potential in the manner envisaged by the National Security Act.

Then, fighting against extinction of the already decimated Marine Corps, General Cates said this on October 17, 1949, only months before the start of the Korean conflagration:

The Marine Corps emerged from the last war feeling it had performed creditably. With the Navy, it had pioneered and developed the field of amphibious warfare for the use of the entire allied world. This new technique proved to be the key to victory on every major front in the war. . . . In addition, our own field forces played a decisive role in the reduction of the island fortresses held by the Japanese.

Then this blunt statement from the Marine Corps general:

Thus, it came as a great surprise to find ourselves at the war's end placed almost in the capacity of a culprit or a defendant.

What the defense and security of this Nation needs is more—not less—members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the courage of General Cates to speak out against the ambitious and predatory politicians who all too often give lip service to what they are pleased to call national defense.

Let it be remembered that it was the politicians within and without the Pentagon, who thumbed their figurative noses at Congress and rigged the plank for Admiral Denfeld because he, too, had the courage to speak out before the House Armed Services Committee.

I am for this bill. I sincerely hope it will become law and when it does I trust that the Marine Corps member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have the courage and conviction to speak out candidly before Congress in the best tradition of the Marine Corps, as did General Cates.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. VINSON].

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Chairman, the committee will recall that the Senate bill makes the Commandant of the Marine Corps a consultant. After a long hearing, after we had the benefit of hearing many witnesses, and my recollection is that General Cates was one of the main witnesses, he said that some years ago he did not think he should be on the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee but after further consideration of the matter he was of the opinion that it was proper for the Commandant of the Marine Corps to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Congress created the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. There is nothing holy about its personnel. The reason we said the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should be on that committee is that they are the three top officials of the respective services. It is just as sound to say that the Comman-

dant of the Marine Corps should be there, too, because each one has a certain military function and a certain military mission. Certainly there is no military mission that is developed in this country without the Marine Corps having some part in it. So an exchange of ideas will be brought about by the Commandant of the Marine Corps being on that committee. So I am certainly hoping that the committee will make him a bona fide member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of just being a consultant on it. If he is to be a consultant, what is he going to be consulted about? Is he going to be consulted about one thing today and nothing tomorrow? I want him to be a full-fledged member, because the Marine Corps is an integral part of our national defense. I certainly hope this amendment will be voted down.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. TEAGUE].

The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. VINSON) there were—ayes 33, noes 78.

Mr. TEAGUE. Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.

Tellers were refused.

So the amendment was rejected.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and do so for the purpose of asking the majority leader at this time, if he will, to advise us as to the program for next week.

Mr. MCCORMACK. Mr. Chairman, Monday is Consent Calendar day. There will be three suspensions. One is H. R. 7800, to amend title II of the Social Security Act, which was reported today out of the Committee on Ways and Means. Two, the bill H. R. 4752; a bill relating to the waiver of oil and gas rentals. Three, the bill H. R. 7783; a bill relating to disabled veterans' compensation.

After that, if time permits, we will take up the bill, H. R. 3098, relating to the jurisdiction of the Federal courts; that is, with reference to the amount involved, \$10,000. Then, next will come the bill, H. R. 2813, and I might say to my friend that they are scheduled to be taken up in that order. First, H. R. 3098, and then H. R. 2813. H. R. 2813 is the Coll-bran reclamation project.

On Tuesday, the Private Calendar will be called. Thereafter, the bill H. R. 7860, which is the urgency deficiency appropriation bill of 1952. After that is disposed of on Tuesday, and if there is any time remaining, we will take up the rule and as much general debate as possible going into Wednesday on the bill, H. R. 7005, amending the Mutual Security Act of 1951, commonly referred to as the Mutual Assistance Act. I understand that 6 hours of general debate is provided on that bill, under the rule.

As to any changes, or any further program, I make the usual reservation to announce such changes or program later. Of course, conference reports may be brought up at any time.

Mr. ARENDS. I would like to ask the gentleman, if under the program on Monday there are any votes, the votes will be had on Monday.

Mr. MCCORMACK. Exactly. If there are any roll calls, they will take place on Monday.

Mr. ARENDS. Is it also planned, or are there any plans about voting on the Mutual Security bill next week?

Mr. MCCORMACK. Of course that is within the wisdom of the House. I think my views are well known. I like to have a full and complete discussion. Of course, if it could be finished by Thursday or Friday, I would ask to go over until Monday. With that observation, I am always in favor of full and free discussion.

Mr. HINSHAW. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MCCORMACK. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HINSHAW. I would like to inquire again about the McFarland bill, amendment to the Federal Communications Commission Act.

Mr. MCCORMACK. I was frank with my friend last week. You can see the position I am in. The deficiency appropriation is up for consideration. The mutual security bill I assume will take the rest of next week. If the House would pass that by Thursday or Friday, I would think they had done a pretty good week's work. I could not put it on next week's program, but I want to assure my friend that I shall program that bill just as soon as I can.

Mr. HINSHAW. The gentleman from Arizona in the other body has been pressing us for some time.

Mr. MCCORMACK. If there is anybody who has influence on the gentleman from Massachusetts, it is the distinguished majority leader in the other body. If I could make a political speech for his reelection in this Chamber, I would be glad to do it.

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. YORTY. Mr. Chairman, having served in the Pacific theater during World War II, I have some personal knowledge of the Marine Corps, their courage, their great morale, and their very great achievements. I admire the Marines as much as any person can. Like every American, I am especially proud of them. But like every other American, I am also especially proud of our great Army which has always fought with unmatched valor; of our superb Navy which dominates the sea; and of our splendid Air Force which has discharged its responsibilities with great credit to this Nation and to itself.

The Marine Corps is a small, compact service. This simplifies many of its problems as compared with, for instance, the Army. Furthermore, the Marines are singularly colorful. When they act jointly with Army units, which they often do, they are apt to receive greater newspaper space than the Army units and this fact has at times been a source of annoyance to soldiers who, under such circumstances, have felt that their units were not given due credit.

This bill is a step away from unification. It tends toward increased separation of the Marine Corps from the Navy. In a sense, it might be said that the bill

sets up a second land army. It seems obvious that the existence of such a second land army might well cause confusion of functions and cause neglect of the Army which, irrespective of the size of the Marine Corps, must in the future be kept in a state of absolute readiness, prepared to act immediately and to expand rapidly. For large sustained land operations we must depend primarily on the Army. To be misled into exaggerated dependence upon a service as small as the Marine Corps could prove catastrophic. I believe that is one reason why most of our military leaders do not favor making the Marines a second land army with the Commandant of the Marine Corps made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Of course, they are also quite properly concerned with the added costs which Admiral Sherman estimated this bill would entail, because they must daily face the fact that defense costs are already a heavy burden on every taxpayer in the Nation.

It seems to me that if the Marine Corps is part of the Naval Establishment it should be represented on the Joint Chiefs, by the Chief of Naval Operations, the same as other parts of the Navy. If the components of the major services are going to start insisting upon individual and equal representation on the Joint Chiefs, unification is doomed and the present structure of our Defense Department cannot be preserved.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me repeat, I have nothing, absolutely nothing but praise for the great Marine Corps. My admiration for the corps, however, has nothing to do with my vote on this bill which, I feel, would eventually harm not only our defense structure, but also the Marine Corps itself. In order to show our appreciation for the Marine Corps we need not exaggerate and distort its vitally important place as a cog in our defense machinery. Neither are we justified in depreciating the achievements and problems of the other services by unjustified comparisons.

Setting up a second land army duplicating some of the functions of the first is not the road toward greater streamlining and unification. Do we really want unification? If we do, Mr. Chairman, I think this bill is a mistake. It starts us in the wrong direction—toward greater confusion and duplication. Let us keep our great and wonderful Marine Corps integrated in the Naval Establishment where it has functioned with great distinction. It is as part of the Naval Establishment that the corps has made the great record repeatedly recited here as an argument for taking steps to divorce it from the Navy. The great record argues equally strong for not changing the fundamental relationship of the Marine Corps to the Navy.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word, and I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks on the Teague amendment following the remarks of the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. DEVEREUX].

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike out the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay tribute to the gentleman from Texas, Colonel TEAGUE. I was sorry not to vote for his amendments, but I saw the matter otherwise. I know there was no more gallant fighter than the gentleman from Texas, Colonel TEAGUE, and no one who has done more in the interest of those who fought with him; as an infantryman and as a badly wounded veteran he saw fighting under the worst possible conditions in World War II. I would always like to be with him in voting, but sometimes we disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment as amended. The committee amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee will rise.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. DEMPSEY, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (S. 677) to fix the personnel strength of the United States Marine Corps, and to establish the relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pursuant to House Resolution 590, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

Mr. VINSON. Mr. Speaker, on the passage of the bill I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 254, nays 30, answered "present" 2, not voting 145, as follows:

[Roll No. 77]

YEAS—254

Abbott	Boggs, La.	Corbett
Abernethy	Bolling	Cotton
Adair	Bolton	Cox
Addonizio	Bray	Crawford
Allen, Ill.	Brehm	Cunningham
Allen, La.	Brooks	Curtis, Nebr.
Andersen,	Brown, Ga.	Dague
H. Carl	Brown, Ohio	Davis, Tenn.
Anderson, Calif.	Bryson	DeGraffenried
Andresen,	Buchanan	Delaney
August H.	Budge	Dempsey
Andrews	Burdick	Denton
Angell	Burton	Devereux
Arends	Busbey	Dolliver
Armstrong	Butler	Dondero
Aspinall	Byrnes	Donohue
Auchincloss	Camp	Doughton
Ayres	Canfield	Eaton
Baker	Carnahan	Elliott
Bakewell	Carrigg	Ellsworth
Barden	Case	Elston
Barrett	Chelf	Fallon
Bates, Mass.	Chenoweth	Feighan
Battle	Chiperfield	Fenton
Beamer	Chudoff	Fernandez
Bender	Church	Fisher
Bennett, Fla.	Clevenger	Flood
Bennett, Mich.	Cole, N. Y.	Ford
Bishop	Colmer	Forrester
Blackney	Cooley	Frazier
Blatnik	Cooper	Fulton

Gamble	Kluczynski	Roberts
Gary	Lane	Rodino
Gathings	Lanham	Rogers, Colo.
Gavin	Lantaff	Rogers, Fla.
George	Larcade	Rogers, Mass.
Golden	Latham	Rooney
Goodwin	LeCompte	Ross
Gordon	Lind	Sadiak
Graham	McCormack	St. George
Granahan	McCulloch	Saylor
Grant	McDonough	Schenck
Green	McGregor	Scott, Hardie
Gregory	McGuire	Scudder
Gross	McMillan	Secrest
Hagen	McMullen	Seely-Brown
Hale	McVey	Shafer
Harden	Machrowicz	Short
Hardy	Mack, Ill.	Sieminski
Harris	Mack, Wash.	Sikes
Harrison, Nebr.	Madden	Simpson, Ill.
Harrison, Va.	Magee	Simpson, Pa.
Hart	Mansfield	Sittler
Harvey	Martin, Iowa	Smith, Kans.
Havener	Merrow	Smith, Va.
Hays, Ark.	Miller, Nebr.	Smith, Wis.
Herlong	Miller, N. Y.	Spence
Heslton	Mills	Springer
Hess	Murdock	Stanley
Hill	Murray	Steed
Hillings	Nicholson	Talle
Hinsaw	Norblad	Taylor
Hoffman, Ill.	Norrell	Thomas
Holmes	O'Brien, Ill.	Thompson,
Hope	O'Brien, Mich.	Mich.
Horan	O'Hara	Thornberry
Howell	O'Konski	Trimble
Hull	O'Neill	Vail
Jackson, Calif.	Osmer	Van Zandt
Javits	Ostertag	Vinson
Jenison	Patterson	Vursell
Jenkins	Philbin	Walter
Jensen	Phillips	Weichel
Jones, Ala.	Polk	Whitten
Jones,	Preston	Widnall
Hamilton C.	Price	Wier
Jones,	Priest	Wigglesworth
Woodrow W.	Rabaut	Williams, N. Y.
Judd	Radwan	Willis
Karsten, Mo.	Rains	Winstead
Kearney	Reams	Withrow
Kearns	Reece, Tenn.	Wolcott
Keating	Reed, Ill.	Wolverton
Kersten, Wis.	Reed, N. Y.	Wood, Idaho
Kilburn	Rees, Kans.	Zablocki
King, Calif.	Richards	
King, Pa.	Rivers	

NAYS—30

Bentsen	Hollifield	Patten
Bosone	Ikard	Pickett
Burleson	Kean	Page
Cannon	Kelley, Pa.	Rankin
Clemente	Kilday	Scrivner
Coudert	Lucas	Smith, Miss.
Crumpacker	McCarthy	Teague
Curtis, Mo.	Marshall	Wilson, Tex.
Davis, Wis.	Meador	Yates
Eberharter	Miller, Md.	Yorty

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—2

Lyle Nelson

NOT VOTING—145

Aandahl	Dingell	Hunter
Albert	Dollinger	Irving
Allen, Calif.	Donovan	Jackson, Wash.
Anfuso	Dorn	James
Bailey	Doyle	Jarman
Baring	Durham	Johnson
Bates, Ky.	Engle	Jonas
Beall	Evens	Jones, Mo.
Beckworth	Fine	Kee
Belcher	Fogarty	Kelly, N. Y.
Berry	Forand	Kennedy
Betts	Fugate	Keogh
Boggs, Del.	Furcolo	Kerr
Bonner	Garmatz	Kirwan
Bow	Gore	Klein
Boykin	Granger	Lesinski
Bramblett	Greenwood	Lovre
Brownson	Gwinn	McConnell
Buckley	Hall	McIntire
Buffett	Edwin Arthur	McKinnon
Burnside	Hall	Mahon
Bush	Leonard W.	Martin, Mass.
Carlyle	Halleck	Mason
Celler	Hand	Miller, Calif.
Chatham	Harrison, Wyo.	Mitchell
Cole, Kans.	Hays, Ohio	Morano
Combs	Hébert	Morgan
Crosser	Hedrick	Morris
Davis, Ga.	Heffernan	Morrison
Dawson	Heller	Morton
Deane	Herter	Moulder
Denny	Hoever	Multer
D'Ewart	Hoffman, Mich.	

Mumma	Riley	Thompson, Tex.
Murphy	Robeson	Tollefson
O'Brien, N. Y.	Rogers, Tex.	Van Pelt
O'Toole	Roosevelt	Velde
Passman	Sabath	Vorys
Patman	Sasser	Watts
Perkins	Scott	Welch
Potter	Hugh D., Jr.	Werdel
Poulson	Sheehan	Wharton
Powell	Shelley	Wheeler
Prouty	Sheppard	Wickersham
Ramsay	Staggers	Williams, Miss.
Redden	Stigler	Wilson, Ind.
Regan	Stockman	Wood, Ga.
Rhodes	Sutton	Woodruff
Ribicoff	Taber	
Riehlman	Tackett	

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Hoffman of Michigan for, with Mr. Dorn against.

Mr. Bailey for, with Mr. Lyle against.

Mr. Riehlman for, with Mr. Stockman against.

Mr. Kirwan for, with Mr. Regan against.

Mr. Vorys for, with Mr. Nelson against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Martin of Massachusetts with Mr. Chatham.

Mr. Taber with Mr. Jarman.

Mr. Halleck with Mr. Dingell.

Mr. Herter with Mr. McGrath.

Mr. Hugh D. Scott, Jr., with Mr. Evins.

Mr. Tollefson with Mr. Heller.

Mr. Hoeven with Mr. Staggers.

Mr. Allen of California with Mr. O'Brien of New York.

Mr. Hunter with Mr. Deane.

Mr. Beall with Mr. Donovan.

Mr. James with Mr. Greenwood.

Mr. Jonas with Mr. Engle.

Mr. Berry with Mr. Doyle.

Mr. Johnson with Mr. McKinnon.

Mr. Belcher with Mr. Shelley.

Mr. Gwinn with Mr. Sheppard.

Mr. Denny with Mr. Miller of California.

Mr. Brownson with Mr. Morris.

Mr. Bush with Mr. Williams of Mississippi.

Mr. Lovre with Mr. Hébert.

Mr. Cole of Kansas with Mr. Passman.

Mr. Aandahl with Mr. Garmatz.

Mr. Woodruff with Mr. Ribicoff.

Mr. Boggs of Delaware with Mr. Lesinski.

Mr. Wilson of Indiana with Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Betts with Mr. Kee.

Mr. Van Pelt with Mr. Riley.

Mr. Bow with Mr. Hays of Ohio.

Mr. Bramblett with Mr. Fugate.

Mr. Wharton with Mr. Granger.

Mr. Potter with Mr. Fogarty.

Mr. Morano with Mr. Forand.

Mr. McIntire with Mr. Dawson.

Mr. Buffett with Mr. Morrison.

Mr. Morton with Mr. Durham.

Mr. Edwin Arthur Hall with Mr. Roosevelt.

Mr. Sheehan with Mr. Kerr.

Mr. D'Ewart with Mr. Robeson.

Mr. McConnell with Mr. Rogers of Texas.

Mr. Mason with Mr. Albert.

Mr. Poulson with Mr. Baring.

Mr. Leonard W. Hall with Mr. Bates of Kentucky.

Mr. Prouty with Mr. Buckley.

Mr. Harrison of Wyoming with Mr. Hefferman.

Mr. Velde with Mr. Crosser.

Mr. Mumma with Mr. Patman.

Mr. PATTEN changed his vote from yea to nay.

Mr. LYLE. Mr. Speaker, I have a live pair with the gentleman from West Virginia, Mr. BAILEY. If he were present, he would vote "aye." I, therefore, withdraw my vote of "no" and vote "present."

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Speaker, I have a live pair with the gentleman from Ohio,

Mr. VORYS. If he were present, he would vote "aye." I voted "no." Therefore, I withdraw my vote and vote "present."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The title was amended so as to read: "To fix the personnel strength of the United States Marine Corps, to add the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and for other purposes."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CALENDAR WEDNESDAY

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that business in order on Calendar Wednesday of next week be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

ADJOURNMENT OVER

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today it adjourn to meet on Monday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A further message from the Senate, by Mr. Landers, its enrolling clerk, announced that the Senate agrees to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 20) entitled "Joint resolution to confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, and to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources."

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. PHILBIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 30 minutes today, following the conclusion of any special orders heretofore entered.

REPAIRS TO "WASP"

Mr. COLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. COLE of New York. Mr. Speaker, the Navy's greatest peacetime accident resulted in the loss of 176 lives, and grave damage to a major unit of our sea-air power.

Today, we learn from testimony given before the court of inquiry investigating this greatest of naval peacetime disasters that 10 days after the carrier U. S. S.

Wasp entered drydock for repairs it will be ready to put to sea.

This record accomplishment was achieved by cutting off the bow of the carrier *Hornet* which is being taken out of the moth-ball fleet. The *Hornet's* bow was put on the *Wasp* in not only record time, but with great ingenuity. The repairs cost about \$1,000,000.

The *Hornet* will have another bow made and upon being reactivated she too will put to sea and with no loss in time.

Mr. Speaker, the repairs to the *Wasp* and the ability displayed by the officers, men of the Navy, and shipyard workmen is a tribute to their efforts and skill.

REPAIRS TO THE U. S. S. "WASP"

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I congratulate the Navy and the gentleman from New York [Mr. COLE] upon the quick repairs to the great ship *Wasp*. I congratulate the gentleman upon his never-ceasing zeal for our Navy and for our national defense.

That brings up at this time the need for another carrier. I believe the Senate will put it in the appropriations bill now under consideration. This accident shows the need for another great carrier and the rapid repairs. I suggest that the new carrier be called the *United States Congress*.

WAR CONTRACTS TO LOW BIDDERS

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.

Mrs. ROGERS of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I am very apprehensive and very indignant about what I consider unfair discrimination in the awarding of several contracts in my own district. The firms in my district were low bidders. I am very much alarmed that industry today seems to be afraid to fight the awarding of contracts. There is something terribly wrong, and I think a complete lack of judgment and cooperation. Instead of helping a distressed area they hurt it by taking away awards when firms are the lowest bidders. This condition should be thoroughly investigated.

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. BRAY asked and was given permission to address the House for 30 minutes on Tuesday next, following the legislative business of the day and any other special orders heretofore entered.

RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND FREE EUROPE

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks and include extraneous material.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, the Congress should join in serving notice on the Soviet Union that the United States intends to proceed resolutely with the policy of integrating West Germany into free Europe and will not be deterred by Soviet threats or obstruction or by the blandishments of unification talk. For this purpose, I am today—Friday—introducing a resolution stating that it is the sense of Congress to support, first, a suitable contractual agreement with the German Federal Government respecting German sovereignty with such reservations required by the allied powers as are necessary for the protection of West Germany and free Europe and the claims of persecutees; second, integration of Germany's defense potential into the European defense community; third, economic integration of Germany with free Europe as under the Schuman plan; fourth, protection of the territorial and administrative integrity of West Germany and West Berlin; fifth, insistence that a guaranteed system of really free elections can be the only basis for a united Germany and for unification but without any delay of action on items one to four above; and, sixth, effective action by the United States in respect of the foregoing.

Present indications are that if this policy is pursued the Soviet Union will put the pressure on again via Berlin with danger of a repetition of the 1948 Berlin blockade. West Berlin has a population of 2,143,000 with an unemployment rate of 25 percent, totaling 280,000. Yet it is confidently expected that West Berlin will stand up as it did before. West Berlin was a magnificent example of courage in facing the previous Soviet blockade. The fact that the United States, France, and Great Britain broke this blockade was one of the most important single factors in keeping communism out of free Europe because it assured the people of free Europe that the United States recognized and accepted a responsibility for joining in with force, if necessary, to keep it free. We may have an occasion again to show our determination to prevent West Berlin from being taken over or starved out; this time I believe it is likely to be the final and consummating factor in the success of the efforts to unify Europe, economically and politically. We owe it to the transcendent importance of the issues and to the determination we expect of the people of West Berlin, West Germany, and of free Europe to show our backing for them at this time by passing this resolution.

Appended hereto are editorials from the May 15 issue of the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune:

[From the New York Times of May 15, 1952]

THE WEST STANDS FIRM

Despite the threats emanating from Moscow and East Berlin, the three Western Powers—the United States, Britain, and France—have served notice on the Kremlin that they are determined to proceed with the formation of a European Defense Community including Germany, and that they will not be deflected from supporting such a project as the true path to European unification and peace.

The notice was served in parallel notes drafted by the three powers in close consultation with Chancellor Adenauer as a reply to the Soviet efforts to wreck that project by pressing for a peace treaty with a Germany unified, remilitarized and neutralized on Soviet terms. A peaceful European community, the Western Powers declare, cannot threaten the interests of any country devoted to the maintenance of peace. On the contrary, it is designed to initiate a new era in which international relations will be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. Soviet Russia is invited to examine with sincerity and good will any practical plan for extending the area of cooperation beyond its present limits.

The western notice acquires special significance in view of the fact that the European Defense Community treaty has already been initiated and that the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Powers are expected to meet with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn later this month to sign a "peace contract." This, in turn, is to pave the way for Germany's integration with the west and a German military contribution to western defense. The Kremlin is to be given due notice that the European unification plan is not part of a game, nor a pawn to be bartered for Soviet concessions, but a historic innovation transcending the problem of German unification and designed to end the Soviet scheme of conquering the free nations one by one. For this reason the Western Powers refuse to be deterred by threats of Soviet counteraction, including the threat of a new Berlin blockade. These threats may succor the western opposition, in which doctrinaire socialism and ultranationalism, neutralism, pacifism, and the old appeasement elements join to obstruct ratification of the basic pacts. But they can no longer frighten the western governments, and Secretary Acheson warns that the Western Powers will know how to protect both their position in Berlin and the people in Western Germany.

Given these basic premises, the Western Powers are perfectly willing and even anxious to negotiate on the Soviet proposals. But, unlike the Soviets, they refuse to put the cart before the horse, and though they reiterate their previous objections to the Soviet proposals, especially in the matter of the German borders, rearmament and neutralization, they insist that a peace treaty is impossible until Germany has been reunited under an all-German Government chosen in free national elections. They therefore repeat their previous proposal for an investigation of the political conditions in both East and West Germany by an impartial commission, preferably the United Nations commission already created for that purpose. Going beyond that, they insist that conditions of freedom, not only for the day of voting but before and after it, must be established wherever such may now be lacking. This means that the Soviets would have to drop the dictatorial puppet regime they have imposed on Eastern Germany.

Furthermore, the Western Powers insist that the new all-German Government must

be really free, both before and after the peace treaty. This freedom must include Germany's basic right to associate herself with other nations both in defensive arrangements and for other peaceful purposes under the aegis of the United Nations. As the Soviets have already included such former enemy nations as Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria in their own alliance bloc, they can scarcely refuse Germany a like privilege, unless they insist on imposing on Germany permanent shackles for their own purposes.

The Soviets have now two alternatives. They can carry out their threats and precipitate a new crisis, or they can accept the Western proposals in the hope of obtaining a new all-German Government under Socialist and neutralist domination which could serve their immediate purpose of detaching Germany from the West before the pending pacts are ratified. That is a possibility which the Western Powers must face as well. But that possibility can only provide new impetus for them to both square their own "peace contract" with the professions of their present notes and speed up the conclusion of the pacts, lest time and Soviet intrigues still succeed in defeating them.

[From the New York Herald Tribune of May 15, 1952]

THE WESTERN INITIATIVE

The reply of the United States, Great Britain and France to the Russian proposals for a united, neutralized Germany hit at the weakest portions of the Soviet position and emphasized the basic strength of the western stand. It was not a negative or defensive response, but a positive affirmation of faith in the peoples of a free Europe, voluntarily united to promote their common defense and prosperity. In such a Europe, Germany could play a constructive role; in the Soviet scheme Germany would be condemned—at best—to be the source of a permanent state of tension and insecurity in the center of Europe. Moreover, if the vagueness and the qualifications in which the Russians have shrouded their plans for all-German elections are any criterion, the Kremlin's program would lead to the eventual absorption of Germany into the Soviet slave system.

The heart of the western reply is the insistence on a guaranteed system of really free elections for a united Germany. This must be assured by preliminary studies, either by the existing United Nations commission, established for that purpose, or by some similar body. The West does not accept a four-power arrangement in which Russia would have a veto over the other three supervisory nations, and which would either delay interminably or frustrate altogether any effort to allow the East Germans to express their will. Agreement on the form of investigatory commission and the completion of its work are prerequisites to any conference on the precise form of the new German state and its relations with the victorious powers.

Meanwhile, however, the West refuses to scrap the labors that have gone into fusing Western Germany with the free European community. It denies that German neutrality is either practicable or just; it affirms that Germany must have the right to make alliances and agreements with its neighbors for mutual protection and economic advancement; it insists that Europe must continue to press toward unity if the continent is to survive.

From the purely diplomatic standpoint, the western reply regains the initiative that the Russians seized with their suggestion of a speedy unification of Germany. A Russian rejection of the note would reveal a distrust of truly democratic procedures in Germany and an insistence on maintaining

the permanent neutrality of that nation—which means keeping Germany in a state of perpetual tutelage. The West, for its part, has taken a soundly realistic view of Europe's future, and one that is in keeping with the legitimate aspirations and needs of the nations of the continent. The three powers have pointed up the sharp difference between their own concept of human liberty and progress and the dark ambitions of the Kremlin.

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Mr. JACKSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

Mr. JACKSON of California. Mr. Speaker, by its action today the House has insured the integrity of the United States Marine Corps and has served notice that the famous fighting organization is to continue to do its assigned jobs without fear of reprisals from any source or depletion by attrition.

Credit is due to many for the action taken today. First, to the committee which reported the bill. Secondly, to the 44 Senators who sponsored the bill in another body, and to the seventy-odd Members of the House who dropped identical bills on this side. Many Members who have never seen military service themselves rallied to the support of the Marine Corps in both Houses.

Last, but by no means least, credit is due to two great marines. General Clifton B. Cates, former Commandant, and retired Marine general, Merritt Edsen. Without the courageous spirit shown by these two officers before committees of the Congress in expressing their honest views, the Marine Corps might well have suffered oblivion before the Congress could have taken legislative action to protect its legitimate and rightful status. They chose to speak their honest convictions as Marine officers, and each paid an ultimate penalty for his forthrightness. The officers and men of the Marine Corps will do well to remember them as among the staunchest comrades-in-arms.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert at this point in the RECORD an address delivered by President Truman at the sixth annual honor awards program of the Department of Agriculture on the Washington Monument Grounds yesterday.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Massachusetts?

There was no objection.
(The address follows:)

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT AT THE SIXTH ANNUAL HONOR AWARDS PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ON THE WASHINGTON MONUMENT GROUNDS

Mr. Secretary, ladies, and gentlemen, we are gathered here to honor some fine Americans—men and women who are today receiving special recognition for their outstanding work in the public service.

These men and women come from all parts of the country. They do many different sorts of jobs. But they all have one thing in common. They are Federal employees—civil servants—working for the public good. And the extra effort they have put into their jobs is their gift to us, the American people.

I am proud of these fine men and women. I am proud of the whole civil service they belong to and represent so well. There is no better group in the country. And this is a good time to remember that.

Any time a Government employee does something wrong, it makes the headlines. But when Government employees do something good—as they are doing all the time—it is such a commonplace thing the people never hear about it.

I wish all Americans could be here with us to see this evidence of good government. I wish they all could read the little booklet Secretary Brannan gave me the other day—the one that tells what each of these awards is being given for. That would make every one as proud as I am.

SAME KIND OF STORY OF OUTSTANDING WORK

All down the line, behind each one of the awards presented here today, is the same kind of story—a story of outstanding work, the finest kind of service to the public.

No one can read these stories without coming to understand that there is something very special about the public service which has made these men and women put forth their best efforts—made them put everything they've got into their jobs.

The great thing about Government work is that it offers something more than just a way to make a living. It offers the chance to serve a public purpose, instead of just a private purpose—the chance to help the country, and to be part of something bigger than any private undertaking.

It is no wonder to me that here at the Department of Agriculture you have so many honors to give out today. For the goals of your work are tremendously exciting. The common purpose of your programs is as inspiring as anything in the whole Government.

For nearly 20 years now, this Government has been working to rebuild American agriculture as a prosperous, productive, efficient part of our economy—and a good and satisfying way of life for people on the land.

We have made up our minds that this country shall have abundant production of the food and fibre to support our growing population and our great responsibilities as leader of the whole free world. We have made up our minds, too, that the farmers of this country—the people who produce these things for us—shall share fully and completely in the benefits of modern living.

We have set ourselves a goal of parity between farm living and city living. For we know that there is more to productive agriculture than tools and soil and seed. The most important part of the whole picture is the people on the farm. Everything we do—all the work of this Department—comes right back to helping people, helping the farmers of this country and their families—and their neighbors in the market towns—the backbone of our whole free society.

REAL SENSE OF MISSION FOR THE COMMON GOOD

There is a real sense of mission behind you in this department—a real, tangible feeling of working for the common good. In a way—a very common-sense way—you have been engaged in a great crusade all these years. Many of you came down here 20 years ago just to be a part of that crusade and make a contribution to it. And I know you still remember how it all got started and why it got started.

You remember that we had a terrible experience on our farms in the years before 1933. Things were bad enough for farmers in the twenties. And then the great depres-

sion came along and put the finishing touches on.

Farmers were knocked out economically, all across the country. Market outlets and prices for their crops collapsed. Farm families almost everywhere were living in real poverty. We had plenty of good land and hard working people. We had the basic resources all right—but we couldn't put them to work on a paying basis.

It is pathetic when you think about what happened. In desperation for cash crops, farmers plowed up land that should not have been touched. Dust storms blackened the sky as nature's answer to this abuse of the soil. All over the country the story was the same. The Nation's precious topsoil was eroding—blowing away and washing out to sea—ruining agriculture's basic source of strength. Farm incomes were not sufficient to finance badly needed soil-conservation work.

Economic freedom became a mockery without economic strength. And political freedoms were endangered by rebellions that broke out in defiance of law and order. Desperate farmers turned to force and violence to resist the injustice of mortgage foreclosures which would have wiped away their lifetime savings.

It was a terrible time. But fortunately—very fortunately—most Americans learned something from it. Most of us learned that it takes more than a wealth of resources, and more than an industrious people to insure progress and prosperity for our country.

AMERICANS LEARNED NEED OF COOPERATIVE EFFORT

We found out that there had to be common-sense management of our national affairs in the interests of all the people. We found out there had to be cooperative effort and wise legislation to correct the deficiencies of our economic system—to enhance the security of all our people—and to create the conditions necessary for progress and prosperity for the Nation as a whole.

We found out these things were needed if we were to have any order in our society and make our freedoms and resources really work for us. That much we had learned by 1933. And after that, we found out another thing. We found out the job could be done in agriculture and in every other aspect of our national life.

We've been demonstrating that fact for 20 years. Look what has been accomplished on the farm.

Today, American agriculture is highly productive and highly efficient. It is producing abundantly for the defense effort. It is rebuilding strength in the land for the use of future generations. And it is helping to give our people a higher standard of living than they ever have known before.

All of you know the policies and programs that have helped to bring this about:

Price-support programs have brought stability to farm prices; and at the same time they have brought adequate supplies to consumer markets.

Soil-conservation programs have built up the land.

Research projects have helped farmers to boost production and get food to market at a lower cost.

Rural electrification has brought great efficiencies in farming operations and it has turned farm houses into farm homes.

Farm credit and housing loans have helped millions of farmers to buy and improve their lands and homes.

These and other programs—programs your department has carried out so well—have enabled the farmers of America to build the strong agricultural economy we know today. In this way, we have demonstrated that by positive action we can use the powers of our Government to make our resources and our freedoms work for everybody's benefit.

PEACEFUL REVOLUTION IN UNITED STATES
AGRICULTURE

In these 20 years, we have brought about a real revolution—a peaceful revolution—in American agriculture.

Some people have never approved of what we set out to do—and have been doing. They have fought against us every step of the way. They are still at it today. And their favorite cry has been "socialism," "regimentation," Government "control" and "domination" of the farmer.

Actually what we have been doing is the very opposite of socialism. We've been getting the means of production back into the hands of the individual free enterprisers.

Listen to this. In 1932, less than 58 percent of the Nation's farms were owned by the people who operated them. Today, after 20 years of what the mossbacks call socialism, that figure has gone up to 75 percent. There are 250,000 more farmers who own their own farms today than there were in 1932. That doesn't sound like socialism to me. It sounds like real free enterprise. So far as I know, there is nothing in the free enterprise system that requires half the Nation's farms to be owned by absentee landlords.

All this talk about socialism is just plain hokum. What we have actually been working for is to extend and strengthen private farm ownership. And we have been trying to make it possible for all farm families—whether they own their farms or not—to grow good crops and sell them for decent prices. We have been trying to make sure that we will have a strong agriculture as part of a strong economy, and good farm living as part of a good life for all Americans.

That has been our goal these 20 years. That has been the motive power and the inspiration behind your fine work in the Department of Agriculture.

And it is still the goal—still the inspiration—still the reason so many men and women are giving their best efforts to the public service in our agricultural programs.

We must keep it that way. I hope the time will never come when the good fight, the good spirit, the sense of real public purpose and real achievement goes out of this great Department.

For there is still a lot to do. There are plenty of problems still to be solved—plenty of improvements still to be made. It's a big job—and a great challenge.

I know that you will meet this challenge in the same spirit and with the same devotion that has marked the work of the men and women we honor here today.

WHAT IS OUR PROGRAM IN KOREA?

Mr. REECE of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 3 minutes and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection.

Mr. REECE of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, it is time we faced the facts in Korea. More than a year ago General MacArthur was relieved from command. Since then our position in Korea has steadily deteriorated.

When he left Korea, the Red forces were suffering heavy losses, their supply position was precarious and their air support negligible. Had MacArthur been given a free hand, with air restrictions lifted, with Asiatic reinforcements made available, he would have given us a victory. We have this assurance from

a number of responsible officers who have since returned from Korea.

But, Mr. Speaker, the State Department—of all peoples—has developed a new military strategy. It has decided that we will hold a line in Korea until someday, somehow, our enemy will naively conclude that the war is futile and then beg to come to honorable terms.

Cease-fire conversations have been going on nearly 10 months.

What has happened in the meanwhile?

Red strength has been increased enormously. We are outnumbered 2 or 3 to 1 on the ground; nearly 2 to 1 in aircraft; our Sabre jet fighter is outnumbered 5 to 1 by the Red MIG-15.

The Reds have recovered from their precarious supply position; in the cease-fire conversations we are confronted with stalling and lies; Red prisoners have kidnaped their commanding general.

But, Mr. Speaker, the alarming thing about this increased Red strength is not its actual present level, rather it is the fact that there is a constant and progressive increase. It is not only in Korea, it is in China also.

Airdromes, underground hangars, hard standings, runways, modern anti-aircraft are mushrooming up in critical areas in Korea, Manchuria, and China. Red submarines are being sighted in Korean waters.

For the Red forces Korea is a testing laboratory and back of this testing ground real inescapable, sinister power is being amassed.

A third of our entire defensive Air Force is tied down defending our ground forces; half of all American combat divisions are required in Korea and Japan; our allies continue with token forces only. We are not only sadly short of equipment in Korea; but we are so sadly short of ammunition that it is being rationed. Meanwhile, the American program of NATO support continues, so far as I know, on schedule. Our home defenses are sadly neglected.

Our defense and foreign-aid budgets have pushed us deep into deficit spending in spite of the fact that taxes are higher than during the war. The lives of American youth are completely disrupted. By 1954 every eligible lad will have been drafted into the military service.

Mr. Speaker, never before in all history has a first-rate power succeeded so effectively in the complete global diffusion of its entire military resources.

What every real American wants to know is: What is our program for Korea? How do we end Mr. Truman's war there? What is our long-range military program; where is it leading us?

Obviously, in Korea, there are three alternatives: Admit defeat and pull out; continue a war of attrition; reinforce and win.

The American people have a right to know what to expect. My reaction is if we do not intend to win, it is better to pull out and admit defeat than to continue the sacrifice of American lives and treasure with no hope of a military decision.

My further reaction is that so far as possible we should fight the Reds in Korea with our Asiatic allies. Gen. Chiang Kai-shek's troops could largely replace our ground forces. Eventually Chiang's troops should be able to hold the line in Korea and free our ground force from its 2-year-old, arduous assignment.

Our major effort could then be made in the air and on the sea where we are peculiarly qualified to be most effective.

The argument that the use of Chiang Kai-shek's troops would lead to war with Red China is fatuous. We are already at war with Red China.

While we followed Secretary Acheson's policy of "waiting for the dust to settle," we lost China.

Are we going to be foolish enough now, to continue Acheson's leadership of holding a line in a war of attrition while the Reds build up the striking potential to destroy us?

Mr. Speaker, I want to go on record as warning that the present drift of things in Korea could lead to a class "A" military debacle.

The American people have a right to definite assurance that if the Red forces should strike, American boys now in Korea will survive with minimum losses. Are we justified in our present allocation of strength for Europe—where there is no war—while our forces in Korea face a possible annihilation?

Mr. Speaker, if not administration and military leaders have answers to this Korean problem, the American people are entitled to those answers, now. If they do not have the answer, the Congress itself must take a hand.

WHAT ABOUT KOREA?

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the Record.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

Mr. BENDER. Mr. Speaker, the American people are not forgetting about Korea. No matter how much the national administration tries to push the war into the background, it is still the most important single problem before our country. For the first time in American history, we appear to be engaged in a war which the Federal Government refuses to recognize.

It is fantastic to watch the way the White House is treating this tragic struggle. On every occasion when the issue has become embarrassing, Mr. Truman refuses to call the daily warfare in Korea by its right name. Instead, he insists upon using the sugar-coated phrase he invented 2 years ago, a police action. But notice this. In the Supreme Court of the United States last week, our Solicitor General tried to justify the seizure of the steel industry by saying that "we are at war." He spoke the truth. We are at war, and it is time we decided on the measures necessary to bring it to a successful conclusion.

I believe that the motives governing our conduct in Korea are political, not military. They are directed by unseen factors. In my judgment, the blueprint

which would have brought this conflict to an end months ago was drafted by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. Mr. Truman and his State Department do not choose to follow this program because it came from MacArthur. No military leader has offered any alternative to the MacArthur plan of action which promises victory to the U. N. What has been presented to us is a strategy of delay. It is not a blueprint for victory. It is a reduction of American arms from our tradition of valor to the ignominy of stalemate.

There is no doubt of our incredible predicament in Korea. Here we are, the strongest nation in the history of mankind, pinned down on the field of battle by a nation which has never been able to unite in its own defense. The country which was the arsenal of freedom in World War II finds itself frustrated by a lack of adequate planes, munitions, and material. America, never defeated in any war, is being hamstrung by petty bickering in a tent. This is the sorriest spectacle in our history. We have been made fools of on the biggest stage in all the world, and we do not like it.

I do not for a moment suggest that our national vanity should determine our policy in Korea. But I do believe that the 125,000 American casualties—dead, wounded, and sick—must determine our policy. Our prisoners who will ultimately be returned and our missing who will never return are more important than any other concern. Their sacrifice must not be made in vain. Yet every sign points to the most shocking of all sacrifices—those that achieve nothing.

Have we stopped communism? Have we checked its advance in the Far East? Have we succeeded in our objective in Korea? Or have we fallen into a trap designed to pin us down in one area while Communist gains were being consolidated throughout China and central Europe?

The war in Korea is being fought under U. N. banners, but it is being fought by American soldiers, sailors, and aviators. Our allies are making a token contribution, but the decisions are being made every day in Washington. They are not being made in Tokyo or on the battlefields of Korea, and the result is clear. American prestige is being destroyed throughout the Far East, not U. N. prestige. American influence in the councils of the world is undermined, not the influence of the United Nations.

Is it not time for decisive action? We have been engaged in a bloody war for almost 2 years. The only positive formula ever suggested to the American people for bringing this war to an end has been ruthlessly ignored.

We have fallen back into a habit which we should long ago have abandoned—the habit of too little and too late.

This time, there can be no excuse for the performance. Our President took personal responsibility for the use of American troops. He has never asked Congress to this day for a declaration of war on North Korea or on China.

I say that it is high time for Uncle Sam to demand a bill of particulars. We ought to know what is going on inside Korea. We ought to know what the men in the White House and our State

Department propose to do. We ought to know if they intend to perpetuate this stalemate or fight the war to a decision.

If the Korean war is being fought only to prop up the American economy, to keep the Nation in a state of tension, to influence the outcome of the coming national elections, we ought to know that.

Our people believe in responsible action, intelligently planned and boldly carried into execution. American military commanders must share the feeling of frustration and shame at the conduct of the war in Korea. I challenge the administration to take us into its confidence and put its cards on the table. Let us fight the way we must fight to win. Or if we cannot win, let us stop the useless waste of American lives and serve notice on the U. N. that it must build an honest international force to preserve world peace instead of relying on us to do the dirty work.

I have spoken plainly and clearly. It is time to ask the Democrats in Washington to do the same.

The SPEAKER. Under the previous order of the House, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. PHILBIN] is recognized for 30 minutes.

POLAND AND HUMAN LIBERTY

Mr. PHILBIN. Mr. Speaker, it has been my custom since I have been a Member of this body on the anniversary of Poland's Constitution Day to join other Members of the House in commemorating that great event in world history.

I think that Poland's Constitution Day has new significance this year, because already there are signs that the indomitable Polish people and other people similarly oppressed in Western Europe and in other parts of the world are at last, after many years of persecution and suffering, prepared to move in order to throw off the shackles that so cruelly bind them.

There is another reason this year why those of us dedicated to democratic principles of self-determination and justice should make special efforts to keep the great issues of human freedom alive in diplomatic and political circles and that is the current investigation of the outrageous massacre at Katyn.

Since this frightful mass slaughter occurred the world was led to believe that the Germans were responsible for it. Even the publicity agencies of our own Government, such as OWI and the Voice of America, either by their silence or by implication, have given the impression that the Germans perpetrated this horrible and indescribable blood bath. It is interesting for me to note that even though the OWI and later the Voice of America had, or should have had, access to the facts of this cold-blooded slaughter of 15,000 loyal Polish officers, who were massacred on Soviet soil in the spring of 1940, the evidence unhappily shows that these agencies apparently accepted the Russian version of the horrible incident, namely, that it had been perpetrated by the Germans.

All the more distressing is that after the war, when a large number of undeniable facts became available indicating

that it was not the Germans, but the Russians, who massacred the Poles, the Voice of America kept silent. This silence was all the more difficult to understand in the light of the fact that that agency had available to it complete evidence in the Katyn case as assembled by a well-known writer for the New York Herald Tribune. Not only did the Voice of America fail to publish or broadcast this evidence, but it failed to protect the efforts of public-spirited citizens and good American patriots, some of them former high officials of the Government, to try to bring out the facts. Despite the fact that there was intense interest in it all over Europe, where front-page feature stories appeared in the European press concerning the incident, our own foreign publicity and propaganda agencies were as silent as the tomb.

Are we to assume, according to the views of the writer mentioned above, that the Voice therefore decided to play down Katyn because it would create too much hatred against Stalin among the Poles. It is indeed appropriate to ask, as he has, whether anyone connected with this Government desires to create love for Stalin among the Poles at the American taxpayer's expense.

Moreover, it should be noted that the Voice censored the speech of Count Joseph Czapski, one of the few survivors of Katyn, when he was permitted to address the Polish people through the facilities of the Voice. He was not permitted to mention the mere word of Katyn. I am at a complete loss to understand such a policy. Why was it pursued?

If we are interested in helping the Polish people to liberate themselves from oppression, why was the truth about Katyn suppressed for more than 8 years? Why did the officials of this Government consider it proper to tell the truth about Katyn in May 1951 when the same truth was unfit to be produced in 1949 and 1950, not to speak of the years before that?

Now that a House committee, under the leadership of our esteemed colleague from Indiana [Mr. MADDEN] is currently investigating all aspects of the Katyn massacre, we may at least expect to get the full truth as it is available from witnesses and documentary evidence.

In order to document the foregoing remarks that I have made in behalf of Poland and especially my references to Katyn, I desire to set forth in the RECORD a portion of an article entitled "The OWI and the Voice of America," by Julius Epstein, experienced foreign correspondent, former language editor of the OWI and a well-known newspaperman.

It is very difficult for me to understand the tenderness found in many high places for the welfare of persons who are the known enemies of this Nation and its institutions.

We are engaged in a war, call it a police action if you will, but it is one of the bloodiest wars in American history. What is happening in Korea is only a Sunday School picnic compared to what can happen elsewhere if patent instigation from the Kremlin succeeds. The world is aflame. Insurrection and revo-

lution are raging throughout the world through conspiracy and base plots, in which traitorous Americans in this Nation have played a part.

Much of Asia has fallen into the hands of Marxist Communists, who are not only stealing away the liberties of the Chinese and other peoples of Asia, but actually planning and plotting to steal away, destroy, cancel, and nullify for all time the liberties of the American people. They say: "Be patient. If you say too much you are likely to precipitate a war; if you do too much you are likely to bring this Nation into another holocaust."

Personally, I want to say that the American people are not only outraged by such talk but disgusted to think that any American opinion or leadership would follow such a spineless, cowardly course when the clear interests, safety, and welfare of the Nation are at stake, as they are from this great active world conspiracy seething with anti-American sentiment, with anti-American designs and with every purpose of conquering this Nation and subjugating it to the will of world communism.

Let us be Americans, whatever we are, and let us not be afraid to stand on our feet and proclaim our rights and uphold our liberties, protect our interests, and maintain and assert our belief in the philosophical, ethical and moral validity of human freedom throughout the world.

The Polish outrage at Katyn and the rest are just incidents. There are even worse, more dastardly and more dangerous events taking place in the world of which we must take immediate note. Time is on the side of those conspiring for our overthrow. Will we wait until they have strengthened themselves so that they can defeat us? Will we wait until they have implemented the atomic bomb and other horrible modern weapons of destruction to accomplish our undoing and destruction?

Whatever the consequences be, let us face these issues now. If it is necessary, mobilize this country morally, physically, and economically without further delay. Eliminate the confusion among our people. Give direct, affirmative leadership to the aspirations and desires of our people to retain their freedom. Mobilize our strength and be ready to check this great enemy as we can do if we harness ourselves to the task. Let the enemy know that we are indeed in earnest about protecting our heritage and our liberties. Away with all these smooth-talking conspirators fostering cowardice and weakness. The time has come to defend our country and the truths that underlie it. If we do not act soon, believe me, it will be too late.

At this time, therefore, once again I hail and salute the indomitable Polish people, who, perhaps more than any other, symbolizes the issue of freedom versus slavery. They still fight courageously for liberation from serfdom, for the return of their freedoms. Let us send them the encouraging word that they are not forgotten or forsaken—that this Nation still believes in their right to be free and will do its best to help them achieve that great aim.

On the thirteenth anniversary of the iniquitous and infamous attack on gal-

lant little Poland, it is appropriate that all true Americans should pause once again to pay tribute to the valor, gallantry, and indomitable will of the Polish people. It is an occasion also for all of us to rededicate our purpose with moving and more vigorous determination to the campaign for the liberation of Poland and the other small, helpless nations that have been dragged in behind the iron curtain by a combination of bestial violence, unconscionable diplomacy, and subversive infiltration.

We should not delude ourselves about this situation. We should not indulge in sanctimonious feelings of satisfaction with the unwise, unsound, unjust diplomatic settlements in which we had an unfortunate part and which led to the infamous, unconscionable result of the suppression and domination of the God-fearing, liberty-loving, peace-seeking Polish people and other democratic-minded Christian peoples under the ruthless heel of the Soviet Union.

Let us not deceive ourselves or the American people. If these mistakes were made in a spirit of compromise that has since been received with such cynical ingratitude and which has been fraught with such deep anguish and suffering for millions of democratic peoples, let us admit the errors of our ways and move to correct and ameliorate them.

In my opinion, this can be done in only one way and that is the way which I have alluded to on many past occasions in this House, namely, the immediate, forthright, and complete renunciation of the agreements bartering the liberties of small nations entered into at Yalta and Tehran and confirmed at Potsdam but never ratified by the United States Senate according to law.

If we choose to pursue a policy of honor, decency, and justice we are in conscience bound to notify the Soviet Union and the United Nations of our intention to renounce and repeal these agreements. By this means, the way will be paved for the opening of the iron doors which now confine so many of the helpless, innocent struggling peoples of central Europe in the suffocating atmosphere of Soviet control.

As I have stated so many times, there can be no compromise on these great human questions of the destiny of free peoples. It is a grotesque and cynical exhibition, contradictory and incredible, that our own great Nation, which has contributed so much to the building of democracy here and abroad, should be an instrument and the means of perpetuating the ruthless oppression of billions of helpless people by the Godless and brutal forces of organized Marxism and world communism. If we mean to be true to our heritage of freedom, of truth, of democracy, of justice, of the most elementary principles of representative government, of international fair dealing, we must without delay, not only unequivocally declare ourselves on these issues, but take affirmative, uncompromising action to resolve them in accordance with the just deserts and the basic rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of the millions of free-

dom-minded peoples who are entitled by every warrant and right and by many of our solemn declarations to their God-given rights to live as free men and women.

I have heard it said many times that compromise is a prerequisite of the political process. It may be true that compromise is often justified to reconcile conflicting viewpoints of various groups within our Nation and also in the international sphere. But there are some things one can never compromise. Foremost among these is the right of nations desiring to be free, the right of each individual to be free, the right of the human soul to find expression in free institutions, to achieve that measure of freedom bestowed by the Creator, the right of the lowly and the weak to be protected in their choice of life and in their desire and intention to walk humbly in the ways of the Lord seeking and enjoying the privilege that can come only from free government to order their own lives and to be liberated from the bondage and the slavery which selfish, rapacious tyrants impose upon them.

No, my fellow Americans, there can be no compromise on these great issues which mean life or death to the democratic way of life in this world. Some tremble before the thought that strong policy in behalf of the free way of life will result in war. Some are unwilling to risk the chance of war. Some believe that as Americans we can hide safely in our ivory tower if only we yield and appease and surrender everything that is necessary to satiate the lust of the Soviets for world dominion. In my opinion, such an attitude and such a policy will spell doom for America. It is craven. It is cowardly. It can lead only to further encroachments, advances, and aggressions by the Soviet Union. It will ultimately lead to the destruction of all free values in this world and, in short, the physical destruction and conquest of this great Nation.

Let us be true to our glorious heritage of freedom. This heritage was not won through fear and trembling, appeasement and cowardice. It was won through bitter sacrifices, bloodshed, and suffering by millions of people, past and present, who were willing to give everything they had—their honor, their possessions, their material resources, and their lives to protect and sustain our liberties. This heritage was won through determination, through strength, through courage, through fearlessness, and it can only be preserved and protected by the same means.

Russia is a strong, powerful nation. It has resources, it has manpower, it has military organization, it has fierce aim of world conquest, it has hostility to democracy, it has hatred of religion, it has contempt for free institutions, it has designs on our way of life, it seeks our destruction and the destruction of nations like us.

Russia would be a formidable foe. It has puppet allies coerced into its system which will be forced to fight with the forces of the Soviet Union.

But the United States of America is also a formidable foe. We are not a weak, helpless nation although some of our leaders would have our people so believe. We have strength too, we have military striking power and second to none, we have an incomparable productive machine, a free economic system that can out-produce and out-distance the whole world. We have millions of brave, fearless young men who are willing to fight for our country if need be and willing to defend it against all peril. We have some allies, we hope, in the free world.

In the face of these terrible dangers, instead of talking about our weakness and the fear and horror of atomic attack and the power of our potential adversaries, let us talk about our own strength, let us dwell upon the powerful forces we can marshal, the power we can mobilize, the terrific attacks we are capable of making from the air upon any nation that dares to commit an aggression against us or against the free world essential to our security. It is a time for American leadership of strength, of positivism, of unflinching courage, and I hope that on this day devoted to the Polish cause we will rally to the call of country against the dangers of the moment by reaffirming our determination, to face up boldly to these dangers and to develop and organize our resources and fighting power in such ways that we can back up and support our demands for freedom in this Nation and throughout the world.

Poland is an incident in this great struggle between communism and democracy, but it is an important keystone of policy because it marks a situation which we, in part, brought about, a surrender of democratic values and democratic sovereignty which must be corrected if the ideals we profess are to enjoy the respect and confidence of other nations.

Let us pursue these three steps: First, an immediate demand for the liberation of Poland and other small helpless nations that were assigned to the Soviets by agreement or taken by force or infiltration; second, demand on the United Nations that appropriate measures be taken to implement these objectives; third, the continuance of building and mobilizing of a tremendous armed strength and force to meet any possible eventuality that may arise from aggression or the threat of aggressions against our Nation or in the free world; fourth, an uncompromising stand for the recognition of freedom by the Soviets.

Americans should realize that regardless of what the appeasers may tell us that if it were not for the fact that Soviet leaders well know and are so deeply impressed with our present power of retaliation, our present ability to execute swift, smashing atomic attacks from the air, that our own Nation should already have been attacked. Let us sound the American clarion call for freedom, security, and peace.

KATYN AND THE VOICE OF AMERICA
(Excerpts from article by Mr. Julius Epstein)

I do not know of any other case which shows so clearly that the policies of the

Voice of America have sometimes exactly the same effect as if they had been designed and carried out by a well-paid Soviet agent than the way the Voice treated Stalin's cold-blooded murder of 15,000 Polish officers who were massacred on Soviet soil in the spring of 1940. As I already mentioned, the OWI accepted Stalin's big lies on Katyn (that the Germans had murdered the Polish officers) at face value and disseminated those lies all over the world. When, after the war, a large amount of irrefutable evidence became available, evidence to the effect, that not the Germans but Stalin's own NKVD had massacred the Poles, in order to get rid of the most valuable future anti-Stalinists in Poland, the Voice of America kept silent. To make sure that this silence was not accidental, I offered on February 10, 1949, the complete evidence in the Katyn case to the Voice. After 10 weeks of waiting for an answer, I got it on April 20, 1949. The answer was very brief, indeed, just one sentence. It read: "We have decided against making use of the material at this time." The letter was signed by Charles W. Thayer. No reasons whatsoever were given, no explanations advanced why the Voice did not want to avail itself of the tremendous material gathered in a long and thorough research.

When I published in July 1949 a series of articles on Katyn in the New York Herald Tribune, containing new evidence of the Soviet guilt, the Voice kept silent although it daily broadcast press surveys.

When on September 17, 1949, the New Leader carried my article "Murder at Katyn" in a special section, the Voice kept its silence.

When, as a result of those publications, the American Committee for the Investigation of the Katyn Massacre, Inc., was formed under the presidency of Arthur Bliss Lane, former American Ambassador to Poland, and under the vice presidencies of Max Eastman and Dorothy Thompson, the Voice kept silent besides briefly mentioning the fact of the formation of the committee. It neither broadcast Mr. Lane's speech at the inaugural press conference of the American Katyn Committee nor his letter to Vishinsky by which Mr. Lane invited the Soviet Foreign Minister to appear before the committee and to tell the truth about Katyn. (The formation of the Katyn committee as well as Mr. Lane's speech and letter to Vishinsky were front-page features in the European press as well as in many American newspapers.)

When I inquired with my friends at the Voice's foreign language units, why the Voice was still engaged in a rather total conspiracy of silence as far as Stalin's crime at Katyn was concerned, the answer was: "We did not get the green light from Washington."

When I went to the high officials in the New York and Washington offices of the Voice to find the puzzle's solution, the almost identical answer I got ran like that: "We are playing down Katyn, because it would create too much hatred against Stalin among the Poles." When I asked the gentlemen whether they want to create love for Stalin among the Poles at the American taxpayers' expense, there was no answer at all.

When Count Joseph Czapski, one of the very few survivors of the Soviet massacre of Polish officers arrived in this country, he was cordially invited by the Voice of America to address the Polish people.

I had lunch with Count Czapski the very same day he had submitted the script of his speech to the Voice's Polish desk in New York. I shall never forget Count Czapski's rage when he told me that the Voice crossed out any reference to Katyn and did not even allow him to mention the mere word of Katyn. Thus, he was not able to deal with this greatest crime in military history as he intended to do.

The reader will now understand the question: If Stalin had a powerful paid agent in the Voice of America, could he have done better than those gentlemen who so successfully suppressed the substantial truth about Katyn? The answer, of course, is: No, he could not have done a better job. All that happened at a time when President Truman, General Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and many other American leaders categorically called for a "Truth Campaign" and the Voice was supposed to deliver the "T-Bomb."

It was not before May 1951 that the Voice reversed its policy with regard to Katyn. However gratifying that change of policy was, it did not answer the question why our Government's propaganda agency so obstinately suppressed the truth about Katyn for more than 8 years. Why did the officials of the Voice consider it opportune to broadcast the truth about Katyn in May 1951, when the same truth was unfit to be broadcast in 1950 and 1949, not to speak of the years before that time?

SPECIAL ORDER GRANTED

Mr. MEADER asked and was given permission to address the House for 30 minutes on Tuesday next following any special orders heretofore entered.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to extend remarks in the Appendix of the RECORD, or to revise and extend remarks, was granted to:

Mr. KEARNEY.

Mr. BUTLER and to include a copy of a resolution.

Mr. LANE in four instances and to include editorials and extraneous matter.

Mr. VINSON and to include a very able address made by the Honorable HOWARD W. SMITH, of Virginia, when he accepted the Democratic nomination to the Eighty-third Congress from the Eighth Congressional District of Virginia.

Mr. SMITH of Mississippi in four instances, in one to include an address by Gov. James F. Byrnes, of South Carolina.

Mr. SECREST.

Mr. PRICE in two instances and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. WOOD of Idaho in three instances.

Mr. AUCHINCLOSS and to include a citation.

Mr. POLK and to include an American Legion essay by Mr. Jim Blair, of the Wheelersburg (Ohio) High School.

Mr. MILLER of New York (at the request of Mr. ARENDS) in three instances and to include editorials.

Mr. VAN ZANDT (at the request of Mr. ARENDS) and to include an editorial.

Mr. RIEHLMAN (at the request of Mr. ARENDS).

Mr. FULTON (at the request of Mr. ARENDS) and to include a statement by John Foster Dulles.

Mr. MANSFIELD (at the request of Mr. PRIEST) in two instances, in one to include an editorial.

Mr. DEMPSEY and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. SIEMINSKI.

Mr. ZABLOCKI and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding it is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$231.

Mr. KLUCZYNSKI and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. PHILBIN in three instances.

Mr. BENDER.

Mr. McVEY and to include an editorial from the Daily Calumet.

Mr. HALE.

Mr. WOLVERTON and to include extraneous material.

Mr. MEADER and to include an editorial from the Monroe Evening News on lake problems.

Mr. ELSTON and to include an article from the Washington Times-Herald of May 11.

Mr. JACKSON of California and to include a sermon entitled "The Best Way To Stop Communism Here at Home."

Mr. HAGEN in two separate instances in each to include extraneous matter.

ENROLLED BILL AND JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

Mr. STANLEY, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a bill and a joint resolution of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H. R. 5715. An act to increase certain pay and allowances for members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes; and

H. J. Res. 445. Joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States to proclaim the 7-day period beginning May 18, 1952, as Olympic Week.

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled joint resolution of the Senate of the following title:

S. J. Res. 20. Joint resolution to confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, and to provide for the use and control of said lands and resources.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. STANLEY, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on this day present to the President, for his approval, a bill and a joint resolution of the House of the following titles:

H. R. 5715. An act to increase certain pay and allowances for members of the uniformed services, and for other purposes; and

H. J. Res. 445. Joint resolution authorizing the President of the United States to proclaim the 7-day period beginning May 18, 1952, as Olympic Week.

LEAVES OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. O'TOOLE (at the request of Mr. McCORMACK), for an indefinite period, on account of illness in family.

Mr. VINSON, for the week of May 18, on account of official business.

XCVIII—329

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 4 o'clock and 28 minutes p. m.) the House, under its previous order adjourned until Monday, May 19, 1952, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1438. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Commerce, transmitting certifications by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics of the cost of rehabilitation and repair of damages caused by the United States military forces at certain airports, pursuant to section 17 (b) of the Federal Airport Act, as amended; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

1439. A letter from the secretary, Federal Prison Industries, Inc., Department of Justice, transmitting the annual report of the directors of Federal Prison Industries, Inc., for the fiscal year 1951, pursuant to the act approved June 23, 1934 (18 U. S. C. 4127); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1440. A letter from the Director, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, transmitting a draft of a proposed bill entitled "A bill to revise the procedure in the district courts relating to the disposition of the wages and effects of deceased and deserting seamen, and for other purposes"; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

1441. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation entitled "A bill to authorize the Secretary of Defense to appoint Rear Adm. Morton Loomis Ring to a civilian position with the Munitions Board, upon retirement, without affecting his military status and perquisites"; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1442. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting proposed supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 1952 in the amount of \$20,000,000 for the Department of Agriculture and \$25,000,000 for the Department of Defense for civil functions, Department of the Army (H. Doc. No. 469); to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. MORRIS: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H. R. 1631. A bill to set aside certain lands in Oklahoma, formerly a part of the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, and known as the Fort Reno Military Reservation, for the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Indians of Oklahoma, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 1935). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HARRIS: Committee on the District of Columbia. S. 1342. An act to amend acts relating to garagekeepers and liverymen's liens and the enforcement thereof in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 1936). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HARRIS: Committee on the District of Columbia. S. 1822. An act to amend the act creating a juvenile court for the District of Columbia, approved March 19, 1906, as

amended; with amendment (Rept. No. 1937). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HARRIS: Committee on the District of Columbia. S. 2871. An act relating to the manner of appointment of the Recorder of Deeds of the District of Columbia, the deputy recorders, and the employees of the Office of Recorder, and for other purposes; without amendment (Rept. No. 1938). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HARRIS: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 5768. A bill to amend the act entitled "An act to regulate boxing contests and exhibitions in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes", approved December 20, 1944; with amendment (Rept. No. 1939). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HARRIS: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 6857. A bill to amend section 7a of the act entitled "An act to regulate the employment of minors within the District of Columbia", approved May 29, 1928; with amendment (Rept. No. 1940). Referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. HARRIS: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 7253. A bill to authorize the conveyance to the Columbia Hospital for Women and Lying-in Asylum of certain parcels of land in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 1942). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. RANKIN: Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H. R. 7656. A bill to provide vocational readjustment and to restore lost educational opportunities to certain persons who served in the Armed Forces on or after June 27, 1950, and prior to such date as shall be fixed by the President or the Congress; with amendment (Rept. No. 1943). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DOUGHTON: Committee on Ways and Means. H. R. 7800. A bill to amend title II of the Social Security Act to increase old-age and survivors' insurance benefits, to preserve insurance rights of permanently and totally disabled individuals, and to increase the amount of earnings permitted without loss of benefits, and for other purposes; with amendment (Rept. No. 1944). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. McMILLAN: Committee on the District of Columbia. H. R. 6943. A bill to fix the seniority rights and service of Albert O. Raeder as sergeant in the District of Columbia Fire Department; without amendment (Rept. No. 1941). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 3 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. COLMER:

H. R. 7888. A bill to amend the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 to provide for more effective evaluation of the fiscal requirements of the executive agencies of the Government of the United States; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. HAGEN:

H. R. 7889. A bill to exempt publications of religious, educational, scientific, philanthropic, agricultural, labor, veterans, and

fraternal organizations or associations from the minimum rate of postage prescribed by law for each individually addressed copy of publications entered as second-class matter; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. HARRIS:

H. R. 7890. A bill to authorize supplemental payments to the sponsors of certain projects under the Federal Airport Act, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. LANE:

H. R. 7891. A bill to prescribe policy and procedure in connection with construction contracts made by executive agencies, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MANSFIELD:

H. R. 7892. A bill to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. KING of California:

H. R. 7893. A bill to provide for improved enforcement and administration of the revenue laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BYRNES:

H. R. 7894. A bill to provide for standards to be prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture governing imported agricultural food products; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. ROSS:

H. R. 7895. A bill to authorize the issuance of 300,000 special nonquota immigration visas to certain refugees, persons of German ethnic origin, and natives of Italy, Greece, and the Netherlands, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TAYLOR:

H. R. 7896. A bill to provide for the issuance of a special postage stamp in honor of the lawyers of America and in commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the American Bar Association; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. JAVITS:

H. Con. Res. 215. Concurrent resolution to favor a policy of close cooperation between West Germany and free Europe; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ADAIR:

H. R. 7897. A bill for the relief of Leopoldo Gonzales-Garcia; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 7898. A bill for the relief of Luis De La Vega Villarruel; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ADDONIZIO:

H. R. 7899. A bill for the relief of Gaetano Gallazo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAVENNER:

H. R. 7900. A bill for the relief of Miyoko Ogura; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. O'BRIEN of Michigan:

H. R. 7901. A bill for the relief of Silverio Salvatore Conte; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WIDNALL:

H. R. 7902. A bill for the relief of Maj. John B. Titus; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HARVEY:

H. R. 7903. A bill for the relief of William B. Garner; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACKSON of California:

H. R. 7904. A bill for the relief of George W. McLarand; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H. R. 7905. A bill for the relief of Mrs. Shizuye Takahashi Kitagawa, Yooko Kitagawa, and Hiroshi Kitagawa; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

734. By Mr. HALE: Petition of North York United Baptist Association of Maine, protesting President Truman's intention to send an Ambassador to the Vatican; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

735. By Mr. SMITH of Wisconsin: Resolution adopted at the annual meeting of the Waupaca County Republican Voluntary Committee on April 29, 1952, on the death of Hon. Reid F. Murray; to the Committee on House Administration.

SENATE

MONDAY, MAY 19, 1952

(Legislative day of Monday, May 12, 1952)

The Senate met at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

The Chaplain, Rev. Frederick Brown Harris, D. D., offered the following prayer:

God of our fathers, above all the commotion and confusion of the busy present with its bewildering demands, we would turn aside now, at the beginning of another week, to seek the quietness of Thy presence. Inspired by the example of the Nation's founders, we pause at midday to lift our thoughts above all pressing cares and public concerns into the contemplation of Thy infinite calm. Since it is of Thy mercy that still another day is added to our lives, wilt Thou sanctify our work; let no unhallowed words pollute the tongues which Thou hast made to praise and bless Thee, no evil deeds defile the bodies which Thou hast taught us are the temples of Thy presence.

In these hallowed halls, where Thy servants stand to speak for the people, may they serve with fidelity the cause of our Nation and of our common humanity and so help to build on the ruined wastes of this disturbed and disordered world the city of our God. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, May 16, 1952, was dispensed with.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Snader, its assistant reading clerk, announced that the House had passed the bill (S. 677) to fix the personnel strength of the United States Marine Corps, and to establish the relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with amendments, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

The message also announced that the House had passed a bill (H. R. 7593) to amend paragraph 1774, section 201, title II, of the Tariff Act of 1930, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

On request of Mr. McFARLAND, and by unanimous consent, Mr. ANDERSON was excused from attendance on the session of the Senate today.

NOMINATION OF JAMES P. McGRANERY TO BE ATTORNEY GENERAL—MINORITY VIEWS (EX. REPT. NO. 6)

Under authority of the order of the Senate of May 9, 1952.

Mr. FERGUSON (for himself and Mr. WATKINS), members of the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted on May 17, 1952, minority views on the nomination of James P. McGranery to be Attorney General, which were ordered to be printed.

NOTICE OF NIGHT SESSIONS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I wish to give notice that there will be a night session tonight. It could be prevented only by a manifestation of less talking and more voting. So unless there are some signs of voting this afternoon, there will certainly be a session tonight, and probably a session every night this week, in order that there may be an early disposition of the pending bill.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. McFARLAND. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wish to cooperate with the majority leader in getting a vote today. I think he is absolutely correct in what he has said. There should have been a vote on Friday. I should be delighted to have one today. If we could have a vote at 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock, or at any other hour, it would be excellent. The sooner we vote the better off we will all be.

Mr. McFARLAND. I agree with the Senator from Minnesota.

TRANSACTION OF ROUTINE BUSINESS

Mr. McFARLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senators may be permitted to transact routine business, without debate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PETITION

Mr. SALTONSTALL (for himself and Mr. LODGE) presented resolutions of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which were referred to the Committee on Finance, and, under the rule, ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Resolutions urging the Congress of the United States to enact H. R. 6437, making possible aid to Massachusetts in cases of severe unemployment

Whereas the defense program and the accompanying inflation have created industrial dislocations, particularly affecting important Massachusetts industries, including textiles, leather, shoes, and clothing; and

Whereas this situation has brought about severe unemployment in various communities in Massachusetts, adversely affecting